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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff/Respondents ,
)
)
vs.
)
)
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
)
)
Defendant/Appellant.
)
_______________________________________ )

Supreme Court No.43751

RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine.
_______________________________________________________________________________
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE, DISTRICT JUDGE
_______________________________________________________________________________
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE
PO Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701

STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL APPEALS
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Attorney for Appellant
Attorney for Respondent
_______________________________________________________________________________
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User: CRYSTAL

Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County
ROA Report
Case: CR-2014-0001813 Current Judge: Robert J DRUG COURT-Elgee

Defendant: Arenas, Osvaldo Guadalupe
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas

Felony
Date
8/1/2014

Judge
New Case Filed - Felony

R. Ted Israel

Prosecutor assigned Jim Thomas

R. Ted Israel

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 08/01/2014 01:30 PM)

R. Ted Israel

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 08/01/2014 01:30 PM:
Hearing Held

R. Ted Israel

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 08/01/2014 01:30 PM:
Court Minutes

R. Ted Israel

Order Appointing Public Defender

R. Ted Israel

Defendant: Guadalupe-Arenas, Osvaldo Order Appointing Public Defender R. Ted Israel
Public defender Andrew Parnes
Order Setting Preliminary Hearing and Bond

R. Ted Israel

Application For Appointment Of Attorney/granted
R. Ted Israel
Document sealed
A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (I37-2734A(1) Drug Paraphernalia-Use R. Ted Israel
or Possess With Intent to Use)
A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (I49-301 Drivers License or Commercial R. Ted Israel
Drivers License Violation)
BOND SET: at 5,000.00

R. Ted Israel

Criminal Complaint

R. Ted Israel

Affidavit Of Probable Cause

R. Ted Israel

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 08/12/2014 03:00 PM)

Daniel Dolan

Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 5000.00 )

R. Ted Israel

Notice Of Appearance

R. Ted Israel

Defendants Request For Discovery

R. Ted Israel

8/7/2014

Waiver of Time for Preliminary Hearing

R. Ted Israel

8/11/2014

State's Motion To Continue

Daniel Dolan

8/12/2014

Order Granting Continuance

Daniel Dolan

Continued (Preliminary 09/30/2014 10:30 AM)

Daniel Dolan

State's Reqt For Discovery/demand For Alibi

R. Ted Israel

State's Response To Request For Discovery

R. Ted Israel

9/18/2014

Stipulation to continue

R. Ted Israel

9/22/2014

State's first supplemental response to discovery

R. Ted Israel

9/29/2014

Order granting continuance

R. Ted Israel

Continued (Preliminary 10/08/2014 09:00 AM)

R. Ted Israel

8/4/2014
8/6/2014

8/20/2014
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County
ROA Report
Case: CR-2014-0001813 Current Judge: Robert J DRUG COURT-Elgee

Defendant: Arenas, Osvaldo Guadalupe
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas

Felony
Date

Judge
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Preliminary
Hearing date: 10/8/2014
Time: 9:01 am
Courtroom: Magistrate Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: ANDREA
Tape Number: MAG
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback

R. Ted Israel

Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 10/08/2014 09:00 AM:
Preliminary Hearing Held

R. Ted Israel

Change Assigned Judge

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 10/08/2014 09:00 AM:
Bound Over (after Prelim)

R. Ted Israel

Order binding over

R. Ted Israel

Preliminary Hearing Exhibit /Witness List

Robert J DRUG
COURT-Elgee

10/10/2014

State's First Supplemental Request For Discovery

Robert J. Elgee

10/15/2014

Information

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of District Court Arraignment

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 10/27/2014 09:00 AM)

Robert J. Elgee

10/20/2014

State's Second Supplemental Response To Discovery

Robert J. Elgee

10/27/2014

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 10/27/2014 09:00 AM:
District Court Arraignment

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 10/27/2014 09:00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Denise Schloder
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100

Robert J. Elgee

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (I37-2732(c)(1) {F} Controlled
Substance-Possession of)

Robert J. Elgee

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Arraignment
Hearing date: 10/27/2014
Time: 9:12 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Denise Schloder
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Motion for preparation of transcript of preliminary hearing at County's
expense

Robert J. Elgee

10/8/2014

Order granting Motion for preparation of transcript of preliminary hearing at Robert J. Elgee
County's expense
10/28/2014

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 12/22/2014 09:00 AM)

Robert J. Elgee
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County
ROA Report
Case: CR-2014-0001813 Current Judge: Robert J DRUG COURT-Elgee

Defendant: Arenas, Osvaldo Guadalupe
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas

Felony
Date
10/28/2014

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/07/2015 09:00 AM) 2 days

Robert J. Elgee

Notice of Trial Setting, Pretrial Conference & Order Governing Further
Proceedings

Robert J. Elgee

Motion to Suppress Evidence

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Suppress Evidence

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress 12/08/2014 10:00 AM)

Robert J. Elgee

11/13/2014

Transcript Filed (Preliminary Hearing 10/8/14)

Robert J. Elgee

12/8/2014

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to Suppress
Hearing date: 12/8/2014
Time: 10:05 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Continued (Motion to Suppress 12/15/2014 03:30 PM)

Robert J. Elgee

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100

Robert J. Elgee

Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence

Robert J. Elgee

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to Suppress
Hearing date: 12/15/2014
Time: 3:37 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

10/30/2014

12/15/2014

Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled on 12/15/2014 03:30 PM: Robert J. Elgee
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100
Exhibit/Witness List- Mot. to Suppress

Robert J. Elgee

Continued (Pretrial Conference 02/23/2015 11:00 AM) & Oral Argument

Robert J. Elgee

Continued (Jury Trial 03/10/2015 09:00 AM) 2 days

Robert J. Elgee

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

1/7/2015

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence

Robert J. Elgee

1/20/2015

State's Memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress

Robert J. Elgee

1/27/2015

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence

Robert J. Elgee

12/26/2014
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County
ROA Report
Case: CR-2014-0001813 Current Judge: Robert J DRUG COURT-Elgee

Defendant: Arenas, Osvaldo Guadalupe
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas

Felony
Date
2/23/2015

Judge
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 2/23/2015
Time: 11:16 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 02/23/2015 11:00 AM: Robert J. Elgee
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: & Oral Argument
less 100
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 03/10/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Robert J. Elgee
Vacated 2 days

2/24/2015

4/13/2015

4/14/2015
4/16/2015

Case Taken Under Advisement

Robert J. Elgee

Court Minutes

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 04/13/2015 10:00 AM) &
Status

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 4/13/2015
Time: 10:05 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Cathy Pavkov
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Cathy Pavkov
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100

Robert J. Elgee

Continued (Scheduling Conference 05/04/2015 09:30 AM) & Status

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Decision On Motion to Suppress

Robert J. Elgee

No Longer U/A

Robert J. Elgee
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County
ROA Report
Case: CR-2014-0001813 Current Judge: Robert J DRUG COURT-Elgee

Defendant: Arenas, Osvaldo Guadalupe
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas

Felony
Date
5/4/2015

Judge
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 5/4/2015
Time: 9:36 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 05/04/2015 09:30 Robert J. Elgee
AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: & Status less 100
5/5/2015

8/3/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 08/03/2015 09:00 AM)

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/25/2015 09:00 AM) 2 days

Robert J. Elgee

Notice of Trial Setting, Pretrial Conference & Order Governing Further
Proceedings

Robert J. Elgee

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 8/3/2015
Time: 9:00 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: ANDREA
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 08/03/2015 09:00 AM: Robert J. Elgee
Court Minutes
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 08/03/2015 09:00 AM: Robert J. Elgee
Hearing Held
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 08/03/2015 09:00 AM: Robert J. Elgee
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 08/25/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Robert J. Elgee
Vacated 2 days
Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea 08/24/2015 10:00 AM)

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

8/12/2015

State's motion to dismiss

Robert J. Elgee

8/18/2015

order granting motion to dismiss

Robert J. Elgee
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County
ROA Report
Case: CR-2014-0001813 Current Judge: Robert J DRUG COURT-Elgee

Defendant: Arenas, Osvaldo Guadalupe
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas

Felony
Date

Judge
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Change of Plea
Hearing date: 8/24/2015
Time: 10:00 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 08/24/2015 10:00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 11/02/2015 10:00 AM)

Robert J. Elgee

A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (I37-2732(c)(1) {F} Controlled
Substance-Possession of)

Robert J. Elgee

Written Entry of Conditional Plea

Robert J. Elgee

Order to Report

Robert J. Elgee

(PG 2 SEALED) Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered and
Notice of Sentencing

Robert J. Elgee

10/22/2015

PSI Report (electronic only)

Robert J. Elgee

11/2/2015

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Sentencing
Hearing date: 11/2/2015
Time: 10:01 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Sabrina Vasquez
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

11/3/2015

Continued (Sentencing 11/23/2015 09:30 AM)

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Sentencing
Hearing date: 11/23/2015
Time: 9:36 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas

Robert J. Elgee

8/24/2015

Document sealed

11/23/2015
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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County
ROA Report
Case: CR-2014-0001813 Current Judge: Robert J DRUG COURT-Elgee

Defendant: Arenas, Osvaldo Guadalupe
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas

Felony
Date

Judge
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 11/23/2015 09:30 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100

Robert J. Elgee

Court Accepts Guilty Plea (I37-2732(c)(1) {F} Controlled
Substance-Possession of)

Robert J. Elgee

Sentenced To Incarceration (I37-2732(c)(1) {F} Controlled
Substance-Possession of) Confinement terms: Credited time: 2 days.
Penitentiary determinate: 3 years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 2 years.

Robert J. Elgee

Probation Ordered (I37-2732(c)(1) {F} Controlled Substance-Possession
of) Probation term: 3 years. (Supervised)

Robert J. Elgee

Judgment Of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to One Felony Count,
Suspending Sentence & Order Of Supervised Probation

Robert J. Elgee

Order to Report

Robert J. Elgee

Judgment

Robert J. Elgee

Order of Acceptance into Drug Court Program

Robert J. Elgee

Addendum to Felony Probation re: Drug Court

Robert J. Elgee

Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 5,000.00)

Robert J. Elgee

Change Assigned Judge

Robert J DRUG
COURT-Elgee

Notice Of Appeal

Robert J DRUG
COURT-Elgee

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Robert J DRUG
COURT-Elgee

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Robert J DRUG
COURT-Elgee

12/1/2015

Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender

Robert J. Elgee

12/2/2015

Order for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender

Robert J. Elgee

12/30/2015

Notice of Transcript on Appeal Lodged

Robert J. Elgee

11/23/2015

11/24/2015

11/25/2015
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OR IGINAL
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

FILED :-~--.,...._.
AUG - 1 2014
J afyrm Drage, /.., ,, District
Court !3tsine Ccunty. lrJaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
Case No. CR-2014- ) ~

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

I3

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Matthew Fredback, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, who hereby
submits the following criminal complaint based upon the sworn affidavit of Manuel
Ornelas, a duly appointed peace officer, and charges the defendant with the following
criminal offenses:
COUNT ONE
That the Defendant, OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS, on or about the 31st day
of July, 2014, in the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled
substance, to-wit:
Substance,

in

Methamphetamine and/or Amphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled

violation of Idaho

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,

Code § 37-2732(c)(1 ),

POSSESSION

OF A

METHAMPHETAMINE AND/OR AMPHETAMINE, a

FELONY.

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT- Page 1
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COUNT TWO
That the Defendant, OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS, on or about the 31st day
of July, 2014, in the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess with the intent
to use drug paraphernalia, to-wit: a glass pipe used to ingest and/or inhale or otherwise
introduce into the human body a controlled substance, in violation of Idaho Code § 372734A, POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a MISDEMEANOR.

COUNT THREE
That the Defendant, OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS, on or about the 31st day
of July, 2014, in the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did operate a motor vehicle, to-wit: a
2000 Ford Explorer, at or about State Highway 75 and Countryside Blvd, without a valid
driver's license, in violation of Idaho Code§ 49-301, DRIVING WITHOUT OBTAINING A
DRIVER'S LICENSE, a MISDEMEANOR.

All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
Wherefore, Plaintiff State of Idaho prays that the defendant be brought before the
Court and dealt with according to law.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Subscribed and sworn to before me this_\,__ day of August, 2014.

Magistrate

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
\
day of August, 2014, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333

_ y s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
. / Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
_
Telecopy

Deput'(~

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT - Page 3
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Departmental Report# HPD2014-00586
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRIC·d4~,a..:.t,1,tr,- - - - - - ,
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BL,""'" '"'"'·.JI

....------

AUG - 1 2014

THE STATE OF IDAHO, ·
Plaintiff,

COURTCASENUMBER ~~~~~
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF ARREST

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Defendant.
DOB
DL#:
State: Idaho

County of Blaine,
ss
State of Idaho

I, Sergeant Manuel Ornelas the undersigned, being first duty sworn on oath, depose and say that:
1. I run a peace officer employed by the HAILEY POLICE DEP.ARTMENT.
2. The defendant was a:rrested on 07-31-2014 at 2223
DAM [g] PM for the crime of Possession of
Controlled Substance J.C. 37-27)2( c) 1, Possession of Paraphernalia I.C. 37-2734 (A), Blaine County
Warrant, JV-2014-16

.3 . Location of Occurrence:

Countryside Blvd. and State Highway 75
CITY OF HAILEY, STATE OF IDAHO,

4. Identified the defendant as: Osvaldo "Ozzie" Arenas
0Military ID IZ!State ID Card 0Student ID Card
0Paperwork found ~Verbal ID by defendant
[:8JOther: P:rior Contacts

5. The crime was committed in my presence. ~ Yes

COUNTY OF BLAINE

0Drivers License

Ocredit Cards

D No

6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because of the following
facts: (NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed and what
you learned from someone else, identifying that person)

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AND ARREST:

Yes D No On 07-31-2014 at approximately 2223·hours, I was on vehicle patrol southbound on State Highway
75 near the Airport Tower (mile marker 115). During this time I observed a maroon 2000 Ford Explorer (Idaho
plate 5B90733) traveling in. front of me also traveling southbound. Shortly afterwards I observed the Explorer as it
crossed over the solid white line (passenger side front and rear tires) near the slow vehicle turn off without
signaling a lane change.
~

fage 1 of3
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Hai ]ey Pol ice Dept,
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The Explorer then pulled back into the southbound lane of travel and continued south on 75 where it signaled left
at the turn lane at the intersection with Countryside Boulevard and turned onto Countryside Blvd.

I activated my emergency overhead lights for the traffic stop and came to complete stop near the intersection with
Shenandoah Drive. I exited my patrol unit and walked up to the driver side window and made contact with the
driver, Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas (who I identified visually from prior contacts).

I also was aware of a valid Blaine Collllty Warrant for his arrest. Osvaldo also had a second person in the Explorer
sitting in the front passenger seat. which I identified as Luis Fernando Duran (from prior contacts and verbally). I
returned to my patrol unit and checked both of their driving statuses with Blaine County Communications (BCC).
BCC confirmed the valid warrant for Osvaldo's arrest and his driving status returned "NOT LICENSED". Luis
retumed valid and clear. During this time Officer Jeremiah Jones arrived on scene. I walked back up to the driver
side window and asked Osvaldo ifhe had a driver's license. Osvaldo replied 11 No 1'. I asked Osvaldo to step out of
his Explorer and step to the rear bumper. Osvaldo complied. At the :rear area of the Explorer I informed Osvaldo
of the valid warrant and told him he was under arrest as I grabbed his left arm and placed it behind his back.
Osvaldo was handcuffed, checked for tightness and doubled locked.

I asked Osvaldo if he had anything on him (referring to drugs or weapons). Osvaldo replied "No, in a low tone".
While placing my hand over his front left jean pocket I felt a familiar object in his pocket (due to my training and
experience) which I recognized as a glass pipe. I questioned Osvaldo on my findings to what was in his pocket
and he replied "Meth pipe". I aclmowledged his comment to the Meth Pipe and escorted him to the front bumper
of my patrol unit where I first removed the glass pipe from his pocket and noticed it had been used as
Paraphernalia with burnt white crystal like substance inside it which I identified as burnt Meth residue (also
through my training and experience).
The pipe was collected as evidence in an evidence envelope and photographed as exhibit number one. Osvaldo
was then placed into my patrol unit and I walked back up to the Explorer and asked Luis to step out of the front
passenger seat. Osvaldo had verbally agreed to release the Explorer to Luis and I was going to inventory the
·
Explorer prior to releasing it to Luis.

I also informed Luis of my recent findings on Osvaldo and told him that I would be patted him for weapons. Luis
complied and was patted down for weapons and asked to stand near the .front bumper of my patrol unit while I
inventoried the Explorer. I first observed a black I-Phone 5 box on the floor board of the driver side. I found this
to be alanning because of it being in the driver floor board area and there were no visible I-Phones in the Explorer.
I photographed the box in its location and placed it on the driver seat and opened the box. I observed a small black
baggie, a red plastic spoon, and traces of crystal like substance (identified through my training and experience as
Meth.amphetamine. I collected the black box as exhibit number two.
While Osvaldo was sitting in my patrol unit Officer Jones noticed Osvaldo was not looking at him when he asked
him if he had anything else on his person. Officer Jones had previously read Osvaldo his Miranda Rights and
Osvaldo stated he was hiding more black baggies within his waist line under his belly button. Osvaldo was asked
to step out of the patrol unit and asked how many baggies he was hiding. Osvaldo replied "Four''. I then pulled
his pants forward enough to expose the hidden baggies, two baggies contained crystal like substance inside them
for a total amount of 1.5 grams. A total of 5 were located on Osvaldo, photographed and collected as evidence and
labeled as exhibit number three.
Upon anival at the Blaine County Jail in the sally port I again patted Osvaldo down for weapons and checked his
jean pockets for personal property I located an additional black plastic baggie which I collected and photographed
as exhibit number four, While at the Hailey Police Department shortly after booking Osvaldo I "N.I.K" tested a
Eage2 of3
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small amount of the crystal like substance for Methamphetamine, and observed a presumptive positive reaction
with the required color change as instructed ..
I walked over to the front passenger side area and noticed a white I-Phone 4 box on the floor board where Luis was
sitting in, where his feet would be. I photographed the box and placed it on the front passenger seat and opened it.
Inside the box I noticed a 3 inch glass pipe with white burnt residue inside it, 1 black plastic baggie with .3 grams
of crystal like substance inside it and 4 empty black plastic baggies, and 1 empty clear plastic baggie.
The glass pipe was later collected as evidence and labeled as exhibit number five. I also collected and
photographed the I-Phone box containing the baggies both empty and with the crystal substance and labeled them
as exhibit number six.
While inventorying the Explorer I also observed a 28 ounce plastic bottle of "Gatorade" that had been also been
modified into a water bong with a red plastic straw glued into the side of it. The straw also appeared to have white
bumt residue on it similar to the glass pipes. I also photographed and collected the bottle as exhibit number seven.
Item was later disposed of at the Hailey Police Department.

I instruct~d Officer Jones at this time to detain Luis and handcuff him. Luis was placed in the back seat of Jones
patrol unit. I then walked over to Jones unit and made contact with Luis. Prior to asking Luis any questions I
asked hitn if he knew his Miranda Rights and read them to him again.
I asked Luis if he understood his rights. Luis replied "Yes". I asked Luis about the white I-Phone box on the floor
board. Luis stated to me that the box belonged to him. I asked Luis what was in the box and he replied 11 A pipe
and bags". Luis said the bags contained "Shit" I asked Luis to clarify his version of shit. Luis replied ncrystalU,
referring to·Methamphetamine.
Both subjects were then transported to the Blaine County Jail and booked in on the above stated charges.

By my signature and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I hereby
solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and associated reports and documents included
·
herein and made a part hereof is true and correct to the best o y info
Dated· 811 l'Z.tJ!t/

Subscribed and sworn to before me on
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~h Judicial District Court, State of I .
•
In and For the County of Blaine
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, Idaho 83333

FILED

r---.:~~:;:;;-

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs.

AUG O1 201~
Jolynn Drag,
.
.
6 · C le,~:
Court
District

m·

)

)
)
)
)

Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas
Hailey, ID 83333
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

DOB:
DL or SSN:

AM
PM~

---~~a,'!.!.!.ne~.c2;o~un'2!JlY~.t(dda~h~o~-

I

Case No: CR-2014-0001813
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER

The Court being fully advised as to the application of Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas, and it appearing to be a proper
case,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the:

Public Defender's Office
Andrew Parnes
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum ID 83340
(208) 726-1010

Public Defender for the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby
appointed to represent said Defendant, Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas, in all proceedings in the above-entitled
case.

The Defendant is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost of
court appointed counsel.

/t_r/_

__,_?/_(

Date: _

Judge
Copies to:
£....-Public Defender
~rosecutor -

- -Defendant
Order Appointing

-

~

~

-~~

Public Defender

~

Deputy Clerk

D0C30 10/88
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ORDER SETTING PRELIMINARY HEARING AND BOND

I

sTATE oF mAHo v.

Osva Ld.o @,

Av.e n<qs

Case No. CR-

/

/? /3

LJ -

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the matter is SET FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING at the Blaine County
Courthouse, Hailey, Idaho, as follows:

g-/;J,-14

DA TE OF PRELIMINARY HEARING:
ASSIGNED JUDGE:

[ ] Israel

[ ] Ingram

~Other:

D~

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BOND IS SET in the amount of: [ ] O.R.

A WARRANT MA y BE ISSUED FOR FAIKJ~O
\

~e-_'-·y1

~c"'l~

e)~

~~ .--

co~1A WITH TH

\ L ~'- ~

itl\j

[)

RECEIVEDBY

[. /J,......;;$
J

1. The Defendant MUST APPEAR at the time set.
3. [ ] Conditions of Release required.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
2. [ ] No Contact Order issued.

DATED:

3:tJO Prt'\..

AT

1

JUDGE

d ~ cf_~
DEFENDANT

cc:

[ ~ecuting Attorney

[~ense~ttorney

.

a./~

~

[ tr"mafne County Sheriff

,
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Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In and For the County of Blaine
)
)
)

STA TE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)

Osvaldo Guadalope Arenas
PO Box 456
Hailey, ID. 83333
Defendant.
DATE: 08/01/14 01:30 PM. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Judge:

[J.YR.

Ted Israel
[ ] Daniel Dolan
[ ] Robert J. Elgee
[] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CHARGES: PV on JV-14-16. _ _ _ _ _ __

Is

Case No: CR-2014- / f/3 t--And JV-2014-16
CRIMINAL MINUTE ENTRY

Clerk:

CD:

fY\Ct@=:

Counter:

-+/_.-'3~'1=--------

[ ] Kate Riley
[ ] Heidi Schiers
[~osa Stinnett
[] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

[~secuting Attorney: Miltt F1edbaclt-t&ffl\. ~
[+Defendant appeared:,,,._ ~ - k ~~
[ ] Defense Attorney: ~ • ~ --Ju:>
[] Interpreter: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
[]Officer: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

HEARING TYPE: Arraignment

PV: JV-2014-16, 19-2602
New Charges: I37-2734Al Possession of Para with intent to use
137- 732 Other Dru - Possession

/r:) 7 ~ I fJS k
JVi.A, JI/ IC
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THE FACE OF THIS DOCUMENT HAS A COLORED SECURITY BACKGROUND AND MICRO PRINTIN G - THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS DOCUMENT HAS A WATERMARK
THIS DOCUMENT IS VOID IF THE PINK HEAT SENSITIVE INK BOX IN THE LOWER RIGHT HAND CORNER DOES NOT DISAPPEAR WHEN RUBBED WITH WARM HANDS

POWER AMOUNT VOID IF NOT EXECUTED BY:
•''-'"" • I
$5,000

POWER OF ATTORNEY

American Surety Company

C, - - . "' ._;

SEP.25.2014
~
~ ~
r
n- •

P.O. Box 68932, Indianapolis, IN 46268

n,

ASS

972155

·
l't • s!! ~

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: that AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY, a corporation duly authorized and existing under the laws of the State
of Indiana, does constitute and appoint the below named agent its true and lawful Attorney-in-Fact for it and in its nam~ p c~ fnd
ecute, and
deliver for and on its behalf, as surety, a bail bond only.
Authority of such Attorney-in-Fact is limited to appearance bonds. No authority is provided herein for the execution of surety immigratio bo ds or to
ran
alimony payments, fines, wage law claims or other payments of any kind on behalf of below named defendant. The named agent is appointed only to execute the bond consistent with the
terms of this power of attorney. The agent is not authorized to act as agent for receipt of service of process in any criminal or civil action.
This power is void if altered or erased or used in any combination with other powers of attorney of this company or any other company to obtain the release of the defendant
named below or to satisfy any bond requirement in excess of the stated face amount of this power. This power can only be used once. No authority is provided to a copy or
facsimile of this power of attorney without the prior written consent of American Surety Company. The obligation of the company shall not exceed the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND ($5,000.00) DOLLARS

and provided this Power-Of-Attorney is filed with the bond and retained as a part of the court records. The said Attorney-In-Fact is hereby authorized to
insert in this Power-Of-Attorney the name of the person on whose behalf this bond was given.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY has caused these presents to be signed by its duly authorized officer, proper for the
purpose and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed this
day of
:x::J\
,20~.

h

Bond Amount$
Defendant:

c;Q{X) -

()SVO-. \6{)

Appearance Date

~'\e.V'):::<'.:)

Court __:...=....,.""r-¥--~_..............__ _ _ _ Case#

<c)/\?./\ ~
AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY

C'\2.\\..\ - \~\:.;>
33.3,.55>

___,.,~~-$~Zip

President
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ASC-98

FILED~.-~~
BLAINE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

ALG -f2D14

Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
BAIL BOND RECEIPT/AR#: 29905
Court Blaine County, Ida!}!?_
BOND PAID BY: FREEDOM BAIL BONDS ADDRESS: P.O. BOX 3036 HAILEY ID 83333
Name of Person being bonded out: ARENAS, OSVALDO GUADALOPE
Charges against above person: 37-2734A1 POSS OF PARAPHERNALIA/37-2732 POSS OF DRUGS
Warrant#:
Amount of bond: $5,000.00
[8J Surety
D Money Order
HOW PAID:
D OR'd
D Cash
D Check
D Other
BOND ACCEPTED BY: 260 DATE ACCEPTED: 8/1/2014

STATE OF IDAHO,

}
Plaintiff, }
vs.
}
BAIL BOND DEPOSIT
}
ARENAS, OSVALDO GUADALOPE , }
Defendant. }
I the undersigned, tender herewith the sum of $5,000.00 Represented by
D OR'd
D Cash
D Check
D Money Order
[8J Surety
D Other
the same to be used as bail bond for the above name defendant.
In the event said defendant is found guilty of the charge for which this bond is
posted, then this bond or so much thereof as is necessary, may be used to pay the fine imposed for such
violation, but in the event said bond is exonerated, e same shall be repaid to: SAME AS ABOVE whose
address is:

ADVISEMENT OF CONDITIONAL RELEASE AND APPEARANCE DATE
I understand that in the event I am released on bond or on my own recognizance and promise to appear that I
will be required to appear in the Magistrate Court in Blaine County, Hailey, Idaho or at the following location:

on the 12th day of AUGUST, 2014

, at

. (or 3:00 Oa.m./[8:Jp.m.).

[8:1 TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ATTORNEY AND/OR COURT FOR FUTURE APPEARANCE DATE.
I also understand that in the event that I fail to appear at the aforementioned time, my bail can be forfeited
and I can be re-arrested and charged with the offense of Bail Jumping, as that offense is defined by I.C. 187401:
A person set at liberty by Court Order with or without bail, upon condition that he will
subsequently appear at a specific time and place, commits a misdemeanor if, without lawful
excuse, he fails to appear at that time and place. The offense constitutes a felony where the
required appearance was to answer to a charge, and the charge of felony, or for disposition of
any such charge, and the actor to flight or went into hiding to avoid apprehension, trial or
punishment. This section does not apply to obligations to appear incident to release under
suspended sentence or on probation or parole.

l /J/1

'::r~~S:) 1~ { 2 0

SIGNATURE:

{J~i,6,i.a·Hours

I HEREBY ORDER that the release of all persons arrested in Blaine County is conditioned upon the proper
execution of the above acknowledgment and appearance at all hearings scheduled in this matter.
DATED APPROVED: July 27, 2004

Signature on file
Robert James Elgee, District Judge
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AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY

FREEDOM BAIL BONDS LLC

P. 0. Box 68932
Indianapolis, Indiana 46268

P.O. Box 3036
Hailey, lpaho 83333
PH: 208-788-3000
FAX 208-788-3020

APPEARANCE 801\D
IN

COURT, STATE OF IDAHO

\:-::\0,_~\~Q:\e_
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF

Y.:)\c,\ "'-.D

~

vs.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, (J".:2\/ a..\sx=> ~'\C. .X'\.C(')
as principal
and AMERICAN SURETI' COMPANY, as surety are held and firmly bound unto the Governor of the
State of Idaho, and his successors in office, the said CY=:::},/ a, \oQ A"'C"e'..:Y-)C\S
Principal, in the sum of
\J-...Q..
~DlJ::o,J'\c\
Dollars,
and the said AMERICAN SUREIT COMPANY in the sum of
~ 5000
Dollars#
for the payment whereof well and truly to be made we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators,
successors and assigns, jointly and severally firmly by these presents.

D

The condition of this bond is such that the above-named defendant shall personally appear in the above
\~~
, 20_Jg_, at ·~'. 00
o'clock p
M.,
Court on ~
to answer tothe' charge of 'Qc;E:6 of ~ o .CO, ~ (£) \X7SS t>:f (\ Qrl· St 2P·
,
and to do and receive what shall be by said Court then
there enjoined upon him, and shall not depart
the said Court without leave, and meanwhile shall be of good behavior toward all people of the State of
Idaho then this obligation shall be void, otherwise in full force and effect, but not to extend beyond the time
of the verdict of the jury, or a plea of guilty by the defendant, except will at all times hold himself amenable
to the orders and process of the court, and if convicted, will appear for judgment and render himself in
execution thereof, or if he fails to perform either of these conditions, that we will pay to the people of the
State ofldaho the sum of
f1> '::Xl:;o·
Dollars.

an

Taken before and approved by me:
Principal

Melissa Roemer
Agent

American Surety Company (L.S.)

\..! 0 ~ ~OQh. Qr'

(L.S.)

Attorney-In-Fact

THIS BOND NOT VALID UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDIVIDUALLY NUMBERED
POWER OF ATIORNEY PROPERLY EXECUTED.

ASC-92
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AUG/ 06/ 201 4/ WED 04 :48 PM

P. 002/ 007

FA X No . 208 726 1187

Andrew Parnes

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

AUG - 6 2014
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court B~oun Idaho

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813

)
)

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)

Andrew Parnes hereby enters his appearance as attorney of record for
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS, defendant, in the above entitled matter.
DATED this 61h day of August, 2014.

ewPames
Attorney at Law

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

Page 1
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AUG/ 06/ 2014/ WED 04 : 48 PM

P,ndrew Parnes

FAX No.208 726 1187

P. 003/ 007

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Emily Dion, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine, Idaho; I
am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is
671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on August 6, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner noted:

Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine Connty Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333
_ _ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.
_ _ By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office of the attorney in Hailey,
Idaho.
~ By sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:

788-5554.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

Page 2
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11,ndrew Parnes

FAX No. 208 726 1187

.

P. 004/ 007

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83 340
Telephone: (208) 726~1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

AUG - 6 2014
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun Idaho

Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CR-2014-1813
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

)
)
)
)

Jim J. Thomas, County Prosecuting Attorney:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pmsuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho

Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of the following information,
evidence, and materials:
1. Any and all ,vritten or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies
thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the State, the existence of which is
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

Page 1
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AUG / 06/ 2014/ WED 04: 48 PM

P,ndr ew Parnes

FAX No. 208 726 1187

P. 005/ 007

known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence; and
also the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant whether before or after
arrest to a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, or his agent.
2. Any and all written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the substance

of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant, whether before or after arrest, in
response to interrogation; or by any person known by the co-defendant, whether before or
after arrest, in response to interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a

peace officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney.
3. A copy of the defendant's prior criminal record, if any, as is or may become
available to the prosecuting attorney.
4. Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, or copies or

portions thereof, which are in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting
attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense, or intended for use by
the prosecution as evidence at trial, or obtained from or belonging to the defendant.
5. The names and addresses of all persons having knowledge or relevant facts who
may be called by the State as witnesses at the trial, together with any record or prior
felony convictions of any such persons which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting
attorney. Copies of statements made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective
prosecution witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or his agents or to any official involved
in the investigatory process of the case unless a protective order is issued as provided in

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

Page 2
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AUG/ 06/ 2014/ WED 04 :48 PM

Andr ew Parnes

FAX No. 208 726 1187

P. 006/ 007

Rule 16(k).
6. Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests
or experiments, made in connection with the case, including any breathalizer or other
blood alcohol level analysis, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control
of the prosecuting attorney.
7. Any reports and memoranda, in the prosecuting attorney's possession which

were made by a police officer or investigator in connection with the arrest, investigation,

or prosecution of this case.
DATED this

6th

day of August, 2014.

DEFENDANT' S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

Page 3
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,ll,ndr ew Parnes

FAX No. 208 726 l !87

P. 007/ 007

.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Emily Dion, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine, Idaho; I
am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is

671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on August 6, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner noted:
Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333

_ _ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

_ _ By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office-of the attorney in Hailey,
Idaho.

¥-By

sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:
788-5554.

Emily Dion

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

Page4
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IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
IN THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

FILED
AUG - 7 2014

· wAI.vER ·oF sTAruToRv rrME. i?.dR J>RELlMINARY 'Ftk.Ji1Nc
· · · cAsE No. cR~:Jo Jv( · · ~ l~ l ·:!>.
·,. ·

JoLynn Drage, Clerk District ·
Court. 8iRine COW1!t Idaho ·

FILL IN THE BLANKS. CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX OR CIRCLE THE CORRECT RESPONSE
Comes now the Defendant,.

t'...s v N/ le; [t{~

, and hereby states as follows:

].

A.
B.

I have received a copy of the Criminal Complaint charging me with t h e ~
I understand the elements of the offense(s).

.f1vvo .ru,J

~

2.

My attorney is:
PA,-(L,r,/
representation ofrny attorney to this point in time.

3.

1 have discussed my right to a preliminary hearing with my attorney.

@fil.-/

(NO)

~

(NO)

~ I am satisfied with the
~
(NO)

~

(NO)

My attorney has discussed with me my right to have a preliminary hearing withi~ if! am incarcerated or witliin 21
days if! am not in jail.
~
(NO)

4.

I understand that ifmy preliminary hearing is not held within the time periods ~ a y be entitled to dismissal of the
charges against me.
~
(NO)

5.

I have discussed the matter with my attorney and believe it is in my best interests to waive the time period for preliminary
hearing and allow the matter to be reset outside those time periods.
(NO)

6.

7.
[ ]
I am under the influence of controlled or intoxicating substances that effect my ability to understand this waiver of
preliminary hearing.

p<(

I am not under the influence of controlled or intoxicating substances that effect my ability to understand this waiver
ofprelimmary hearing.
8.

I take the following prescribed medication:
.
This medication [ J does [ J does not effect m ability to understand this waiver of preliminary hearing.

9.

I have been forced or threatened to induce this waiver of the statutory time period.
(YES)

10.

I have been made promises in order to induce me to waive the statutory time period.
(YES)

The nature of the promise is:---------------------I understand that regardless of a11y broken promise or otherwise. once I agree to this waiv~1ot rescind it.
~
(NO)
Knowing what is contained in this document and after consulting with counsel,~ desire to waive the statutory time
l J.
period for preliminary hearing.
~
(NO)

Signed:

{1JlvJ.~nt
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788~5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554
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AUG 1 1 2014

1
j
.~.--1
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District

Court Blaine County, Idaho

t,I
r
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF,BLAINE

Case No. CR-2014-1813

STATE OF IDAHO,

STATE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE

Plaintiff,
vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho moves the Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1(a)
for its order continuing the preliminary hearing scheduled in the above-captioned case
on August 12th, 2014, until a later date at the Court's convenience. The grounds for saidl
motion are the lab results for the controlled substance will not be completed for four to
six weeks.
The undersigned attorney
contacted defense counsel and was informed that
...
defense counsel does not object to the instantmoticm.

DATEo this

)

Iv--

day of August, 2014.

STATE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J£

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of August, 2014; I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Hailey, Idaho 83333

STATE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE- Page 2

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_
9vernight Mail
____L,/'Telecopy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2014-1813

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

The Court, having considered the motion to continue filed herein;• and good·
cause appearing therefor, HEREBY ORDERS that the preliminary hearing currently .
scheduled for August 12th, 2014, at the hour of 3:00 p.m., be vacate1 and rescheduled
./L ~'~ - L,...
~ ()II
to commence on the
301A-- day of ~
,,200_,
at the hour of
/tJ:30

.t!:_.m., in the Magistrate Courtroom of the Kramer Judicial Building, 201

2nd Avenue S., Hailey, ~o.
DATED this

j;l. C

day of August, 2. . ~
.4:

~"Id'---::::::::::=....~==========---.,.-ts
Daniel Dolan
Magistrate Judge

ORDER-GRANTING CONTINUANCE - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
/'-~day of August, 2014, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by. the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Hailey, Idaho 83333

_

U.S. Mail, PostagePrepaid

___L Hand Delivered
_
_

Overnight Mail
Telecopy
/

_
_

ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE - Page 2

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208)788-5554

AUG 2 0 2014
JoL.ynn Drage, Cleric District
Court Blaine Coun Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2014-1813
STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
AND DEMAND FOR ALIBI

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

TO:

THE DEFENDANT AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD
Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16, requests for

discovery and inspection the following information, evidence and materials:
1.

All books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or

portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the defendant,
and which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at trial.
2.

All results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific

tests or experiments made in connection with this particular case, or copies thereof,
within the possession or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to
introduce in evidence at trial, or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant
intends to call at trial.
3.

The names and addresses of all witnesses the defendant intends to call at

trial.

STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY AND DEMAND FOR ALIBI - Page 1
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.,

DEMAND FOR ALIBI
Furthermore, Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.1 and
Idaho Code § 19-519, requests a written notice of intention to offer an alibi defense.
Such notice shall state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to
have been at the time of the alleged offenses and the names and addresses of the
witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi.
DATED this

Ib

day of August, 2014.
. ''\
...

;\ ..,,./'
\j:

-

-...

,,

'

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY AND DEMAND FOR ALIBI - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

;?a~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of August, 2014, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

<.,/(J.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
_
Telecopy

~

~ o n , Legal Secretary

STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY AND DEMAND FOR ALIBI - Page 3
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

Jol.ynn Drag c
.
Court Bl. · '8, '!erk District
alne Coun Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2014-1813
STATE'S RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to the Idaho Criminal Rules, submits its
response to defendant's request for discovery.
Pursuant to the State's discovery obligations under Idaho Criminal Rule 16(a),
the State is unaware of any evidence that is exculpatory upon its face relating to the
offenses charged other than that which may be included in the enclosed reports or
statements. With regard to evidence that is not exculpatory upon its face, the State
requests that the defendant submit, in writing, the defense to be asserted in this case,
so that the State may review its file to determine if any facts, evidence or witnesses may
be material to the preparation of that defense.
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b):

1.

Statements of the defendant:

STATE'S RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - Page 1
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..
•

See enclosed police reports, witness statements and other documents.

2.

Statements of the co-defendant: N/A.

3.

Defendant's prior record: See enclosed criminal history.

4.

Documents and tangible obiects:
•

All items of evidence referenced in enclosed police reports including but
not limited to the following:

•

Criminal Complaint

•

Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of Arrest of Sgt. Manuel Ornelas,
HPD

•

Hailey Police Department Initial Case Report of Sgt. Manuel Ornelas, HPD

•

Hailey Police Department Supplemental Report #1 of Officer Jeremiah
Jones, HPD

•

Booking Report

•

Fingerprint card

•

Audio CD

•

Photo CD

•

Criminal history

5.

Reports of examinations and tests: N/A.

6a.

State's witnesses:
•

Sgt. Manuel Ornelas, HPD

•

Officer Jeremiah Jones, HPD

Witnesses' statements: See enclosed police reports, witness statements

6b.

and other documents.

7.

Police reports:
•

See enclosed police reports and other documents.

Furthermore, the State hereby objects to any request for discovery by the
defendant calling for materials or information other than that specifically provided for by
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b) or other applicable rule or statute. The State reserves the
right to supplement discovery as information becomes available.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - Page 2
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In this response to request for discovery, the State has served upon the
defendant herewith, consecutive pages numbered 0001 through 0028.

Defendant is

advised to immediately contact this office if any of said pages are missing.
DATED this

J.B.__ day of August, 2014.

_

~w*~~.~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

STATE'S RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - Page 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

;;/O~y

of August, 2014, I caused to be
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

VLJ.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_
_

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

STATE'S RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - Page 4
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Jim J. Thomas. ISBN 4415
Blaine County ProsecutJng Attcmey
219 11t Avenue South, Suite 201
Halley. tdaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IOAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF'SLAINE

STATE OF !CAHO,

Case No. CR-2014-1813

Plaintiff,

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

Defendant.

Plalntlff State of Idaho and the above~eaptloned defendant by and through their
undersigned counsel, hereby stSpulate and move the Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 5.1(&) for its on::ter continuing the prellmlnary hearing acheduled In tha above.
captioned cas• on September 301t1, 2014. until Octaber

au,,. 2014.

The grounds fer said

motion are State's witness, Offloer Ornelas, Is out of town on that data.

DATED this 1 ~

day of September. 2014.

~c
Matthew FNldbaek. ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
DATED this

l~ • Y of September, 2014.

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE - Page 1
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

I

JoLynn Dra9e. /erk District
Court Blaine Coun!YiJ.<!·'!!J.r.;___,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2014-1813

Plaintiff,

STATE'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to the Idaho Criminal Rules, submits the
following

supplemental

response to defendant's request for discovery.

This

supplemental response is intended to add to and supplement the prior response of the
State, and should not be construed as limiting any prior response. The supplemental
response to discovery is as follows:
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b ): See enclosed numbered documents, if
any.
1.

Additional Statements of the defendant: See enclosed police reports,

witness statements and other documents.

2.

Additional Statements of the co-defendant: NIA.

3.

Defendant's prior record: N/A.

4.

Documents and tangible objects:

STATE'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY- Page 1
41 of 200

•

Idaho State Police Forensic Services Forensic Controlled Substance
Analysis Report of Kerry Russell, Forensic Scientist

•

Idaho State Police Drug Restitution for Laboratory Case No. M2014-2359
- $200.00

5.

Reports of examinations and tests: As above.

6a.

Additional State's witnesses:
•

Kerry Russell, Forensic Scientist

6b.

Additional Witnesses' statements: NIA.

7.

Additional Police reports:

See enclosed police reports and other

documents.
Furthermore, the State hereby renews its objection to any request for discovery
by the defendant calling for materials or information other than that specifically provided
for by Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b) or other applicable rule or statute. The State reserves
the right to further supplement discovery as information becomes available.
In this supplemental response to request for discovery, the State has served
upon the defendant herewith, consecutive pages numbered 0029 through 0030.
Defendant is advised to immediately contact this office if any of said pages are missing.
DATED this "'1- 1- day of September, 2014.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

STATE'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY- Page 2
42 of 200

.

CERTIFICATE op-RVICE

:;/;x

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of September, 2014, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, ID 83340

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ .Overnight Mail
T•elecopy

_v_T
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-2014-1813

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

The Court, having considered the motion to continue filed herein, and good
cause appearing therefor, HEREBY ORDERS that the preliminary hearing currently
scheduled for September 30th, 2014, at the hour of 1:30 p.m., be vacated and
rescheduled to commence on the 81h day of October, 2014, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.,
in the Magistrate Courtroom of the Kramer Judicial Building, 201 2nd Avenue S. , Halley,
Idaho.
DATED this

l\

day of September, 2014.

R. Ted Israel

Magistrate Judge

ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'l/'1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of September, 2014, I caused to be
a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

served

Blaine County Prosecuting
AttorneY-s Office
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

_u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
-~ -1-l
Hand

Delivered

~ Overnight Mail

_
~
_
_
_

Telecopy
.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE· Page 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Preliminary
Hearing date: 10/8/2014
Time: 9:13 am
Judge: R. Ted Israel
Courtroom: Magistrate Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Minutes Clerk: ANDREA
Tape Number: MAG
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter#
9.13

Court introduces case, Def. present with counsel, Mr. Parnes, State represented
by Mr. Fredback, case set for preliminary hearing
Counsel ready to proceed
Mr. Parnes moves to exclude witnesses, Court grants motion, witnesses are
excluded

9.13

STATE'S 1sr WITNESS, Qf{k;er Manuel Qrnelas, sworn under oath and gives
testimony under direct exam by Mr. Fred back-patrol sergeant for Hailey Police
Department, describes night of incident and driving pattern of Def.'s vehicle,
familiar with driver Osvaldo Arenas, stop was in Blaine County, Idaho
Witness identifies Def. in the courtroom, continues describing incidentidentified the passenger as Luis Duran, Def. was arrested on outstanding

COURT MINUTES 1
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·,._. ,,-.lfil

warrant, patted down Def. and felt something in his pocket
0 BJECTIO N/ OVERRULED
Witness found meth pipe in Def.'s pocket, evidence procedures, intended on
searching the vehicle and then releasing it to the passenger, describes search
and findings, describes what happened with passenger
State intends on recalling Officer Ornelas
9.26

CROSS EXAM-witness draws diagram of his location on Hwy 75, describes stop
of Def.'s vehicle, search of Def. and finding of meth pipe, describes pipe, has
video of what occurred, arrested Def., passenger had valid driver's license
Witness reviews his notes, describes what he found in the vehicle, there is audio
on the video
Nothing further, witness steps down
DEF'S EXH A. ID-Sgt. Ornelas' diagram, OFFERED, NO OBJECTION, ADMITTED

9.46

STATE'S 2ND WITNESS, Offi,er Jeremiah Jones, sworn under oath and questioned
under direct exam by Mr. Fredback-Officer employed by Hailey Police
Department, arrived on scene when Sgt. Ornelas was confirming the warrant on
Def., he was present when Def. was patted down and pipe found, Def. was placed
in his patrol vehicle
Witness identifies Def. in courtroom, describes how Def. was acting, admitted
having something in his waistband, found several black baggies, white crystal
substance in 2 of the 4 baggies, looked like meth

9.53

CROSS EXAM-describes is involvement in the stop, didn't have his audio on, gave
Miranda Rights to Def., baggies were put into evidence by Sgt. Ornelas
Nothing further, witness excused

9.59

State recalls Sgt. Manuel Ornelas-previously placed under oath, describes
finding of black baggies on Def.'s person, tested presumptive positive for meth,
describes search of Def. at the Blaine County jail and findings, evidence was sent
to Idaho State Lab, received results
STATE'S EXH 1. ID-results from Idaho State Lab, OFFERED, NO OBJECTION,
ADMITTED

COURT MINUTES 2
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Jail is located County of Blaine, Idaho
10.07

CROSS EXAM
Nothing further, witness steps down
Counsel submit case on the evidence
Court reviews EXH 1, gives findings for purposes of preliminary hearing and
finding probable cause, finds there is probable cause Def. committed crime,
binds case over to District Court for further proceedings, Def. released on bond
previously posted
Court signs Order Binding Over

10.11

Recess

COURT MINUTES 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Case No. CR-2014-1813

STATE OF IDAHO,

ORDER BINDING OVER

Plaintiff,
vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER came before the Court for a preliminary hearing on the 8th day of
October, 2014, on a complaint charging the Defendant with the felony offense of
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, METHAMPHETAMINE AND/OR
AMPHETAMINE, in violation of Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(1 ).
The Court, having considered the testimony, other evidence and argument of
counsel, finds based upon substantial evidence upon every material element of the
aforementioned charged offense, that such offense was committed and that there is
probable or sufficient cause to believe the Defendant committed such offense.
Accordingly, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 (b ), the Court hereby orders that
the Defendant be held to answer in the District Court on said felony charge and is
hereby bound over on the same to the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine.
DATED this

h

day of October, 2014.

R. Ted Israel
Magistrate Judge

ORDER BINDING OVER - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

f3

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of October, 2014, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
_
Telecopy

Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

___}(u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_
_

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Deputy Clerk

ORDER BINDING OVER - Page 2
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EXHIBIT /WITNESS LIST
Date: October 8, 2014
Hearing Type: Preliminary
Case Number: CR 2014-1813
Judge: R. Ted Israel

Clerk: Andrea Logan

State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Attorney: Matt Fredback

Attorney: Andrew Parnes

State's Witnesses

Defendant's Witnesses

1 - Sgt. Manuel Ornelas 10/8/14
2 - Officer Jeremiah Jones 10/8/14

12-

3-

3-

4-

4-

5-

5

67-

6
7

8-

8

9-

9

1011 -

10

State's Exhibits

0

A

Defendant's Exhibits

0

A

1-Results from Idaho State Lab
2
34
5
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X
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A - Sgt. Ornelas' diaoram
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Andrew Parnes
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ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

, 1I U
•.··

Jolynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Gou . /eaho

Attorney for Defendant

IN THE D1STR1CT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TIJE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

Defendant.

)

Case No. CR-2014-1813

)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT'S FIRST
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

)
)
)

TO:

Jim J. Thomas,' County Prosecuting Attorney:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pw·suant to Rule 16 of the Idaho

Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of the following information,
evidence, and materials:
1.

A copy of the video tape from Officer Ornelas' s police vehicle on July 31,
2014;
Page

DEFENDANT'S 1sT SUPPLE:MENTAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
1
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OCT;\0/2014/FRI 12:50 PM

.

Andrew Parnes

.•

2.

A copy of the video tape from the Blaine County Detention Center of the
showing the search of Defendant Arenas on July 31, 2014;

3.

Copy of any/all dispatch tapes from Blaine County related to this stop and

arrest on July 31, 2014; and
4.

A copy of the Inventory Sheet prepared by Officer Ornelas related to the
search of Defendant Arenas's car on July 31, 2014.

DATED this 10th day of October, 2014.

(fJ.<g~J?-----..
Attorney at Law

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I) Emily Dion, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine, Idaho; I
am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is
671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on October 10, 2014, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner noted:

Jim Thomas
Office of the Blame County Prosecuting Attorney

201

znd

Avenue South, Suite 100

Hailey, ID 83333

a

_ _ By depositing copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.
_ _ By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office of the attorney in Hailey,

Idaho.

'I,} By sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:
788-5554.

£;--bV~

Emily Dion

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2014-1813

Plaintiff,

INFORMATION

vs.
OSVALDO FERNANDO ARENAS,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 7, by this Information
charges the Defendant, OSVALDO FERNANDO ARENAS, with the following crimes:
COUNT ONE
That the Defendant, OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS, on or about the 31st day
of July, 2014, in the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled
substance, to-wit:
Substance,

Methamphetamine and/or Amphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled

in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1 ),

POSSESSION OF A

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, METHAMPHETAMINE AND/OR AMPHETAMINE, a
FELONY.

INFORMATION - Page 1
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COUNT TWO
That the Defendant, OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS, on or about the 31 51 day
of July, 2014, in the County of Blaine, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess with the intent
to use drug paraphernalia, to-wit: a glass pipe used to ingest and/or inhale or otherwise
introduce into the human body a controlled substance, in violation of Idaho Code § 372734A, POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a MISDEMEANOR.

All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and
provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
DATED this

/'3,

day of October, 2014.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

INFORMATION - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
/
day of October, 2014, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

INFORMATION - Page 3

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
-~vernight Mail
-:7'_ TT•elecopy
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OCT 1 5 2014
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2014-1813

Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF DISTRICT COURT
ARRAIGNMENT

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.
TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT AND THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT
Plaintiff State of Idaho gives notice pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 10(d) that an

Information has been filed against the defendant, and that this matter has been set for
arraignment on the 2ih day of October, 2014, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., before the
Honorable Robert Elgee, District Judge, in the District Court Courtroom of the Kramer
Judicial Building, 201 2nd Avenue S., Hailey, Idaho.
Defendant is further advised that Idaho Criminal Rule 1O(a) provides that the
defendant must appear in person at the arraignment.
DATED this

/

$

day of October, 2014.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputing Prosecuting Attorney

NOTICE OF DISTRICT COURT ARRAIGNMENT - Page 1

58 of 200

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

t,;6"*:y

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of October, 2014, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the wi in and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ S)vernight Mail
-~-T
TP.ellecopy

NOTICE OF DISTRICT COURT ARRAIGNMENT - Page 2
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 151 Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

OCT 2 0 2014
JoLynn Drage, Clerk Di8trlct
Court Blalne Coun Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2014-1813

Plaintiff,

STATE'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho, pursuant to the Idaho Criminal Rules, submits the
following supplemental

response to defendant's request for discovery.

This

supplemental response is intended to add to and supplement the prior response of the
State, and should not be construed as limiting any prior response. The supplemental
response to discovery is as follows:
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b ): See enclosed numbered documents, if
any.
1.

Additional Statements of the defendant: See enclosed police reports,

witness statements and other documents.

2.

Additional Statements of the co-defendant: NIA.

3.

Defendant's prior record: NIA.

4.

Documents and tangible obiects:

•

DVD video Sgt. Ornelas' vehicle of stop

STATE'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY-Page 1
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•

DVD video from PSF showing search of Arenas

•

CD Dispatch audio 07-31-14

•

Vehicle impoundment record Arenas vehicle

5.

Reports of examinations and tests: As above.

6a.

Additional State's witnesses: N/A.

6b.

Additional Witnesses' statements: N/A.

7.

Additional Police reports:

See enclosed police reports and other

documents.
Furthermore, the State hereby renews its objection to any request for discovery
by the defendant calling for materials or information other than that specifically provided
for by Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b) or other applicable rule or statute. The State reserves
the right to further supplement discovery as information becomes available.
In this supplemental response to request for discovery, the State has served
upon the defendant herewith, consecutive pages numbered 0031 through 0034.
Defendant is advised to immediately contact this office if any of said pages are missing.
DATED this

'?i>

day of October, 2014.

Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

STATE'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (}{) ~ay of October, 2014, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, ID 83340

/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_
_

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

~ L e g a l Secret

STATE'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY- Page 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Arraignment
Hearing date: 10/27/2014
Time: 9:12 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
...
Courtroom: 0 1'5'1Vlc..,t"
Court reporter: Denise Schloder
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
l
Tape Number:_:tl:b"v\C ~~
Defense Attorney: Lori Nakaoka for Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
9.12

State and Lori Nakaoka present
Court introduces the case.
Ms. Nakaoka having trouble locating the Def.

9.13

Court allows a few minutes RECESS

9.55

State and Ms. Nakaoka present.
Court reviews the information and the maximum penalty
Ms. Nakaoka enters a plea of not guilty on behalf of the Def.
Court sets 2 day J.T. 1/7/15 and a PTC for 12/22/14 at 9a.m.
Mr. Nakaoka presents a motion and order for preparation of a transcript at county
expense. State- no objection.
Court enters order.

10.02

Recess

COURT MINUTES 1
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/

FIL

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

OCT 27 2014
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun Idaho

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH mDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813
MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY
HEARING AT COUNTY'S
EXPENSE

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, Andrew Parnes, and
moves this Court for the preparation of the transcript of the preliminary hearing in the
above matter, before Judge R. Ted Israel, on October 8, 2014, at the County's expense.
Good cause exists for this motion in that the transcript is needed to prepare
Mr. Arenas's defense in District Court. Mr. Arenas has been declared indigent and

Ill
MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING
AT COUNTY'S EXPENSE

1
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ORIGINAL

:Wdti&i

cannot afford the cost of the transcript.
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Lori Nakaoka, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine, Idaho;
I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is
671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on October 271\ 2014, I served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner noted:
Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333
_ _ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

·"1

By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office of the attorney in Hailey,
Idaho.

_ _ By sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:
788-5554.

(

~
MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING
AT COUNTY'S EXPENSE

2
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ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

OCT 27 2014
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun Idaho

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY
HEARING AT COUNTY'S
EXPENSE

Good cause appearing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the transcript of the
preliminary hearing before Judge R. Ted Israel, on October 8, 2014, shall be prepared at
the County's expense and provided to counsel of record.
DATED:

(Ji~ ;l_ 7
_ ____.;;:'--------'------)-.o/ '(

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY
HEARING AT COUNTY'S EXPENSE
1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on

(irl, 2[4

, I served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Order by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:

Andrew Parnes
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
208 726-1187
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Ave South Ste. 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208 788-5554

--r'

~

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Deputy Clerk

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY
HEARING AT COUNTY'S EXPENSE
2
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Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
2 2014
In and For the County of Blaine
2012nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, Idaho 83333
~~~~District
, ldtl.ho
STATE OF IDAHO
)
) Case No: CR-2014-0001813
Plaintiff,
)
VS.
) NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING,
Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
) PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, AND
PO Box 456
)
ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER
Hailey, ID 83333
) PROCEEDINGS
Defendant.
)
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Pretrial Conference
Judge:

Monday, December 22, 2014
Robert J. El gee

09:00 AM

Jury Trial
Judge:

Wednesday, January 07, 2015
Robert J. El gee

09:00 AM

Total trial days:-=2,____
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties must comply with the following requirements:
1. Pre-Trial Motions: ALL pre-trial motions must be filed within 28 days from this date, and heard
within 42 days.
2. Discovery: Must be completed within 42 days of this date.
3. Pre-Trial Conference: The parties shall conduct a settlement conference before the date of the pretrial conference. The day of the pre-trial conference. the parties must be prepared to inform the Court
whether the case is going to trial and the results of the settlement negotiations.
4. Plea Bargain Agreements: All plea bargain agreements shall be reduced to writing before the date
of sentencing or dismissal. The agreement must be signed by the attorneys for both parties and by the
defendant.
5. Change of Plea: The defendant may use the pre-trial conference date to change his/her plea if notice
is given to the Court.
6. Motions to Continue: All motions to continue the trial date must be in writing and shall state the
reason for the motion. Motions to continue made by the Defense shall be signed by the Defendant.
All motions and stipulations for a continuation shall be accompanied by an order to vacate and reset
the trial and pre-trial conference. The dates for rescheduling the trial and pre-trial conference shall be
left blank so that the Court may fill them in.
7. Jury Instructions. Jury instructions and a list of witnesses must be submitted by the parties to the
Court at least 5 days before the trial date.
8. Waiver of Speedy Trial: A written waiver of speedy trial must be signed by the Defendant and filed
with the Court before the Court will schedule a trial date beyond the six-month period. The sixmonth period is calculated from the date of the District Court arraignment.
9. Alternate Judges: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned to this case intends to
utilize the provisions of !.C.R. 25 (a)(6). Notice is also given that if there are multiple defendants,
any disqualification pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(l) is subject to a prior determination under I.C.R.
25(a)(3). The panel of alternate judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been
hroeder,
disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan, Brody, Butler, Crabtree, Elgee,
Stoker, Wildman and Williamson.
Judge
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING, PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & ORDER
GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 1
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I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday,
October 28, 2014.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:
Andrew Parnes
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum ID 83340
Prosecutor:

/
Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Mailed v
-Mailed 7

Hand Delivered
Hand Delivered

~ ;i:-1"()(.Q , \ \lt

L

Jim Thomas Blaine County Prosecutor
Mailed

v- J ~ . . .

55'~

Hand Delivered ; { ~ ' -

Dated: Tuesday, October 28, 2014

By:
Deputy C l e r k '

NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING, PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & ORDER
GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 2
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.

OCT/3012014/THU
03:23 PM
""

Andrew Parnes

FAX No. 208 726 1187

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: {208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

P. IJ04- 1 006

OCT 3 0 201~
JoLynn ~ . Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun Idaho

Attorney for Defendant
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

Defenqant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CR-2014-1813
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE
Date: December 8, 2014
Hour: 10:00 a.m.
Court: Hon. Robert J. Elgee

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant, Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas, by
and through counsel, Andrew Parnes, moves this Court for an order suppressing all
evidence that was seized from the Defendant on or about July 31, 2014, and any evidence
which is the fruit of that search on the grounds that the detention, search, seizure, and
arrest were in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

1
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OCT/3~l20 l 4[THU 03: 24 PM

FAX Ne,. 208 72t, l l 87

Andrew Parnes

P. 0051006

Said motion is based on the papers and pleadings on file in this action, any
evidence to be presented at the hearing in this matter, and any argument to be presented
after the receipt of the. evidence in this matter .

.¥-

DAIBD this~ day of

(

(iJ:v)it/ , 2014.

(l~

,~Parnes
Attorney at Law

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
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OCT1312 '20l4lTHU 03: 24 PM

P. 0061006

Andrew Parnes

CERTIFICATE OF

SERVICE

I, Emily Dion, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine, Idaho; I
am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is
671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on the_ day of
, 2014,
I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner
noted:
Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd A venue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333

_ _ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

_ _ By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office of the attorney in Hailey,
Idaho.

~ By sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:
788-5554.

~(
EmilyDion

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

.-.Ll_

~

3

72 of 200

OCT/30/2014/THU 03:23 PM
&

FAX No.

Andrew Parnes

P. 0021006

208 726 1187

-

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum. Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

OCT 3 0 2014
JoLynn Drage, C'8rlc District
Court Blaine Coun

Idaho

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813

)

NOTICE OF HEARING ON
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

)
)
)
)

Date: December 8, 2014
Hour: 10:00 a.m.
Court: Hon. Robert J. Elgee

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above entitled case is set for hearing on
Motion to Suppress on Monday, December 8, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., before Judge Robert J.

Elgee, District Court. in Hailey, Idaho.
DATEDthis-hayorQJv~,2014.

{2li2
ewPames

Attorney at Law

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
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OCT/30/2014/THU
03:23 PM
.

Andrew Parnes

FAX Nc,. 208 72t) l l :37

CERTIFICATE QF

P. 0031006

SERYIC&

I, Emily Dion, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine, Idaho; I
am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is
671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on the_ day of
, 2014,
I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner
noted:
Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd A venue South, Suite 100
Hailev, ID 83333

_ _ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

_ _ By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office of the attorney in Hailey,
Idaho.

YJ

By sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:
788-5554.

7-·La-

E~~

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

2

74 of 200

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Motion to Suppress
Hearing date: 12/8/2014
Time: 10:05 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter#
10.06

10.08

Counsel present.
Court introduces the case.
Mr. Parnes requests to continue hearing to next week, 3:30p.m. on 12/15.
State comments that this is the 2nd time the Def. hasn't been present. If Def. is
not on time and present next week the state will be requesting a warrant.
Court continues Motion to Suppress to 12/15 at 3:30p.m.
Recess

COURT MINUTES 1
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DEC/08/20 l 4/MON l l: 28 AM

F,AVA t,J·

Andrew Parnes

~

1r.lQ
!!07
I_ 1_1 7GC
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ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813

AMENDED MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
Date: December 15, 2014
Hour: 3:30 p.m.
Court: Hon. Robert J. El gee

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant, Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas, by
and through counsel, Andrew Parnes, moves this Court for an order suppressing all
evidence that was seized from the Defendant on or about July 31, 2014, and any evidence
which is the fruit of that search on the grounds that the detention~ search, seizure, and
arrest, and questioning of the defendant were in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution as well as

AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

1
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DE/08!2.0l4/MON ll :28 AM

Andrew Parnes

P. OC:31004

7"R
Fr.1 X !1o · -?1u·R
-·~
- llA7
-

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution.
Said motion is based on the papers and pleadings on file in this action, any
evidence to be presented at the hearing in this matter, and any argument to be presented
after the receipt of the evidence i

DATED this ~ay f~-=.:::-W=---"----'-_,,2014.

~P1-----s-----------..
Attorney at Law

AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
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DEE':/08l2014/MON ll:28 AM

Andrew Parnes

FAX No. 2[1f: 72c1 l l f:7

P. CIC!4 i[l[l4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Emily Dion, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine, Idaho; I
am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is
671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on the~ day of ~ 0 1 4 ,
I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner
noted:
Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 znd Avenue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333

_ _ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

_ _ By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office of the attorney in Hailey,
Idaho.
~ y sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:

788-5554.

~;i=--!J---

AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
CR-2014-0001814
State of Idaho vs. Luis Fernando Duran
Hearing type: Motion to Suppress
Hearing date: 12/15/2014
Time: 3:37 pm
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Defense Attorney: Christopher Simms
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback ·
Counter#
3.37
3.39

3.40
3.43

3.48

3.49

4.04

Court introd.uces the case.
Mr. Simms comments, didn't know about the video, doesn't know why the Def.
isn't present, requests a transcript of the preliminary hearing, requests this
motion be continued along with the trial.
State comments on the video. No objection to the continuance.
Court inquires.
Court grants the Def s (Duran) motion to continue.
Court continues J.T. to 3/10/15 and Motion to Suppress to 1/5/15 at 10a.m.,
grants motion to prepare transcript at county expense, sets PTC for 2/9 /15 at
9:30a.m.
State requests Def. be present at motion to suppress and PTC.
Mr. Simms has no objection.
Court orders Def. be present at motion to suppress and PTC.
Court introduces CR14-1813
Mr. Parnes calls, Manuel Ornelas, sworn under oath, and questioned. Witness
reviews Exh. A- marked-id-video. Reviews Exh. B-marked-id-audio.
Mr. Parnes offers Exh. A & B- No objection
Court ADMITS· mcii:A & i'.B

COURTMINUTES 1
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4.20
4.29
4.35
4.42
4.44
4.45
4.56
4.59

5.05

Witness continues.
State questions the witness. Reviews Exh. A
Witness reviews Exh. B.
Mr. Parnes questions the witness.
State questions the witness.
Court clarifies aboutthe car crossing the fog line.
Mr. Parnes questions the witness.
Court excuses the witness.
Mr. Parnes calls, Jeremiah Jones, sworn under oath and questioned.
State questions the witness.
Court excuses the witness.
Mr. Parnes requests to brief the issue. Request the trial be continued.
State has no objection.
Court vacates jury trial. Mr. Parnes brief due 1/5 /15, State's response due
1/20/15, Mr. Parnes reply due 1/26/15. Oral Argument 2/23/15 at 11a.m. and
PTC, and J.T for 3/10/15.
Recess
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Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In and For the County of Blaine

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.

FILED}~

201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, Idaho 83333
)

vs.

)
)
)

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
PO Box456
Hailey, ID 83333

)
)
)

DEC 2 6 2014
JoLynn Dtags, Cl6rlc District
Court 8lslrie Cn11mv 'rlP"'"

Case No: CR-2014-0001813
AMENDED
NOTICE OF HEARING

)
)

Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Pretrial Conference & Oral Argument
Judge:

Monday, February 23, 2015 11 :00 AM
Robert J. Elgee

Jury Trial
Judge:

Tuesday, March 10, 2015
Robert J. Elgee

09:00 AM

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Friday,
December 26, 2014.

ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned to this case intends to utilize
the provisions of I.C.R. 25 (a)(6). Notice is also given that if there are multiple defendants, any disqualification
pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(1) is subject to a prior determination under I.C.R. 25(a)(3). The panel of alternate
judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan,
Brody, Butler, Crabtree, Elgee, Hurlbutt, Schroeder, Stoker, Wildman and Williamson.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
fI
Mailed--:fMailed--!-

Hand Delivered

-Hand Delivered
--

Andrew Parnes
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum ID 83340
Prosecutor:

Jim Thomas Blaine County Prosecutor
Mailed

Hand Delivered----k-

Dated: Friday. December 26, 2014
Jolynn Drage
Clerk Of The ist ·
By:
Deputy Cler
D0C22 7/96
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ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

)
)

Defendant.

Case No. CR-2014-1813
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

)
)
)
INTRODUCTION

This memorandum will discuss the issues related to the initial detention of the
defendant and then the Miranda issues after the initial detention. If the initial detention
was not valid, the ensuing search as well as any statements taken from the Defendant
must be suppressed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hailey Police Officer Manny Orenelas was on patrol the night of July 31, 2014. At
approximately 10:23 p.m., he observed a vehicle whose driver was later identified as the
defendant, Osvaldo Arenas. Because Ornelas observed what he thought was a traffic
violation, he activated the video camera located on the dashboard of his patrol car. The
video was admitted into evidence.
Officer Ornelas testified that once he activates the camera, the recorder will then
save approximately thirty seconds of recording taken before the manual activation. Thus,
the video in this case contains a period of time before the machine was manually
activated.
The video shows Mr. Arenas's car driving south on Highway 75 at a point just east
of the airport. The road conditions are wet with a light rain falling. There is a tum out at
one point in the road and a white stripe separates the turnout from main lane of
southbound traffic. The video begins at 22: 19 after the hour. 1 About 22 seconds later,
Mr. Arenas's car is next to the tum out lane. About four seconds after that, a car
approaches Mr. Arenas's car from the south in the northbound lane. As the two cars pass
each other, Mr. Arenas's car pulls slightly to the right and touches the white stripe for a

1The

video shows the time as 23:22:19; however, the correct time was one hour
before that. Apparently, the clock on the recorder was one hour off; this discrepancy has
no impact on the matters at issue in this motion.
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few seconds, 2 then, continues south fully within its lane, puts it tum signal on and turns
left at the light.
Officer Ornelas testified that the sole basis for the detention of the vehicle was the
contact with the white line on Highway 75, and this is confirmed by initial conversation
with Mr. Arenas, which is contained in Exhibit B, the audio tape.
Shortly after stopping the car and getting Mr. Arenas's name, Officer Ornelas
returned to his vehicle and called dispatch. He learned that Mr. Arenas had a juvenile
warrant for his arrest. Officer Jones arrived at the scene around this time.
Officer Ornelas returned to the vehicle and had Mr. Arenas exit, placing him
immediately under arrest. Mr. Arenas was placed in handcuffs at the rear of the car by
Ornelas and Jones. He was patted down and asked what he had in his pocket. No
Miranda warnings were provided before this questioning.

Mr. Arenas answered that the object was a meth pipe, and that he had smoked that
day. 3 While Officer Ornelas testified that Mr. Arenas consented to have the passenger
drive the vehicle, the audio tape proves this occurred before Mr. Arenas was arrested and
told that he would not be free to leave with the car, while Mr. Duran drove.
While Officer Ornelas testified that the video tape was an accurate portrayal of
what happened on direct examination by defense counsel, he contended on crossexamination by the prosecution that this one part of the tape showing the car touching, not
crossing, the white line was not correct and that he observed both tires over the line. This
Court should reject this part of his testimony as it is clearly contradicted by the video tape.
The officer provided no explanation of why the video was inaccurate, even though placed
on the dashboard of his vehicle to his right with an obstructed view of the entire incident.
2

3This

conversation is contained at approximately 8 :32 minutes into the audio tape.
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While Mr. Arenas continues to be in handcuffs, Officer Jones can be heard on the
tape telling that if he has anything on him it would be another felony if they found it in
the jail. 4
Mr. Arenas is then placed into the patrol vehicle and remains there until
transported to to the jail. At approximately 22:52 hours, the patrol camera is turned to
face Mr. Arenas. He can be seen sitting alone in the back seat until the tape ends at
23:59. At no point on the tape is Officer Jones seen at the back seat window talking with
Mr. Arenas. Officer Jones did not activate his hand held tape recorder during this entire
detention and arrest.
Officer Ornelas' s audio tape recorder was turned on as he approached the
defendant's car and remained on for the next 39 minutes. On the tape, Officer Ornelas
can be heard telling Officer Jones that Mr. Arenas had not been Mirandized. 5 At 23:02,
Officer Ornelas turns off the audio tape, and he testified that he was unsure why he did
so.
Officer Jones testified that he observed Mr. Arenas acting nervously in the back
seat of the patrol vehicle, that he provided Miranda warnings and told Mr. Arenas that if
he brought drugs into the jail it would be another felony. Mr. Arenas then told him he
had drugs in his waistband, and Officer Ornelas removed some plastic bags from Mr.

4 This

can be heard at approximately 10:45 minutes into the audio tape.

5This

occurs at approximately 39: 15 minutes into the audio tape.
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Arenas' s waistband. Because the officers had turned off their recorders, none of this
exchange between the officers and Mr. Arenas was captured on audio or video tape.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
1.

The Initial Detention was Illegal
Under both Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 17

of the Idaho Constitution, a traffic stop is a detention and must be supported by
reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime has been committed. See, e.g.

Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014), and State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176,
90 P.3d 926 (Idaho App. 2004).
In the instant case, the sole basis for the stop is the alleged violation of LC. § 49637(1), failing to remain within one's own lane. That statute reads in relevant part:
Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly
marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all else, shall apply:
( 1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a

single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first
ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.
LC. § 49-637(1).
In this case, there was no violation of the rule permitting the officer to detain Mr.
Arenas. First, the car was driven "as nearly as practicable" within his lane of traffic.
Second, the brief touching of the white line appears to have occurred in response to the
oncoming traffic and was done "with safety" as permitted by the statute.
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If the mere touching of the white line for a few seconds could justify a detention of
a driver, police in Idaho would be able to detain most drivers. There are many reasons,
including defensive driving, for briefly moving one's tires out of the lane of traffic and
such driving does not meet the "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411,
417-418 (1981).
While no Idaho case has applied this statute in the context of facts similar to those
here, other court have examined similar or identical traffic rules and found that the mere
touching of the white line does not justify a detention. See, e.g. United States v. Colin,
314 FJd 439, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2002) and State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 2004).
In Tague, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a statute identical to LC.§ 49-637(1)
did not permit a detention when the officer "observed the left tires of Tague's vehicle
cross over the left edge line of [the road] and return to the roadway." Id. at 200.
The plain language of the statute requires that the driver of a vehicle must
drive his or her vehicle as much as possible in a single lane, and that the
driver cannot move from that lane to the shoulder or to another lane until
the operator of the vehicle has ascertained whether he or she can move the
vehicle safely. The dual purpose of the statute is to promote the integrity of
the lane markings on the highway and to ensure the safe movement of
vehicles on laned roadways. A violation does not occur unless the driver
changes lanes before the driver ascertains that he or she could make such
movement with safety. This interpretation is consistent with interpretations
of identical statutes by courts that have considered the issue under similar
facts as we have in the present case. See United States v. Freeman, 209 F Jd
464, 466--67 (6th Cir.2000) (holding the mere passage of defendants vehicle
across the line separating the emergency lane of a highway from the right
lane of travel did not constitute probable cause that defendant violated the
unsafe lane change provision of Tennessee law); United States v. Gregory,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
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79 F.3d 973,978 (10th Cir.1996) (holding an isolated incident of a vehicle
crossing into emergency lane of roadway did not constitute probable cause
that defendant violated the unsafe lane change provision of Utah law); State
v. Lafferty, 291 Mont. 157, 967 P.2d 363,366 (1998) (holding crossing of
the edge line twice and driving on the edge line once did not constitute
probable cause that defendant violated the unsafe lane change provision of
Montana law); Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 769 A.2d 879, 889 (2001)
(holding a driver's momentary crossing of edge line of roadway and later
touching of that line did not constitute probable cause that defendant
violated the unsafe lane change provision of Maryland law); Crooks v.
State, 710 So.2d 1041, 1042-43 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (holding three
occasions of drifting over the right edge line did not constitute probable
cause that defendant violated the unsafe lane change provision of Florida
law).
Id. at 203.

Indeed, the facts in Tague are strikingly similar to those here:
[Tague] was not driving his vehicle in an erratic manner, violating any
speed restrictions, or weaving his vehicle from side to side on the roadway.
Despite the fact Tague's vehicle just barely crossed the left edge line for a
brief period, the State failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence any
objective basis to believe Tague's movement was done without first
ascertaining that he could make such movement with safety. Thus, Tague's
single incident of crossing the edge line for a brief moment under these
circumstances did not give the police probable cause to stop Tague for a
traffic violation under section 321.306.
Id. at 203-204.

Nor is the dicta in State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32 P.3d 685, 688 (2001)
controlling here. In Slater, the court looked to a number of factors in addition to a
crossing of the fog line, including erratic fluctuating speeds for several miles ...
2.

The Searches Subsequent to the Detention are not Attenuated and the Fruits of the
Illegal Detention Must be Suppressed
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Nor can the fruits of the search of the Mr. Arenas be admitted into evidence solely
on the basis that the discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant was an intervening
circumstance breaking the causal chain sufficiently to dissipate the taint. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a court should examine three factors to determine if
the unlawful conduct of the officer has been adequately attenuated. These factors are ( 1)
the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the
occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the
improper law enforcement action. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
In State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court
adopted the Brown three factor test and did not create a per se rule that the discovery of
an arrest warrant would always attenuate the taint from the initial illegal conduct. The
Page Court looked to a Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Green, 111 F .3d 515 (7th
Cir. 1997) for guidance. In Green, the fact that the arrest warrant was discovered within
five minutes of the illegal conduct was a factor weighing against a finding of attenuation.
Id. at 521. In Page, while the Court addressed this factor, it apparently did not consider
fully the analysis in Green. Moreover, in Page, the initial detention of the defendant was
found to be consensual and not one that implicated one's privacy interests as guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho State Constitution. Finally, the search of the
defendant there was found to be incident to the arrest warrant.
Here, when the three factors are considered, this Court must suppress the evidence
seized from the defendant and his vehicle. First, the mere seven minutes from the initial
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
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detention of Mr. Arenas weighs strongly against a finding that the taint was dissipated.
Indeed, without that detention, the officer would not have known who was driving the car
or that the driver had a warrant for his arrest. See also, United States v. Williams, 615
F.3d 657, 669 (6th Cir. 2011). In Jefferson v. State, 780 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App 2002),
the appellate court suppressed evidence found after a defendant had been illegally
detained and a subsequent arrest warrant had been discovered. The Jefferson facts are
very similar to those here - the illegal detention leads almost immediately to the discovery
of a warrant.
While the second factor - the discovery of the warrant - may weigh in favor of
finding an attenuation, standing by itself, the existence of the warrant cannot always
permit the seizure of evidence found pursuant to the arrest. For example, the Sixth
Circuit in United States v. Gross, 622 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2011) rejected aper se rule
because it would "create perverse incentives. "We do not wish to create a system of posthoc rationalization through which the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal
searches and seizures can be nullified. Accordingly, while the discovery of the
outstanding arrest warrant in this instance may be a factor in the attenuation analysis, it
does not establish attenuation." Id. at 405.
The third factor relates to the initial improper law enforcement action. Here, the
seizure of Mr. Arenas for allegedly touching the white line creates a significance intrusion
on motorists driving on Idaho's roads. Thousands of motorists driving on the roads touch
the white line momentarily for numerous legitimate reasons; permitting law enforcement
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
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to exploit this legal conduct by then permitting a traffic stop and then allowing the officer
to ask for the driver's identification and then run the name for possible warrants would
create the "perverse incentive" the Sixth Circuit so wisely rejected. Moreover, no Idaho
Court has admitted evidence based on this factual situation, where the initial detention
was unwarranted. Even in Page, the initial encounter between the police and the
defendant was deemed consensual and the brief extension of that encounter was not as
significant an intrusion on one's freedom as the detention of an automobile being driven
legally.
Therefore, when the three Brown factors are fully considered, the search of Mr.
Arenas is not attenuated from the illegal detention and the all the items seized from the
defendant and his vehicle must be suppressed.
Alternatively, there was no basis to conduct a search of the vehicle incident to the
arrest on the warrant. See, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). This is especially true
in this case because the officer did not even know what the warrant for Mr. Arenas was
based upon. Thus, even if the search of Mr. Arenas's person could be justified, the items
found inside the car must be suppressed.
3.

The Failure to Mirandize Mr. Arenas
The facts are undisputed that the officer's did not Mirandize Mr. Arenas until at

least forty minutes after his detention, despite the fact that he was asked numerous
incriminating questions after he had been placed in police custody and handcuffed.
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Once a person is "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way," it is incumbent upon the police to provide Miranda warnings before
seeking to elicit incriminating statements from the in-custody defendant. Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966).
The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is
subject either to express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to
say, the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.

Rhode Islandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980).
Here, the officer asked Mr. Arenas what was in his pocket, to which Mr. Arenas
replied "meth pipe." Based upon this response, the officer removed the object and placed
it in evidence. Both the statement and the physical evidence must be suppressed.

4.

The Search of The Vehicle
Because the search of the vehicle cannot be justified as incident to the arrest of Mr.

Arenas on the arrest warrant and there was no search warrant for the car, the State has the
burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement.
Here, the office used the excuse of releasing the car to the passenger as the basis
for a search of the car. Yet, the audio tape is clear that Mr. Arenas never gave his consent
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to a search of the car for this purpose. 6 Therefore, there was no legal basis to search the
vehicle and the evidence found inside the car must be suppressed on this additional
ground.
5.

The Subsequent Search of Mr. Arenas at the Scene
Finally, the fact that there is no video or audio of the final search of Mr. Arenas at

the scene must be considered by this Court as evidence tending to show that no such
warnings were given to Mr. Arenas while he remained at the scene. Moreover, the threat
from Officer Jones can be heard well before any Miranda warnings, so that Mr. Arenas's
statement that additional bindles were still in his pants should be suppressed and the
resulting evidence taken from Mr. Arenas should be suppressed as well.

Dated: January 5, 2015

,W:

Pfilllels-----~

Attorney at Law

While the officer testified that he asked Mr. Arenas about releasing the car, the
tape itself contains no such exchange between the officer and Mr. Arenas. Based upon
the officer's testimony which is contradicted by the video tape, this Court should reject
this particular testimony about the conversation with Mr. Arenas as well.
6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Andrew Parnes, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine,
Idaho; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business
address is 671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on January 5, 2015, I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner noted:
Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2"d A venue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333
_ _ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.
_ _ By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office of the attorney in Hailey,
Idaho.
~

By sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:
788-5554.
I"-.,

~--
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Jim Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554
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JAN 2 0 2015
JoLynn Drage. Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CR-2014-1813
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

Plaintiff, State of Idaho, submits its Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to
Suppress filed by Defendant.
FACTS
On July 3I5\ 2014, at 10:23 p.m., Officer Manual Ornelas was traveling southbound on
Highway 75 south of Hailey. His video recorder was activated and is in evidence as Defendant's
Exhibit A. Ornelas observed a vehicle in front of him also driving southbound. Just south of the
airport tower, a turnout lane appears on the right side of the southbound lane with a solid white
line demarcating between the two southbound lanes. Officer Ornelas observed the vehicle drift
onto the white line and travel down the line for several seconds. Because it is raining and dark, it
is difficult to see on the video whether the vehicle's tires cross the white line or simply drive on
the white line. Officer Ornelas testified that he observed the vehicle cross over the white line.
The vehicle then returned to the primary traffic lane and continued south until it turned left at
Countryside Boulevard.
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Officer Ornelas pulled the vehicle over for failing to drive within a single lane under LC.
§ 49-637. Ornelas was wearing an audio recorder which is in evidence as Defendant's Exhibit B.
Ornelas approached the driver of the vehicle, identified him as the Defendant, and notified him
of the traffic violation. The Defendant told Officer Ornelas that he did not have a driver's
license with him. Ornelas returned to his patrol car and ran the defendant and passenger through
dispatch. At 5:50 seconds on the audio recording, Ornelas was notified of an outstanding arrest
warrant for the Defendant and that he did not have a driver's license. At 6:50, Ornelas returned
to the Defendant's vehicle and notified him that he does not have a driver's license. Ornelas then
requests the Defendant to exit his car and places him under arrest for the warrant. At 8:00,
Ornelas asked whether he would like the car released to the passenger and if he would like
anything out of his car.
Once the Defendant is outside his car, Ornelas asked him whether he has anything on
him. The Defendant responds, "no." Then, Ornelas proceeds to put the Defendant in handcuffs,
again asking whether he has anything on him. The Defendant again responds, "no." Ornelas
patted down the Defendant and upon feeling something in his pocket, said "I thought you had
nothing on you, dude." The Defendant said "it's a piece, a meth pipe." Ornelas then retrieved
the pipe from his pocket.
Officer Ornelas then searched the Defendant's vehicle. On the driver's side floorboard,
Ornelas found a black I-Phone box that contained paraphernalia and traces of methamphetamine.
Additional drugs were found on the passenger floorboard. They were later found to be possessed
by the passenger.
After the search, Officer Jones testified that he observed the Defendant acting fidgety and
nervous in the backseat of the patrol vehicle. He further testified that he then advised him of his
Miranda rights and told him again that if drugs are brought into the jail, he would be charged
with an additional felony. (At 39: 15 Officer Jones can be heard on the audio telling Officer
Ornelas that he Mirandized the Defendant.) Officer Jones testified that the Defendant then
admitted to having four baggies tucked inside his waistline.

Officer Ornelas retrieved the

baggies and found them to contain methamphetamine.
Later, the Defendant was brought to the Blaine County Detention Facility and searched
again before entering the jail. During that search, Officer Ornelas discovered another small bag
containing methamphetamine.
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ISSUES
1) Officer Ornelas had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle after observing
the vehicle drive on or across the white line demarcating two lanes in violation of LC. §
49-637.

A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants, necessarily
implicating the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); State
v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is
articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981);
State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho
205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Naccarato, 126
Idaho 10, 12, 878 P .2d 184, 186 (Ct.App.1994 ). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less
than probable cause, but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id.
Defendant contends officer Manual Ornelas lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the
Defendant's vehicle for a violation of LC. § 49-637. The statute provides in part:

Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked
lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all else, shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane
and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that
the movement can be made with safety.
Idaho Code§ 49-637(1)

The Defendant concedes "his car pulls slightly to the right and touches the white stripe
for a few seconds." See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence,
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p.3.

However, Defendant contends that the purpose of the statutory language "as nearly as

practicable" from LC. § 49-637 is to provide some margin of error or permit some driving on the
line demarcating lanes.
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently considered this issue in State v. Neal, 2014 WL
5151426.

In Neal, the Court rejected this expansive reading of the language "as nearly as

practicable." The Court decided that the term "practicable" is unambiguous and is defined as
"able to be done or put into practice successfully" (NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY 1338 (2001), and as "feasible in the circumstances," BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1172 (6th ed.1990). See Neal, 2014 5151426 at 5. The Court then decided that
the definitions of "practicable" were inconsistent the Defendant's argument that "'as nearly as
practicable" creates a safe harbor permitting a person to occasionally leave his lane, without any
apparent need, because doing so falls within the wide spectrum of normal driving behavior."
Neal, 2014 WL 5151426 at 5. Rather than speculate what reason a driver may have to leave the

lane in a "practicable" manner, the Court of appeals concluded that there was nothing in the
record that justified the Defendant's departure from his lane as not "practicable." Id.
The Defendant's argument is based solely on an Iowa Supreme Court case, State v.
Tague, 626 N.W. 2d 197 (Iowa 2004) where that court ruled a single incident of crossing the line

was insufficient to stop the Defendant for a violation of Iowa's statute. However, Idaho's Court
of Appeals' ruling in Neal is obviously contrary to Iowa's interpretation of their statute. The
Court in Neal acknowledged various interpretations of this statute by stating that "this issue is
not one that confounds only Idaho courts." Id at 3. The Court then cites various rulings on both
sides of the issue.

However, the Idaho Court's conclusion is that the public policy behind

Idaho's statute is safety.

Driving on the line demarcating lanes would increase the risk of

accidents. Therefore, the Court ruled LC. § 49-637 requires "vehicles be driven between lane
lines "as nearly as practicable." Id. at 4.
In this case, as the video shows and the Defendant admits, the Defendant was not driving
between the lane lines. There was no evidence presented by the Defendant that any obstacle
prevented the Defendant from driving within his lane. There is no evidence that Arenas left his
lane to avoid oncoming traffic. Defendant asks this court to assume this fact. As in Neal, there
is simply nothing in the record to show that the Defendant left his lane because staying within his
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lane was not "practicable." See Neal, at 5. Moreover, the video does not show an oncoming
vehicle touch or cross the center-line while approaching the Defendant's vehicle.
Secondly, counsel argues that the driving on the white line "appears to have occurred in
response to the oncoming traffic' and was done 'with safety' as permitted by the statute." Again,
no evidence was presented by the Defendant to support the contention that the Defendant first
ascertained that the movement could be made with safety, as required by LC. 49-637(1).
Finally, only reasonable suspicion is necessary to justify a traffic stop. Terry v . Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-5 (1968). The police officer's suspicion must be premised upon
specific articulable facts and the rational inferences drawn from those facts. Id. at 1879-80.
Officer Ornelas observed the Defendant drive on the white line demarcating traffic lanes. This
observation provided Officer Ornelas reasonable suspicion that the Defendant violated LC. § 49637. See State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293 (2001).
The Defendant cites Slater and refers to the language holding that an officers'
observations of the Defendant's tire crossing the fog line "albeit fleetingly" as dicta.

The

Defendant is incorrect. The Defendant in Slater specifically appealed the District's Court's
ruling that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Defendant claimed "the
officer did not act until four miles after observing Slater's vehicle's right tires cross the fog line
by 4 to 6 inches one time while on the highway on-ramp. Slater, 136 Idaho at 298 (Ct. App.
2001). The Court ruled "Accordingly, when Officer Bums observed Slater's tire cross the fog
line, albeit fleetingly, Bums now possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that Slater had
violated LC. § 49-630 by driving on the shoulder of the highway, rather than on the "roadway."
Id. The Court of Appeals goes on to state that the officer's observation of speed fluctuations in

addition to the crossing of the line created reasonable suspicion that Slater may be driving under
the influence. Id.
The Court's ruling in Slater is not dicta because it was a controlling issue before the
Court. "If the statement is not necessary to decide the issue presented to the appellate court, it is
considered to be dictum and not controlling." State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74, 305 P.3d 513,
518 (2013).

In Slater, the Court's determination whether the officer possessed reasonable

suspicion based on one brief crossing of the fog line was the exact issue on appeal. Therefore,
the Court's ruling cannot be considered dicta. If anything, the following statement regarding the
crossing of the fog line and speed fluctuations was dicta.
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2) Officer Manual Ornelas search of the Defendant's person and vehicle were lawful
searches incident to arrest.
In this case, three separate searches of the Defendant yielded three separate discoveries of
contraband. First, a methamphetamine pipe was found in the Defendant's pocket upon a search
incident to his arrest. Second, Officer Jones noticed the Defendant fidgeting in the back of the
patrol car and informed him that if he brought drugs into the jail it was a new and separate
felony.

The Defendant then indicated he had multiple baggies of methamphetamine in his

waistband. Third, upon arriving at the jail, the Defendant was again searched and another bag of
methamphetamine was found inside his pocket. Finally, a search of the vehicle the defendant
was driving resulted in the finding of an I-phone box containing paraphernalia and additional
methamphetamine. Each search was a lawful warrantless search of the Defendant and/or his
vehicle.
After Officer Ornelas pulled over the Defendant's vehicle he approached the car and
immediately identified the Defendant as the driver. The Defendant did not have a driver's
license so Ornelas had the Defendant spell his name. Within three and a half minutes of first
speaking with the Defendant, Ornelas returned to his patrol vehicle to run the Defendant and
passenger through dispatch.

After approximately three minutes of speaking with Dispatch,

Officer Ornelas returned to the Defendant's vehicle. Ornelas informed the Defendant he did not
have a driver's license and requested the Defendant to exit his vehicle. He then informed him he
had a warrant for his arrest and placed him in handcuffs. Immediately after being placed under
arrest, Officer Ornelas searched his pockets and found a pipe used for smoking
methamphetamine.
An arresting officer may, contemporaneously incident to a lawful custodial arrest, search

the arrestee's person and area within the arrestee's immediate control. Chime/ v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969). The Defendant was lawfully placed under arrest for the warrant. His person
was lawfully searched three separate times incident to his arrest.
The Defendant argues that the search of his vehicle was not incident to arrest based on
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

Under Gant, police may search the passenger
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compartment of a vehicle, including any open or closed containers located therein, incident to a
recent occupant's arrest, only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence
of the offense of arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
The Idaho Court of Appeals applied the United State's Supreme Court's ruling in Gant
to the case State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho 247 (Ct. App. 2010). In that case a Defendant was pulled
over for suspicion of driving under the influence. The Defendant failed one field sobriety test
and refused the rest. He was arrested for driving under the influence. The Officer then searched
the Defendant's vehicle for evidence associated with the DUI and discovered a large amount of
marijuana. State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho 247, 248 (2010). The Court of Appeals concluded that
the offense of arrest, DUI, presented the officer with a reasonable belief that evidence of the
offense, e.g. alcohol containers or other evidence of alcohol use, might be found in the vehicle.

Id. at 253. Therefore, the search was lawful under the application of Arizona v. Gant.
In this case, while the Defendant was initially arrested on a warrant, a methamphetamine
pipe was immediately found on his person. He was subsequently arrested for possession of
paraphernalia. Upon finding the methamphetamine pipe, it was reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence relevant to the crime of arrest, to-wit; possession of paraphernalia. See Gant
556 U.S. 332 (2009) and State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho 247 (2010). Indeed, Officer Ornelas did
discover

evidence

relevant

to

the

crime

of arrest,

additional

paraphernalia

and

methamphetamine. Therefore, the search was a valid search of the vehicle incident to arrest.

3. The Defendant's statement that the item in his pocket was a "meth pipe" was not in violation
of Miranda.

Officer Ornelas place the Defendant under arrest for the warrant and searched his person.
Before the search, Ornelas asked the Defendant whether he had anything on him. The Defendant
responded "no". Ornelas then searched the Defendant and felt his pockets. Upon feeling a pipe
in his pocket, Ornelas said to the Defendant "I thought you had nothing on you dude." The
Defendant responded, "it's a piece, a meth pipe." Ornelas then retrieved the pipe from his
pocket. Contrary to the Defendant's assertion, Ornelas never asked the Defendant what was in
his pocket.
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While interrogation is not limited to questioning, the issue is whether Ornelas' statement,
"I thought you had nothing on you" was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect. Rhone Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980). Ornelas didn't confront
the Defendant with the pipe, nor did he say anything about the pipe. Even if the Court concludes
that Officer Ornelas' statements were likely to elicit incriminating statements, the search was
justified and therefore there is no basis to suppress the methamphetamine pipe.
The Defendant's last argument is that the baggies found in his waistband should be
suppressed because it is not recorded. The Defendant cites no authority for this argument. In
fact, Officer Jones testified that he read the Defendant his Miranda rights and then questioned
him whether he was hiding anything. The Defendant then retrieved four additional baggies of
methamphetamine. On the audio recording, at 39:15, Officer Jones can be heard telling Officer
Ornelas that he had Mirandized the Defendant. The argument that Jones improperly told the
Defendant that if he brought drugs into the jail it would be an additional felony is without any
legal basis. Furthermore, if the statement by Jones occurred well before the Miranda warnings,
then that statement did not produce any evidence. Therefore there is nothing to suppress. Jones
testified that while the Defendant was in the patrol vehicle, he noticed him squirming around and
appeared nervous.

He then read the Defendant his Miranda rights and notified him of the

consequences of concealing drugs at the jail. At that point, the Defendant revealed additional
drugs.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Court should find that the stop of the Defendant was
based on reasonable suspicion in light of State v. Neal, 2014 WL5151426.

Further, the

Defendant was lawfully arrested on an outstanding warrant and therefore the searches of the
Defendant incident to his arrest were lawful. Finally, the Defendant was not required to be read
his Miranda rights because Officer Ornelas did not at that time interrogate the Defendant. This
Court should deny the Defendant's Motions to Suppress.

DATED this 201h day of January, 2015.
Matthew Fredback, ISBN 7262
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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·'?I. y--I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s ~ day of January, 2015, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
_t../felecopy
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JAN 27 2015
ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

INTRODUCTION
This reply memorandum is intended solely to respond to the State's contentions
requiring further discussion for proper determination of the issues. Mr. Arenas
specifically adopts his opening memorandum arguments on each and every issue whether
or not discussed individually below and does not waive the issues not expressly addressed
herein.
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I.

The Initial Detention was Invalid
The State concedes that a traffic stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion

and relies upon LC. § 49-637 as the sole basis for the detention. (State's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, hereinafter "State's Opp.," p. 3.) To
support the touching of the fog line as 'reasonable suspicion," the State relies on State v.

Neal, 2014 WL 5151426. However, the State fails to inform the Court that on December
18, 2014, the Idaho Supreme Court granted a petition for review in the Neal case, so that
the decision is not binding precedent on this Court. See. I.A.R., Rules 38 and 118. (A
Copy of the Order Granting Review is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.) Thus, if anything,
this Court could note that the Magistrate Judge in Neal held the traffic stop was not
reasonable even though the driver there had driven on the fog line twice.
Since Neal is no longer citable or binding, this Court should rely on the numerous
cases cited by the Defendant as persuasive reasoning that the detention was illegal. 1
The State next contends that Mr. Arenas must show that the move was made "with
safety" or "as nearly as practicable." But when an officer detains a person without a
warrant, the burden is on the prosecution to justify the stop. In this case, this Court has
the evidence from the video, in which the officer can be seen following the vehicle. From

1The

State contends that "[t]he Defendant's argument is based solely on an Iowa
Supreme Court case." (State's Opp., p. 4.) However, Mr. Arenas cited other cases both
federal and state, many of which were relied upon by the Iowa Supreme Court.
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that evidence alone, this Court should conclude that the vehicle was driven "as nearly as
practicable" within the lane -there is a slight touching of the lane for a mere second or
so, at the point when another vehicle is passing from the opposite direction. Moreover,
there is no contention from the officer that the touching of the line was made in an unsafe
manner, nor does the video depict any unsafe movement. Indeed, the video appears to
demonstrate proper defensive driving. This type of evasive maneuver is common at night
on a two lane highway, as drivers often move slightly away from oncoming traffic and
this is a natural response to the glare of bright headlights and the danger of cars passing in
the opposite direction.
Finally, the State argues that State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32 P.2d 685 (Ct. App.
2001) should control in this case. But there, the evidence was clear that the vehicle did
not merely touch the line, but crossed it with the vehicles right side tires and, importantly,
there was significant other evidence to support the detention:
The state's evidence indicates that on April 1, 1999, at about 6:47 p.m.,
Kellogg Police Officer Dewey Bums observed the two right side tires of
Slater's vehicle cross the fog line on the side of the highway on-ramp as that
vehicle entered the highway. Officer Bums believed that Slater was
involved in the manufacture and distribution of drugs and was aware that
he was out of custody pending appeal for a drug related offense. Bums
followed Slater's vehicle for several miles, observing the vehicle being
driven at varying speeds between 40 and 65 miles per hour in a 75 mile per
hour zone, before initiating a traffic stop. Slater's vehicle did not
immediately pull over when Officer Bums activated his car's overhead
lights and siren, but proceeded down the highway more than a mile before
turning off the highway and into a service station.
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Id. at 296-97.

Moreover, the fog line in Slater demarcated the "roadway," whereas here the brief
touching of the line occurred right at the point where there was another lane which was
part of the roadway and on which the vehicle could have been driven.
Finally, the State wants the Court to accept the testimony of the officer that the
vehicle's tires were fully across the line, even though the video does not show that.
(State's Opp., p. 1.) But if it is difficult for the lane crossing to be seen on the video
"[b]ecause it is raining and dark," one must assume that the same conditions impaired the
officer's ability to see and the he may have been mistaken. Indeed, the video camera is
placed on the front dashboard, to the right of the driver, with an unobstructed view of the
driving pattern, so the video actually had the better view. For these reasons, this Court
must find that there is not sufficient evidence to prove that the vehicle did anything other
than briefly touch the white line.
2.

The Search of Mr. Arenas's Person and Vehicle was Illegal
The State contends that the search of the Mr. Arenas's person was justified by the

arrest on the warrant. (State's Opp., pp. 6-7.) Since the State does not address the
attenuation issue, the Defendant will not reiterate his argument that the discovery of the
warrant was not sufficiently attenuated here under the Fourth Amendment. However, Mr.
Arenas provides additional support for this position in State of Utah v. Strieff, Jr., 2015
UT 2 (decided on January 16, 2015). (A copy of the decision is attached hereto as Exhibit
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2.) Because of the lack of attenuation, the discovery of the "meth pipe' in Mr. Arenas's
pocket must be suppressed.
Once that item is suppressed, the State's reliance on State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho
247, 233 P.3d 1787 (Ct. App. 2010), completely vanishes. But even if the pipe is not
suppressed, the search of the vehicle is not valid. As the Supreme Court stated, "Police
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense ofarrest." Arizona v.

Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (emphasis added). Here, the officer initiated his plan to
search the vehicle when he had no knowledge of the offense he had arrested Mr. Arenas
for -the officer tells Mr. Arenas it is a probation violation, but the officer has no other
information. Because Mr. Arenas was not placed under arrest for the meth pipe before
the search of the vehicle, the search of the vehicle cannot be justified under Gant or

Cantrell.
3.

The Miranda Violations
The State concedes that no Miranda warnings were provided before Mr. Arenas

acknowledged there was a meth pipe in his pocket. However, Mr. Arenas was in custody
and the officer's comments were the type to elicit an incriminating response. Therefore,
this statement must be suppressed.
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The State points to the very end of the audio tape which records an officer's that
Miranda warnings had been given. (See, 39:15 minutes into the audio tape.) While this
is heard on the tape, it is unclear that this comment refers to the warnings provided to Mr.
Arenas outside the patrol car. This is because just two minutes before the officer states
that no Miranda warnings had yet been given. (Approximately 37 minutes on the tape.)
Also, the video camera tape, which ends at about the time the officer says warning were
given, does not depict any conversation between the officer and Mr. Arenas who remains
seated in the back of the patrol car at that time.
Thus, while the officer testified that the warnings were given at some point, the
audio and video tapes do not depict those warnings. In any case, the statements made by
Mr. Arenas and his showing the additional baggies must be suppressed as the fruit of the
unlawful detention.
Finally, the search at the jail is also the fruit of the illegal detention and the item
found during that search must also be suppressed.
4.

Conclusion
For these reasons and those stated in the opening memorandum, this Court should

suppress the evidence from all of the searches in this case.
Dated: January 26, 2015

n~~dg~i
~=----===-----

-,~rew Parnes
Attorney at Law
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Andrew Parnes, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine,
Idaho; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business
address is 671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on January 26, 2015, I served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner noted:
Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
201 2nd A venue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333
_ _ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.
_ _ By hand delivering a copy of the same to the office of the attorney in Hailey,
Idaho.

-+

By sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his facsimile number:
788-5554.
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR REVIEW
Supreme Court Docket No. 41534-2013
Ada Cowity No. 2012-17239

)

NATHAN DAVID NEAL,

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

A PETITION FOR REVIEW was filed by coW1Sel for Appellant on November 4, 2014, and
a MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PEffiION FOR REVIEW with attachments was filed by
cowisel for Appellant on November 17, 2014, requesting this Court for review of the published
Opinion issued by the Idaho Court of Appeals on October 15, 2014.

This Court being fully

advised; therefore,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's PETITION FOR REVIEW be, and hereby is,
GRANTED as to the issues presented in this appeal.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Respondent shall file a Brief in response to the Brief ftled by
the Appellant in Support of the Petition for Review on or before twenty-one (21) days of the date of
this Order. Appellant shall file with this Court any Reply Brief within fourteen (14) days from the
date of filing of Respondent's Brief.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Court of Appeals Case No. 41534 is CLOSED and Supreme
Court Case No. 42729 shall be used on all future filings in diis proceeding.
!

DATED this \'\

i

day of December, 2014.

By Order of the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon,ierk
cc:

Counsel of Record

EXr11BIT

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW - Docket No. 41534-2013
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

2015 UT2
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
V.

EDWARD JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR.,

Petitioner.
No.20120854
Filed January 16, 2015
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Michele M. Christiansen
No. 071900011
Attorneys:
Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for respondent
Joan C. Watt, Robert K. Engar, Salt Lake City, for petitioner
JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING,
JUSTICE DURHAM, and JUSTICE p ARRISH joined.
JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:

,Jl In this case we are asked to determine the applicability of
the "attenuation" exception to the exclusionary rule to a fact pattern addressed in a broad range of lower-court opinions but not
by the United States Supreme Court. The essential fact pattern involves an unlawful detention leading to the discovery of an arrest
warrant followed by a search incident to arrest. The attenuation
inquiry is essentially a proximate cause analysis. It asks whether
the fruit of the search is tainted by the initial, unlawful detention,
or whether the taint is dissipated by an intervening circumstance.
As applied to the outstanding warrant scenario, the question pre-

EXHIBIT

Q.

113 of 200

ST A TE v. STRIEFF

Opinion of the Court
sented is whether and how to apply the attenuation doctrine in
this circumstance.
,r2 The lower courts are in disarray in their application of the
attenuation doctrine to the outstanding warrant scenario. In some
courts the discovery of an outstanding warrant is deemed a
"compelling" or dispositive "intervening circumstance," purging
the taint of an initially unlawful detention upon a showing that
the detention was not a "purposeful" or "flagrant" violation of the
Fourth Amendment. l In other courts, by contrast, the outstanding
warrant is a matter of '"minimal importance,"' and the doctrine's
applicability is strictly curtailed. 2
i-13 We adopt a third approach. We conclude that the attenuation exception is limited to the general fact pattern that gave rise
to its adoption in the United States Supreme Court-of a voluntary act of a defendant's free will (as in a confession or consent to
search). For cases arising in the context of two parallel acts of police work-one unlawful and the other lawful-we interpret the
Supreme Court's precedents to dictate the applicability of a different exception (inevitable discovery).
,r 4 Our holding is rooted in our attempt to credit the terms of
the attenuation doctrine as prescribed in the Supreme Court's
opinions, while also respecting the parallel doctrine of inevitable
discovery. Thus, we read the Court's attenuation cases to define
the conditions for severing the proximate causal connection between a threshold act of police illegality and a subsequent, intervening act of a defendant's free will. And in the distinct setting of
both unlawful and then lawful police activity, we deem the inevitable discovery doctrine to control. Because this case involves no
independent act of a defendant's free will and only two parallel
lines of police work, we hold that the attenuation doctrine is not
implicated, and thus reverse the lower court's invocation of that
doctrine in this case.

1

United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 522, 23 (7th Cir. 1997).

2 State v. Moralez, 300 P.3d 1090, 1102 (Kan. 2013) (quoting State
v. Hummons, 253 P.3d 275, 278 (Ariz. 2011)).
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I. Background

,rs In December, 2006, an anonymous caller left a message on
a police drug tip line reporting "narcotics activity" at a South Salt
Lake City residence. Police officer Douglas Fackrell subsequently
conducted intermittent surveillance of the residence for approximately three hours over the course of about one week. During
that time, the officer observed "short term traffic" at the home.
The traffic was not "terribly frequent," but was frequent enough
that it raised Officer Fackrell' s suspicion. In Officer Fackrell' s
view, the traffic was more than one would observe at a typical
house, with visitors often arriving and then leaving within a couple of minutes. Thus, the officer concluded that traffic at the residence was consistent with drug sales activity.
i!6 During his surveillance of the residence, Officer Fackrell
saw Edward Strieff leave the house - though he did not see him
enter- and walk down the street toward a convenience store. As
Strieff approached the convenience store, Officer Fackrell ordered
Strieff to stop in the parking lot. Strieff complied. Officer Fackrell
testified that he detained Strieff because "[Strieff] was coming out
of the house that [he] had been watching and [he] decided that
[he'd] like to ask somebody if [he] could find out what was going
on [in] the house." Officer Fackrell identified himself as a police
officer, explained to Strieff that he had been watching the house
because he believed there was drug activity there, and asked
Strieff what he was doing there.
i!7 Officer Fackrell also requested Strieff' s identification,
which Strieff provided. Officer Fackrell then called dispatch and
asked them to run Strieff's ID and check for outstanding warrants.
Dispatch responded that Strieff had "a small traffic warrant." Officer Fackrell then arrested Strieff on the outstanding warrant and
searched him incident to the arrest. During the search, the officer
found a baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in
Strieff' s pockets.

,rB

Strieff was charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. He
moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search incident to
his arrest, arguing that it was fruit of an unlawful investigatory
stop. The State conceded that Officer Fackrell had stopped Strieff
without reasonable articulable suspicion (given that Officer
Fackrell had not seen Strieff enter the house, did not know how
long he had been there, and knew nothing of him other than that
3
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he left the house). The State argued, however, that the exclusionary rule did not bar the evidence seized in the search because the
attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule applied.
if9 The district court agreed and denied Strieff's motion to
suppress and subsequent motion to reconsider. First, the district
court found that Officer Fackrell "believed he had seen enough
short-term traffic at the house to create a reasonable suspicion that
the house was involved in drug activity," and thus that the purpose of the stop "was to investigate a suspected drug house." Second, while acknowledging that Officer Fackrell' s belief that he
had sufficient suspicion to stop Strieff was incorrect, the court
concluded that "the stop was not a flagrant violation of the Fourth
Amendment" but a "good faith mistake on the part of the officer
as to the quantum of evidence needed to justify an investigatory
detention." Finally, "[w]eighing the factors in their totality," the
court found "suppression to be an inappropriate remedy," concluding that "the search was conducted after discovering an outstanding warrant and arresting the Defendant on that warrant, an
intervening circumstance that Officer Fackrell did not cause and
could not have anticipated."
iflO Strieff entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia, reserving his right to appeal the order denying his motions to suppress and reconsider. The court of appeals
affirmed under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule
recognized in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). State v. Strief!,
2012 UT App 245, 286 P.3d 317. Applying the factors set forth in
Brown, a majority of the court of appeals concluded that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant was a powerful "intervening circumstance" dissipating the taint of the unlawful detention, and that Officer Fackrell's detention of Strieff was not a
"purposeful" or "flagrant" violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at ,r,r 21, 27. And although the "temporal proximity" of the
discovery of the warrant weighed against attenuation, the majority deemed that factor outweighed by the existence of an intervening circumstance and the lack of a purposeful or flagrant violation. Id. at 29-30, 37.

,ru Judge Thorne dissented. He disagreed with the majority's
analysis of the attenuation factors as applied to this case. Id. at
if if 46, 48-50. And he expressed discomfort with what he saw as an
4
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inconsistency between the outcome of this case and that of State v.
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159, a case arising under similar
facts but decided under the inevitable discovery exception. Strieff
filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted.
if 12 On certiorari, we review not the underlying decision of the
district court but the ultimate decision of the court of appeals- a
decision that merits no deference in our analysis. See State v. Verde,
2012 UT 60, ,r 13, 296 P.3d 673. "That said, [t]he correctness of the
court of appeals' decision turns, in part, on whether it accurately
reviewed the district court's decision under the appropriate
standard of review." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted). And the deference, if any, we owe to the district
court's decision varies depending on the nature of the determination in question.
if 13 First, any factual determinations made by the district court
are entitled to substantial deference under a standard of review
for clear error. See Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby
B.), 2012 UT 35, ,r 40, 308 P.3d 382. Second, to the extent the district court's decision implicated pure legal questions regarding the
terms and conditions of the attenuation exception, the court's resolution of those questions is reviewed for correctness. See HiCountry Prop. Rights Grp. v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ,r,r 13-14, 304 P.3d
851 (noting that threshold legal determinations embedded within
mixed determinations are reviewed for correctness like any other
determination of law). Finally, the district court's application of
the attenuation exception to the facts of this case is likewise a determination that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Wonvood,
2007 UT 47, ,r,r 11-12, 164 P.3d 397. Although that decision is a
"mixed" determination of fact and law, it is one of those decisions
that is "law-like" in that our resolution of it lends itself to "consistent resolution by a uniform body of appellate precedent." In re
Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 44.
IL The Exclusionary Rule and the Attenuation Doctrine
if14 Although this case concerns a single exception to the exclusionary rule (attenuation), that exception is best conceptualized
within the broader context of the rule and as one of a range of exceptions that define its limits. We accordingly start with first principles, explaining the basis for the rule and describing the contours of various exceptions that are related to the attenuation doc-
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trine (independent source and inevitable discovery). From there
we outline the elements of the attenuation exception as relevant to
the disposition of this case. And we conclude this section by outlining the approaches that various lower courts (state and federal)
have taken in cases involving the attenuation doctrine and the
discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant.
A. The Rule and its Exceptions
115 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy that gives life to that protection. In its
most basic terms, the exclusionary rule suppresses the admission
of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). It is a prudential doctrine, created
by courts to "compel respect for the constitutional guaranty." Davis v. United States,_ U.S.
131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (citations
omitted). There is no constitutional right to exclusion, nor is the
doctrine designed to redress the injury occasioned by a Fourth
Amendment violation. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
exclusionary rule's "sole purpose ... is to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations." Id.
_J

116 While deterrent value is a "necessary condition for exclusion," it is "not a sufficient one." Id. at 2427 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Exclusion of otherwise-relevant and probative
evidence from criminal proceedings "exacts a heavy toll on both
the judicial system and society at large." Id. at 2427. The rule, after
all, often "suppress[es] the truth and set[s] the criminal loose in
the community without punishment." Id. at 2427 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117 The terms and conditions of the exclusionary rule must appropriately account for these concerns. Thus, "[f]or exclusion to be
appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs." Id.
118 The exclusionary rule is far from absolute. In the simplest
case for exclusion, evidence is "direct or primary in its relationship to the [police action]." 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, § 9.3(a) (3d ed. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In those cases, the connection between the illegal police action and the evidence is clear and close. In other cases, the challenged evidence is less directly connected to the illegality, but is
6
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"secondary or derivative in character." Id. (describing as "secondary" or "derivative," examples such as "physical evidence located
after an illegally obtained confession, or an in-court identification ... made following an illegally conducted pretrial identification"). In these cases, there is a disconnect-factual, legal, or temporal- between the unconstitutional conduct and the evidence.
These disconnects give rise to a series of exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
B. Independent Source, Inevitable Discovery, and Attenuation
119 Evidence seized as a result of an illegal search or seizure
may be admitted under three "closely related but analytically distinct" exceptions to the exclusionary rule: (1) the independent
source exception, (2) the inevitable discovery exception, and (3)
the attenuation exception. United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897
F.2d 1099, 1113 (11th Cir. 1990).
120 Under the independent source doctrine, the "taint" that is
otherwise-attached to the fruit of police misconduct is removed
when the same fruit is derived from lawful police activity. See
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988). In the classic independent source scenario, "an unlawful entry has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has been learned by
other means." Id. at 538. In Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
800-01 (1984), for example, drug enforcement agents unlawfully
entered defendant's apartment and remained there until a search
warrant was obtained. The United States Supreme Court deemed
the evidence acquired pursuant to the valid, untainted warrant
admissible because it was discovered pursuant to an "independent source." Id. at 813-14.
121 This exception has also been extended to circumstances
where the fruit obtained through an independent source was itself
previously obtained unlawfully-"that is, in the example just given, to knowledge of facts x and y," and not just z. Murray, 487 U.S.
at 538. In Murray, drug enforcement agents entered a warehouse
unlawfully and observed burlap-wrapped bales of marijuana, but
then subsequently seized the same evidence upon execution of a
valid search warrant. Assuming the agents "would have sought a
warrant [even] if they had not earlier entered the warehouse" (a
matter not resolved on the record in Murray and thus meriting a
remand), the Supreme Court held that the execution of the war7
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rant would remove the taint of the earlier unlawful entry. Id. at
542-43 (noting that the search pursuant to the warrant would not
have been a "genuinely independent source . . . if the agents' decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen
during the initial entry, or if information obtained during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to
issue the warrant") (footnote omitted).
,r22 The independent source doctrine thus turns on cause-infact analysis. A source is independent-in a manner removing the
taint arising from a prior act of police misconduct-if it actually
led to the discovery of the evidence in question and would have
done so even in the absence of police misconduct. Where that is
the case, there is no longer a sufficient deterrence-based justification for exclusion:

[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police
conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly
balanced by putting the police in the same, not a
worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred .... When the
challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a
worse position than they would have been in absent
any error or violation.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).

,r23 The inevitable discovery doctrine is related. Here the classic case is Nix. In Nix, the defendant had made incriminating
statements in response to police investigation impinging on the
right to counsel-which statements led police to the discovery of a
victim's dead body. Id. at 435. But the record also indicated that a
search had been underway that inevitably would have led to the
discovery of the victim's body but for the defendant's unlawfully
obtained statements. Id. at 448-50. And the Nix Court upheld the
admissibility of the fruit of the unlawful investigation based on an
inevitable discovery rationale-holding that "when, as here, the
evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered
without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no

8
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nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible."
Id. at 448.
124 Both the independent source doctrine and the inevitable
discovery exception are rooted in cause-in-fact analysis. The former forecloses exclusion when tainted fruits are actually obtained
through a truly independent source. The latter prescribes the
same result if the tainted evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.
125 The attenuation exception is distinct. It turns not on causein-fact analysis but on a question of legal cause. Thus, under Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), and Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975), evidence that would not have been secured but for
an unlawful search or seizure is nonetheless admissible if the legal
nexus between the police misconduct and the challenged evidence
is sufficiently attenuated that any tainting of the evidence is dissipated. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88 (declining to "hold that all
evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would
not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police")
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126 In Wong Sun, federal drug agents arrested the defendant
without probable cause, but he returned to the station house several days later and gave a voluntary confession. Id. at 491. The
Court ruled that drugs seized pursuant to the unlawful arrest
were properly excluded as fruit of a poisonous tree. Id. at 487 (noting that "this is not the case envisioned by this Court where the
exclusionary rule has no application because the Government
learned of the evidence 'from an independent source"'). As to the
confession, however, the Court held that it might escape exclusion
even if "it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions
of the police." Id. at 488. Specifically, the Court held that the admissibility of the confession should turn on "whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 Ultimately, the Wong Sun Court held the confession admissible under this standard. "On the evidence that Wong Sun had
been released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment,

9
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and had returned voluntarily several days later to make the
statement," the Court held "that the connection between the arrest
and the statement had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint."' Id. at 491.
,r28 The Wong Sun standard was extended in Brown. There, the
defendant was also arrested without probable cause and gave a
subsequent confession, but this time the confession came within
two hours after the arrest. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604. The Brown Court
found such a confession not to satisfy the fact-intensive, case-bycase analysis called for under the attenuation doctrine. Id. at 60405. In so doing, however, the Court articulated three factors of relevance to the analysis: the "temporal proximity of the arrest and
the confession"; the "presence of intervening circumstances"; and
the "purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Id. at 60304. These factors weighed in favor of exclusion in Brown because
the confession was given just two hours after the arrest without
any intervening event of any significance, and the arrest was patently illegal and undertaken "in the hope that something might
turn up." Id. at 605.
,r29 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Kaupp v. Texas,
538 U.S. 626 (2003). There the Court applied the Brown factors and
found the defendant's confession to be the fruit of his prior illegal
arrest. Id. at 633. In so doing the Court emphasized that (1) there
was "no indication ... that any substantial time passed between
Kaupp' s removal from his home in handcuffs and his confession
after only 10 or 15 minutes of interrogation"; (2) at least some of
the six officers involved in taking him into custody "were conscious that they lacked probable cause to arrest"; and (3) "the
State ha[d] not even alleged 'any meaningful intervening event'
between the illegal arrest and Kaupp' s confession." Id. at 633.
,r30 Thus, the attenuation exception eschews the "but for" approach to causation that drives the independent source and inevitable discovery exceptions. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268,276 (1978) (noting that the Court has "declined to adopt a 'per
se' or 'but for' rule that would make inadmissible any evidence,
whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which somehow came
to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest'). It instead endorses a more nuanced analysis akin to proximate causation. In asking whether the attenuation exception applies, we assess whether the causal chain has been broken by in10
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tervening circumstances. 3 And we do so in the light of the exclusionary rule's deterrence function. Thus, we "mark the point at
which the detriment of illegal police action becomes so attenuated
that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies
its cost." LAFAVE ET AL., supra,§ 9.3(c)).
C. The Attenuation Factors
,r31 The Supreme Court has set out (and we have applied) a
three-factor test to guide the attenuation inquiry. The three factors
are: (1) the "temporal proximity" of the unlawful detention and
the discovery of incriminating evidence, (2) the presence of "intervening circumstances," and (3) the "purpose and flagrancy" of
the official misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04 (1975); State v.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684,690 n.4 (Utah 1990).
,r32 The threshold inquiry for attenuation analysis concerns the
existence of "intervening circumstances." Such circumstances are
those that establish a break in the legal chain of events leading to
the discovery of the evidence at issue. See United States v. Green,
111 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, a circumstance is "intervening" if it is so distinct from the threshold Fourth Amendment
violation that it can be said that the challenged evidence is not a
product of "exploitation" of the illegality but instead the result of
'"means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.'" Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted).
,r33 A prototypical intervening circumstance involves a voluntary act by the defendant, such as a confession or consent to
search given after illegal police action. A voluntary confession or
consent to search might be the but-for product of an unlawful
search or seizure, but exclusion is foreclosed where the defendant's voluntary act is sufficiently independent to break the legal
connection to the primary violation. Under the caselaw, the independence of such voluntary acts is established, for example,
where the confession or consent comes well after termination of a

See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a
Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. LAW 463, 478-79 (2009) (noting the
Supreme Court's use of attenuation as "refer[ring] to situations in
which the causal chain between a Fourth Amendment violation
and the seizure of evidence ha[s] been broken.").
3
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defendant's illegal detention, after defendant's consultation with
counsel, or as a spontaneous comment not in response to any police interrogation. See LAFAVE, supra, § 9.4(a). Increasingly, courts
have extended this principle to the discovery of an outstanding
arrest warrant, see infra 1 38 n.5, a question to which we will turn
shortly.
134 Under the governing standard set forth in Brown, the question whether a particular circumstance is sufficiently "intervening" to dissipate the taint associated with a primary Fourth
Amendment violation "must be answered on the facts of each
case." Brown, 422 U.S. at 603. And that analysis, in turn, depends
on the relationship between the "intervening circumstance" factor, on one hand, and the "purpose and flagrancy" and "temporal
proximity" considerations, on the other.
135 Conduct is "purposeful" if it is "investigatory in design
and purpose and executed in the hope that something might turn
up." United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Flagrant" conduct is that which
is obviously improper-so far beyond the bounds of the Fourth
Amendment that law enforcement must have seen it as unlawful
but chose to engage in it anyway. See id.
136 Generally, close "temporal proximity" between the illegality and discovery of the evidence weighs in favor of suppression.
See State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1995). Thus, a
"brief time lapse" between a Fourth Amendment violation and
the evidence obtained may "indicate[] exploitation because the
effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate." Id.
D. Attenuation and Outstanding Arrest Warrants
137 To date, the United States Supreme Court's attenuation
cases have all involved confessions made by unlawfully detained
individuals. 4 Thus, the question presented here- of the applicabil-

See, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003) (suppressing
defendant's murder confession following unlawful arrest); Taylor v.
Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 694 (1982) (excluding a confession after finding insufficient attenuation); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
219 (1979) (excluding a confession obtained after an unlawful arrest); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) (holding that a confession was sufficiently attenuated); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
4
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ity of the attenuation doctrine to the discovery of an outstanding
arrest warrant in the course of an unlawful arrest or detention- is
a matter heretofore left to the lower courts.
138 Three principal approaches have emerged on this issue.
One set of decisions, exemplified by United States v. Green, 111
F.3d at 522, concludes that an outstanding arrest warrant may
qualify as "an even more compelling case" for an "intervening
circumstance" than a voluntary confession. Id. 5 The threshold basis for this determination in Green was the assertion that "[i]t
would be startling to suggest that because the police illegally
stopped an automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is
found to be wanted on a warrant-in a sense requiring an official
call of 'Olly, Olly, Oxen Free.'" Id. at 521. In addition, the Green
court suggested that an outstanding warrant is in some sense
more independent of lawful police activity than a voluntary confession. The basis for that conclusion was the assertion that "[a]ny
influence the unlawful stop would have on the defendant's conU.S. 471, 478-79 (1963) (excluding evidence of narcotics obtained
through unlawfully obtained and tainted confession).
This is a complete list of United States Supreme Court cases applying the attenuation doctrine. But it is certainly not an exhaustive list of cases in which the Court has employed the term "attenuation" in framing the exclusionary rule. That term has been
used in reference to a general principle of causation, in connection
with other principles of and exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006) (holding that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule was sufficiently attenuated); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 {1984) (stating that the
police misconduct and the evidence of crime "may be sufficiently
attenuated" to be admissible); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
805 (1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery doctrine in general
attenuation terms).
s See United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir. 2006)
(adopting Green's "compelling case" language); State v. Hill, 725
So.2d 1282, 1287 (La. 2008) (stating that the discovery of outstanding warrants was a "significant intervening event"); Hardy v.
Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Ky. App. 2004) (holding that
the intervening circumstance of the outstanding warrant "outweighed any possible [police] misconduct").
13
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duct is irrelevant," and thus that "there is less 'taint' than in the
cases already recognized by the Supreme Court and this and other
circuits as fitting within the intervening circumstances exception.
Id. at 522. Thus, the Green court extended the attenuation doctrine
to a case involving the discovery of an outstanding warrant in the
course of an unlawful arrest.6 It did so on the basis of its conclusion that the "purpose" of the stop in question was not to seek evidence against the defendant in question (Green) but "to obtain
evidence against" a third party (Williams), and that there was "no
evidence of bad faith on the part of the police," or any indication
that "the police exploit[ed] the stop in order to search [Green's]
automobile." Id. at 523.7

6 Within this first approach to attenuation, there appears to be
two lines of cases. One line expressly characterizes the discovery
of an outstanding warrant as a "compelling case" for an intervening circumstance (as in Green). See, e.g., Simpson, 439 F.3d at 496
(holding that defendant's outstanding arrest warrant constituted
an "extraordinary intervening circumstance"); People v. Murray,
728 N.E.2d 512, 516 (Ill. App Ct. 2000) (adopting Green's analysis
as "instructive"). A second line deems the outstanding warrant a
dispositive consideration, but without any express characterization of the warrant as a "compelling" or "extraordinary" intervening circumstance. See, e.g., McBath v. State, 108 P.3d 241, 248-49
(Alaska Ct. App. 2005); People v. Brendlin, 195 P.3d 1074, 1080 (Cal.
2008); People v. Hillyard, 589 P.2d 939, 941 (Colo. 1979); State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139, 1144 (Fla. 2006); State v. Cooper, 579 S.E.2d
754, 758 (Ga. App. 2003); State v. Page, 103 P.3d 454, 460 (Idaho
2004); Quinn v. State, 792 N.E.2d 597, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003);
State v. Martin, 179 P.3d 457, 458-63 (Kan. 2008); Hill, 725 So.2d at
1285; Cox v. State, 916 A.2d 311, 323 (Md. 2007); People v. Reese, 761
N.W.2d 405, 412 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Grayson, 336
S.W.3d 138, 147 (Mo. 2011) (en bane); State v. Thompson, 438
N.W.2d 131, 137 (Neb. 1989); Jacobs v. State, 128 P.3d 1085, 1089
(Okla. Crim. App. 2006); State v. Dempster, 434 P.2d 746, 748 (Or.
1967) (abrogated by State v. Bailey, 338 P.3d 702 (Or. 2014); Lewis v.
State, 915 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
7 See also Page, 103 P.3d at 459 (finding attenuation in conjunction with a conclusion that police conduct was neither flagrant nor
motivated by an improper purpose); Quinn, 792 N.E.2d at 602
14
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,r39 A second set of cases deems the discovery of an outstanding warrant a matter of '"minimal importance"' under the attenuation factors set out in Brown, and thus carefully limits the doctrine's applicability in the warrant scenario. See State v. Moralez,
300 P.3d 1090, 1102 (Kan. 2013).s These cases are motivated by the
concern that "[w]ere it otherwise, law enforcement officers could
randomly stop and detain citizens, request identification, and run
warrants checks despite the lack of any reasonable suspicion to
support the detention." Id. at 1102. 9 And they narrowly circumscribe the applicability of the attenuation doctrine by concluding
that (a) the short time between an unlawful detention and a search
incident to an arrest on an outstanding warrant "weighs heavily"

(finding "no evidence suggesting any impropriety as the purpose
for stopping Quinn").

See also United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 404-06 (6th Cir.
2011) (holding that the discovery of a valid warrant is a factor but
is not "dispositive"); State v. Bailey, 338 P.3d 702,704 (Or. 2014) (en
bane) (overruling prior precedent establishing a per se rule that
outstanding warrants attenuate taint and concluding that "the
weight assigned to the discovery of the arrest warrant depends on
the degree to which it was the direct consequence or objective of
the unlawful detention"); State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 306
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant should not be overemphasized to the ultimate
detriment of the goal of deterrence that animates the exclusionary
rule").
8

II

See also People v. Padgett, 932 P.2d 810, 816-17 (Colo. 1997)
(holding that the subsequent discovery of a possible warrant did
not overcome the other factors favoring suppression); People v.
Mitchell, 824 N.E.2d 642, 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) Qustifying the refusal to extend the attenuation doctrine on the ground that suppression appears to be the only way to deter police from randomly stopping citizens for the purpose of running warrant
checks"); State v. Soto, 179 P.3d 1239, 1244-45 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008)
(relying on Mitchell, holding that an outstanding warrant did not
sufficiently remove the taint of the initial unlawful conduct).
9

II
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against attenuation,10 and (b) an improper detention followed by a
warrant search "often will[] demonstrate at least some level of flagrant conduct" - of an "investigatory detention[] designed and
executed in the hope that something might turn up" - even if "the
detention is brief and the officers are courteous," id. at 1103.
,40 The third approach to the attenuation doctrine takes thesecond a step further. Under this third approach, an outstanding
warrant is less than a factor of "minimal importance" under the
attenuation doctrine; it is a matter that just doesn't implicate the
doctrine at all. This approach was articulated in a dissenting opinion in State v. Frierson, 926 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 2006) (Pariente, C.J.,
dissenting). In the Frierson case, Chief Justice Pariente proposed to
limit the attenuation doctrine to its original basis-to cases involving voluntary confessions resulting from an independent act of a
defendant's "free will" -and thus to decline to extend it to circumstances involving the discovery of an outstanding warrant. Id.
at 1149-50 (relying on Brown's articulation of the attenuation doctrine in terms of "whether a confession [that] is the product of a
free will" can be deemed an "intervening event" cutting off the
causal connection to the unlawful arrest). Because "the defendant's free will plays no role in the discovery of evidence in a
search incident to arrest pursuant to an active warrant discovered
during an illegal stop," Chief Justice Pariente asserted that the latter circumstance "bears little resemblance to that of a defendant
who confesses or consents to a search for reasons that may be attenuated from the illegality of the stop." Id. at 1150. And the Frierson dissent accordingly would have declined to extend the attenuation doctrine to cases involving an unlawful detention leading to the discovery of an outstanding warrant, concluding that in
this scenario "[t]here is no break in the chain of circumstances
from the illegal detention to the discovery of evidence in the form
of an act of free will on the part of the defendant." Id. at 1151.

10 See also Padgett, 932 P.2d at 816-17 (stating that the evidence
was obtained directly as a result of the unlawful stop "without
sufficient intervening time and circumstances to carry the prosecutions' burden of proof to demonstrate dissipation of the taint");
Bailey, 338 P.3d at 713 (stating that the short time between the unlawful detention and the discovery of the challenged evidence
makes it "less likely" to "break ... the causal chain").
16
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III. Attenuation as Applied to This Case
141 The threshold question presented concerns the applicability of the attenuation doctrine to cases involving the discovery of
an outstanding warrant in the course of an unlawful detention.
Strieff urges a view of attenuation along the lines of the Frierson
dissent described above, asking us to restrict the doctrine to circumstances involving an independent act of a defendant's "free
will" in confessing to a crime or consenting to a search. And because the discovery of an outstanding warrant is not an independent act of free will but a direct result of an unlawful detention, Strieff asks us to deem the attenuation doctrine inapplicable.
142 We reverse on that basis. For a number of reasons, we conclude that attenuation is limited to the circumstances of the cases
embracing this doctrine in the Supreme Court-involving a defendant's independent acts of free will. And in the distinct circumstance involving the discovery of an outstanding warrant, we
conclude that a different doctrine-the inevitable discovery exception - controls.
143 The origins of attenuation are in cases involving independent acts of criminal defendants. Wong Sun, Brown, and Kaupp all
involved a confession given by a defendant after an initial unlawful arrest. 11 And the logic and terms of the attenuation doctrine
developed in these cases are focused on separating the initial police illegality from the subsequent, independent acts of a defendant.
144 The seminal decision in Brown speaks in terms of whether a
defendant's "statements (verbal acts, as contrasted with physical
evidence) were of sufficient free will as to purge the primary taint
of the unlawful arrest." 422 U.S. 590, 600 (1975). And the Brown
Court quoted Wong Sun's formulation of the central inquiry under
the attenuation doctrine in parallel terms-of whether a defendant's voluntary statement was "' sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint"' of the unlawful arrest. Id. at 602 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1963)).
145 The significance of a defendant's independent act of "free
will" is also arguably inherent in the proximate cause premises of
the Brown formulation. Attenuation is focused on intervening cir11

See supra

1 37, n.4.
17
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cumstances sufficient to break the proximate connection to the initial violation of the Fourth Amendment. An intervening cause is a
"means sufficiently distinguishable" from the threshold illegality
that the taint of the initial violation is purged. Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
terminology is significant. In proximate cause parlance, an intervening cause is a subsequent, independent occurrence that materially contributes to the result. See Mccorvey v. Utah State Dep't. of
Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 442 (1965). Such a cause cuts off the legal causal connection to the act of an initial tortfeasor where the intervening cause
is not foreseeable (and is thus a superseding cause). See Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 1996).

,I 46 This concept cannot easily be extended to the discovery of
an outstanding warrant. The discovery of an outstanding warrant
is hardly an independent act or occurrence. It is part of the natural, ordinary course of events arising out of an arrest or detention.
And in that sense, even if the warrant could be thought of as
somehow intervening, it would hardly be unforeseeable. So to the
extent the attenuation doctrine is about proximate cause, see supra
,I 45, an outstanding warrant does not qualify, as it is not an independent act that is sufficiently removed from the primary illegality to qualify as intervening.
,I47 The attenuation factors articulated by the Supreme Court
also seem to cut in the same direction. First, consideration of the
"temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession," Brown, 422
U.S. at 603, reinforces the centrality of proximate cause analysis. If
an extended time lapse is a plus factor for attenuation- as it clearly is as the test has been formulated- the focus must necessarily
be on independent acts removed from the primary act of police
misconduct. Indeed, applying this factor to the discovery of an
independent warrant would turn the inquiry on its head. In the
context of an unlawful detention followed by a warrants check,
temporal delay would logically count in favor of the government.
The constitutional violation in a Terry stop, after all, is a product
of the unreasonable delay associated with an individual's detention by the government. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
686 (1985). So the government could hardly assert the lack of
"temporal proximity" in the discovery of a search warrant as a
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basis for attenuation (and thus avoidance of the exclusionary
rule).
,-r48 Second, the Brown Court's formulation of the "purpose and
flagrancy" factor is also ill-suited to the outstanding warrant scenario. In Brown, the Court's application of this factor was focused
on the "manner in which [the defendant's] arrest was affected,"
with particular attention to whether that "manner" gave "the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and
confusion." 422 U.S. at 605. This, again, is an outgrowth of the inquiry into proximate causation, as a purposeful attempt at "surprise, fright, and confusion" could predictably yield a confession
that would be entirely foreseeable (and thus connected to-and
hardly independent of-the primary police misconduct). And that
assessment would have little application to the outstanding warrant scenario, where "surprise, fright, and confusion" are utterly
irrelevant.
,-r49 These are indications that the Supreme Court's attenuation
doctrine is directed only at intervening circumstances involving a
defendant's independent acts of free will (such as a confession
and perhaps a consent to search). An even stronger signal appears
in the terms of a parallel doctrine, the inevitable discovery exception. As noted above, this exception exempts from exclusion evidence that is the but-for result of police misconduct but that also
would inevitably have been produced by untainted police work.
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448-50 (1984). This doctrine is directly implicated in a case like this one, involving two parallel acts
of police work-one a violation of the Fourth Amendment (detention without reasonable suspicion) and the other perfectly legal
(execution of an outstanding arrest warrant). See State v. Topanotes,
2003 UT 30, ,-r 22, 76 P.3d 1159 (holding, in a case involving an unlawful detention leading to the discovery of an outstanding warrant, that evidence uncovered in a search incident to arrest on the
warrant did not qualify under the inevitable discovery exception
and thus was subject to suppression). And extension of the attenuation doctrine to the outstanding warrant scenario would eviscerate the inevitable discovery exception.
,-i5o That prospect is troubling. Ordinarily, where lawful police
work runs in tandem with an illegal parallel, the taint of the latter
is tough to eliminate. Under Nix, our law does not lightly excuse
an initial Fourth Amendment violation on the ground that it was
19
131 of 200

•
STATE

v. STRIEFF

Opinion of the Court
paralleled by a lawful investigation. Instead we insist on exclusion
unless the fruits of the lawful investigation would inevitably have
come about regardless of the unlawful search or seizure. That approach would require exclusion in this case, as our decision in the
Topanotes case indicates. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, , 20-21.
Granted, Strieff was lawfully arrested on an outstanding arrest
warrant, and a search incident to arrest was thus also perfectly
appropriate.12 But given that that arrest and search came about as
a but-for result of his unlawful detention, exclusion would still be
required under Nix unless the contraband he possessed would inevitably have been discovered in the absence of the threshold unlawful detention. And such a showing would be difficult at best in
a case like this one, as we cannot know whether Strieff might ultimately have had this contraband in his possession on any future
date on which he may have been arrested on the outstanding warrant.
,s1 Extension of the attenuation doctrine to this scenario would
blur the lines of the inevitable discovery exception. If attenuation
is a free-wheeling doctrine unmoored from voluntary acts of a defendant's free will, then the limits of the Nix formulation of inevitable discovery would be substantially curtailed. If Brown, and not
Nix, prescribes the standard for lawful police conduct removing
the taint from unlawful acts, then inevitability would no longer be
the standard. Instead, it would be enough for the prosecution to
assert that an initial act of police misconduct was insufficiently
"purposeful and flagrant" and lacking in "temporal proximity" to
a lawful investigation to sustain exclusion.
,s2 No court has yet extended the attenuation doctrine this far.
To date, the courts that have deemed the Brown factors to apply to
the outstanding warrant scenario seem to treat a search incident to
an arrest on an outstanding warrant as a unique form of lawful
police work. But there is no logical reason to treat such a search
any differently from any other form of police work. So the logic of
12 For this reason the professed concern about the lawfulness of
the arrest on the outstanding warrant, see Green v. United States,
111 F.3d 515,521 (7th Cir. 1997), is a red herring. The exclusionary
rule (with its attendant exceptions) is about exclusion of evidence.
No one is contesting-or even could reasonably contest-the arrest on the outstanding warrant.
20
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the decisions extending Brown to the outstanding warrant scenario will, if taken seriously, ultimately swallow the inevitable discovery exception.

,r 53

And even if these decisions are not taken to their logical
end, the resulting legal landscape (as it currently stands in many
jurisdictions) is untenable. Under the prevailing law in an increasing number of jurisdictions, one form of lawful police work (a
search incident to an arrest on an outstanding warrant) is favored
above all others (such as the completion of an outstanding investigation, as in Nix). This is equally problematic. A search incident
to arrest on an outstanding warrant has no favored status under
the Fourth Amendment. It is entirely arbitrary to subject most
lawful police work (pursued in tandem with unlawful activity) to
the high bar of inevitable discovery while lowering the bar for arrests incident to an outstanding warrant.
if54 We cannot adopt this premise without overriding the Nix
formulation of the inevitable discovery exception. And because
we construe the Brown formulation of attenuation to be limited to
cases involving a defendant's independent acts of free will, we
deem the attenuation doctrine inapplicable here, and reverse the
court of appeals on that basis. We therefore hold that Strieff was
entitled to suppression of the evidence secured in the search incident to his arrest in this case, as the attenuation doctrine advanced
by the State in opposition to that motion was not a viable exception to the exclusionary rule in this case.

IV. Conclusion
if55 The terms and conditions of the exclusionary rule have

been meted out by the Supreme Court in a piecemeal, commonlaw fashion.13 On matters not yet addressed by that Court, the
lower courts are left to fill in the gaps. This case implicates a gap
of substantial significance. And the courts that have addressed it
have come to substantially different conclusions.
if56 The confusion, in our view, stems from a threshold misun-

derstanding of the scope of attenuation. Thus, the reason the
courts have struggled to arrive at a consensus formulation of at-

See Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and
Frisk", 50 OKLA. L. REV. 451,460 (1997).
13
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tenuation as applied to the outstanding warrant scenario is that
the doctrine has no application in this circumstance. In the absence of guidance from the United States Supreme Court, courts
such as ours are left with only tea leaves. We are mindful, in today's effort to fill this gap in Fourth Amendment law, of the distinct doctrines of attenuation and inevitable discovery. To preserve the analytical distinction between the two, attenuation
should be limited to cases involving intervening acts of a defendant's free will. That holding, which we adopt today, avoids the
analytical dilemmas that are currently troubling the lower courts
(as to whether an outstanding warrant is of "compelling" or "minimal" importance, as to the significance of the "temporal proximity" factor, and as to the application of the "purpose and flagrancy" factors). Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court may
chart a different course. Such is its constitutional prerogative.
Ours is to make sense of and apply existing precedent, to fill in
gaps by reading any and all tea leaves available to us.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference/ Oral Argument
Hearing date: 2/23/2015
Time: 11:16 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter#
11.24

11.49
11.50

12.03

12.28
12.34

12.36

Counsel and Def. present.
Court introduces the case.
Mr. Parnes begins oral argument.
Court comments on the Supreme Court decision.
Mr. Parnes responds.
Court comments on law on touching/ crossing the fog line.
Mr. Parnes responds.
State responds.
Court comments.
State comments on the standard for reasonable suspicion.
Mr. Parnes responds.
Court takes the matter under advisement.
Mr. Parnes comments on the trial, requests to continue.
State agrees.
Court vacates 3/10/15 trial. Sets Status/S.C. for 4/13/15 at 10a.m.
Recess
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813 & CR-2014-0001814
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
State of Idaho vs. Luis Fernando Duran
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 4/13/2015
Time: 10:05 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Cathy Pavkov
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes, Christopher Simms
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter#
10.08

10.09
10.10

Counsel present, and Mr. Arenas present.
Court introduces the case.
Counsel identify themselves for the record.
Court comments on the status of the decisions on the motions to suppress.
Mr. Parnes requests a continued status in a couple weeks.
Court continues Status/Sch. Conference for 5/4/2015 at 9:30am.
Recess
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
State ofldaho,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CR-2014-1813

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas,

DECISION ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Defendant.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant is charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, Methamphetamine
and/or Amphetamine and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. This matter came before the Court
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress on the 15th day of December, 2014. The State ofldaho was
represented by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Matthew Fredback, and the Defendant was
represented by Andrew Parnes, Ketchum. Briefing ensued, and the Court set oral argument for
February 23, 2015. The Court took the matter under advisement following oral argument. At the
hearing witnesses to testify included Hailey Police Officer Manuel Ornelas and Hailey Police
Officer Jeremiah Jones. The Court has reviewed the video (Defendant's Exhibit A) and listened
carefully to the audio (Defendant's Exhibit B) of Defendant's stop and arrest. The Defendant did
1
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from the officers involved. Although the Defendant and State generally agree in regard to the
law that applies in this case (the exception being whether a couple of Idaho Court of Appeals
decisions are "final" or not) they disagree concerning the application of the law to the facts in
this case. This memorandum decision will constitute the Court's Findings and Conclusions on
the Motion to Suppress.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In this case, review of Defendant's Exhibits A and Bis relatively consistent with the

witness testimony.
The Initial Stop.
Hailey Police Officer Ornelas was on patrol the night of July 31, 2014. At approximately
10:23 p.m. he was travelling southbound on Highway 75 parallel to the Hailey airport. At that
time he observed a vehicle in front of him whose driver was later identified as the defendant,
Osvaldo Arenas. Just south of the airport tower, a slow vehicle turnout lane exists on the right
side of the southbound lane with a solid white line demarcating between the two southbound
lanes. Ornelas testified that he observed the vehicle drift onto the white line and travel down the
line for several seconds. At that time he activated the video camera located on the dashboard of
his patrol car. 1
The video begins at 22:19 after the hour. 2 The video shows Mr. Arenas's car driving
south on Highway 75 parallel to the airport runway. The road conditions are wet and there is a

1 Officer Ornelas testified that once he activates the camera, the recorder will save approximately 30 seconds of
recording taken before the manual activation. Thus the video in this case contains a period of time before the
camera was manually activated and shows the time frame in question.
2 The video shows the time as 23:22:19. The correct time was one hour before that. The parties agree that this
discrepancy doesn't have any impact on the issues in this motion.
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light rain falling. Mr. Arenas's car approaches the turnout lane at approximately 22:41 and
shortly thereafter a car approaches Mr. Arenas driving northbound. As the two cars pass each
other Mr. Arenas drifts to the right and apparently touches the white line dividing the turnout
lane (it is very difficult to see whether and to what extent the vehicle touched or crossed over the
dividing line in the video). It appears from the video that the vehicle's tires did at least touch the
white line but it did not drift so far right that it is obvious he crossed the line. The Court does not
find this discrepancy matters much. Thereafter the vehicle moves back left, undisputedly within
the proper lane, signals properly, and turns left at a stop light. Officer Ornelas then activated his
lights and stopped Mr. Arenas for failing to drive within a single lane under I.C. §49-637.
Officer Ornelas was wearing an audio recorder at the time of the stop. Officer Ornelas
testified that the sole basis for the detention of the vehicle was contact with the white line
dividing the turnout lane from the normal lane. This basis for the stop is supported by the audio
recording in which Ornelas stated as he contacted Mr. Arenas in the vehicle "you gotta be careful
with the lines, kay, cause you crossed over the lines, the white side lines." Officer Ornelas
probable cause affidavit also states that he "saw the Explorer as it crossed over the solid white
line."
The Court concludes that for purposes of this Motion to Suppress it is irrelevant whether
Mr. Arenas touched or crossed the line, but the visual evidence suggests there was merely a
touching of the line. Any view the officer had of the vehicle would have been impeded by the
conditions, just like the video evidence.

The Detention and Arrest.
Officer Ornelas turned on his audio recorder as he approached the vehicle. After telling
Mr. Arenas why he was stopped he asked Mr. Arenas for his driver's license. Mr. Arenas told
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Officer Ornelas that he didn't have a driver's license but told him his name. At that time Officer
Ornelas returned to his vehicle and ran Mr. Arenas's name through dispatch. At 5:50 seconds on
the audio recording Officer Ornelas was notified of an outstanding arrest warrant for Mr. Arenas
and that he did not have a driver's license. When Officer Ornelas returned to Mr. Arenas's
vehicle he informed the defendant that he didn't have a driver's license, requested that he exit his
car, and placed him under arrest for the warrant. Officer Jones arrived at the scene around this
•

time.

3

Once the defendant was outside the car, Officer Ornelas asked him if he had anything on
him. The Defendant responded "no." Ornelas proceeded to place the Defendant in handcuffs
and again asked whether he had anything on him. The Defendant again responded "no."
Ornelas patted down Mr. Arenas and upon feeling something in his pocket said "I thought you
had nothing on you dude." Mr. Arenas responded by saying it was "a piece ... a meth pipe."
Ornelas retrieved the pipe from his pocket and placed him in the back of his patrol vehicle. At
10:36 on the audio Officer Jones can be heard saying to Mr. Arenas that if you bring something
into jail it is another felony. There is no indication that Mr. Arenas responded to this statement,
at this time, with an incriminating response. 4
Officer Ornelas then proceeded to search Mr. Arenas's car. In the car he found a black
iPhone box that contained paraphernalia and traces of methamphetamine. Additional drugs were

3 Officer Jones arrived on the scene at around the time Officer Ornelas was calling dispatch (5:50 on the audio
recording). He did not tum his audio recorder on during the entire detention and arrest. Officer Ornelas audio
recorder was turned on for approximately 39 minutes. Much of Officer Ornelas audio recording includes the
discussion and arrest of the passenger in the vehicle. Mr. Ornelas turned his audio off at approximately 23:02 pm.
while Mr. Arenas sat in the back seat of the patrol vehicle until 23:59 pm. Officer Ornelas testified he was unsure
why he turned his audio of(
4 There was no additional discussion with Mr. Arenas about drugs at this time and Officer Ornelas went quickly
thereafter to search the vehicle.
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found in a white iPhone box on the passenger floorboard, which the passenger later admitted
were his.
Later, Officer Jones testified that he observed the Defendant acting fidgety and nervous
in the backseat of the patrol vehicle. He testified that he advised Mr. Arenas of his Miranda
rights and told him again that ifhe brought drugs into jail, he would be charged with another
felony. 5 Officer Jones further testified that, at this time, Mr. Arenas admitted to having baggies
of methamphetamine tucked inside his waistline. Officer Ornelas retrieved the baggies and the
substance was found to be methamphetamine.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1) Was the initial stop of Defendant supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion
(was the stop an illegal detention)?
2) If the stop was not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion, were the
searches subsequent to the stop attenuated?
3) Were statements elicited from the Defendant in violation of Miranda?
4) Was the search of Defendant's vehicle lawful?
Was there Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion for the Stop? Is it illegal to touch or cross
a fog line or lane dividing line?
The Idaho Supreme Court has accepted cases similar to this on appeal for review. See,

e.g.-State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, Sup.Ct. No. 42730. Although the Court of Appeals has also
rendered a decision interpreting a state statute regarding driving over or onto fog lines or other
5 This testimony is supported by the audio. At 37:20 on the audio Officer Ornelas informs Officer Jones that Mr.
Arenas has not been Mirandized. Later at 39: 15 Officer Jones returns to within earshot of Officer Ornelas and says
that he Mirandized Mr. Arenas, although the actual Mirandizing cannot be heard on Officer Ornelas's audio
recording. Accordingly, the Court finds Arenas was Mirandized between 37:20 and 39:15, which was before he
admitted to having the drugs in his waistband, consistent with the officer's testimony.
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lane dividers, that decision is under review by the Idaho Supreme Court as well. State v. Neal,
_Idaho_, 2014 WL 5151426 (Idaho App., 2014).
Counsel disagree on whether the Neal decision of the Court of Appeals is final and
therefore controlling on this Court. That precise issue presents itself again in this case. Whatever
decision comes from the Idaho Supreme Court may therefore control the outcome of this case to

some extent. 6 Meanwhile, this Court joins the chorus of other judges, attorneys, and legal
observers in expressing its views on the subject of driving between or onto lane dividers.
a) State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32 P.3d 685 (Ct. App. 2001) notwithstanding, I.C.§49630 provides no basis at all for the proposition that driving onto or over a fog line, but still on the
pavement, gives police reasonable and articulable suspicion or probable cause to stop a driver for
"driving off a roadway." That section defines under what circumstances a driver may drive left of

the center of a highway.
b) I.C. § 49-637. Driving on highways laned for traffic. - Whenever any highway has
been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all
else shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not
be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made
with safety ....

This statute, on its face, does not make it illegal in any sense to cross over any lane
divider. That statute contains far more than its first 14 words. It only makes it an offense to move
the vehicle from the driver's current lane if the driver fails to "first ascertain that the movement
can be made with safety .... " There is nothing illegal about a driver crossing entirely over ANY
lane dividing line. Drivers may cross over fog lines or center lines with impunity if they feel the
need to (safely) pass another vehicle, stop and check their car for mechanical issues, tend to a

There are other issues presented in this case even if the stop for crossing onto a lane divider is condemned by the
Idaho Supreme Court.

6
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crying baby, take a nap, go for a walk along the highway, take photographs, change drivers, get
out and have a smoke, or just breath in the clean air. A driver in Idaho is not forced to come up
with some explainable reason to pull over along any highway, across a fog or center line if
necessary, in order to do what he or she likes. Drivers do not have to have a good reason for

crossing a line, or an evident or plausible reason, or a reason they can explain to the police.
Period. They only need to cross those lines "safely." If it is not illegal to cross over lane
dividing lines, it cannot be illegal, or provide a sufficient basis for a stop, by itself, to touch or
drive over or onto a lane dividing line.
c) Fog lines were not put on highways to cram drivers closer to the center line or give the
police a basis to stop cars. Fog lanes didn't even likely exist at the time the statute was written.
They were put on highways for safety reasons, to give drivers some idea of where the edge of the
lane is, so that in bad weather or at night, drivers have something to go by (particularly at night
facing the headlights of other oncoming vehicles). This case doesn't even involve a fog lane. It
involves a vehicle touching a painted white line separating one lane of travel from a slow turnout
lane.
d) What is unspoken here, but readily apparent, (at least from the Court of Appeals
decision in Neal) is the notion that the police "need" this enforcement tool. The police made
plenty of DUI and traffic stops before this ever became an issue. The police, however, have
elevated the reasons they can stop drivers to "high art." This is both unnecessary and a
tremendous burden on the travelling public. In addition to not being illegal, touching a fog line or
lane divider does not provide reasonable and articulable suspicion to investigate whether some
other law is broken. At least not by itself! I It might provide reasonable and articulable suspicion,
along with other evidence, but, by itself, it does nothing of the kind Of course, if a vehicle goes
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over a line and back more than once, or there is weaving, or the vehicle travels for some distance
over the lane dividing line, or even if a vehicle is weaving improperly within its own lane, it may
give reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe some other offense may be occurring. But by
itself it provides none.
e) Some arguments, (made in the lower court, apparently, in State v. Neal) have been
made about whether a fog line is within or outside of a lane of travel, or "part of the lane," in
order to argue that touching (but not crossing over) a dividing line is acceptable. That argument
totally ignores the most basic concept before the courts here: that it is not illegal in any sense to
simply, (and safely), cross those lines. That theory is also the most ridiculous and illogical reason
out there to determine the meaning or intent of a statute, and is the reason people hate lawyers.
That analysis provides no basis whatsoever to determine the meaning or intent of LC.§ 49-637.

f) Very safe attentive, sober drivers travel over or onto fog lines repeatedly and on
purpose. Drivers would be shocked to learn they can be stopped for an abundance of caution,
say, for example, giving ground to an oncoming car on a two-lane highway because the
oncoming car has a bicyclist riding his fog line, or moving to the side with an oncoming wide
load, or simply hugging the inside of a long curve. All one needs to learn about driver behavior
can be gleaned from looking at curves where the fog lines are worn away in certain sections. Or
stand near a long curve on the highway between McCall and Boise, or between the blinking light
and Bellevue, and observe. In particular areas, it is not uncommon to see 7 of 10 drivers touching
or driving over a fog line, particularly when traffic is heavy. In interpreting statutes, and

determining whether it is a criminal act, or an infraction, to touch or cross a lane dividing line,
Courts need to apply these statutes to real life.

8
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g) This is not just some small debate about whether people can be stopped for touching a
fog line, and everyone knows it. If you are stopped, that's just the tip of the iceberg. Then the
police get to walk the drug dog around your car, ask you and your passengers to step out of the
vehicle, (and then likely search purses or do "pat downs" for weapons that might be used to
assault them), perhaps handcuff you for their safety, separate you from the others in your car and
inquire where you are going to or coming from, check ID's of all the passengers, ask "routine"
questions such as whether you have weapons or drugs in the car, or whether you are carrying any
large amounts of cash, ask if they can search your car, or check to see if you have bloodshot
eyes, (or yes, a "green tongue"), or whether you are giving "evasive answers," all in order to
develop further reasons to detain and/or search you. And if you do answer that you have
weapons, rest assured the police will want to "check them." If you have a large amount of cash,
and the police don't like your answers, that may be gone too. (CNN has runs special news
segments on that). And if the dog alerts on your car, 7 you may be there for quite some time.

8

So

whether and under what conditions the police may stop you in the first place is of monumental
importance.
h) If it seems like the Court is venting its frustration over already strained interpretations
of state statutes that give the police more and more authority to intrude into the everyday lives of
citizens, that assessment would be accurate. People on the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals,

It matters not how good or bad the dog actually is because no one is required to keep records of the dog's
successes or failures. The worst dog, as long as he is "certified," is actually the best dog for sniffing cars. And, as far
as the Court is able to ascertain, drug dogs do not seem to be required to give a verifiable "alert." The Court has
heard testimony before where the handler simply asserts the dog "changes his behavior," so that it is then left to the
handler to divine what the dog is actually signaling. Never mind that none of us have any clue what the dog is
actually smelling. Prescription drugs? Your kid's friends smoking pot in your car two weeks before? And promptly
after an "alert," rather than pointing up or finding what the dog is alerting on, (or what is not there) the dog routinely
goes right back into the police car while the police take all the time they want to conduct their search-of
everything.
8 The Court has personally observed a search at Redfish Lake at 1:30 in the morning in response to a dog alert on a
vehicle where the officers actually dug out and read the driver's mail from under the seat-no drugs were found.
7
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or legislators, or political figures, or the apparently upstanding local citizens, are not usually the
ones that get searched or detained, though that list is growing. This is because now the police can
know an awful lot about you before your car even comes to a stop. This is not meant to be a
criticism of the police. The police do a fabulous job of keeping us safe and enforcing the law.
But the police go as far as the courts let them. Somewhere, somehow, the courts must restore a
proper balance to this process. In order to do what they need to do, the police do not need
another strained interpretation of an Idaho statute.
i) Idaho is not the first state to analyze these statutes. For a lengthy and thorough
examination of the exact statute in question, as well as a rundown of law from other jurisdictions,

seeStatev. Tague,676N.W.2d 197,203 (Iowa2004).
The Court concludes it is not a violation of any Idaho statute for a driver to simply touch
a fog line or lane dividing line with the vehicle's tires. Such activity fails to provide probable
cause for a stop, and it fails to provide in general, and particularly under the facts of this case,
reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe the driver was engaged in, or about to be engaged
in, a violation of some other law.
Were the Searches Attenuated?
Regardless of whether the stop was legal (which will likely be determined by the Idaho
Supreme Court on appeal of State v. Neal), this Court must determine whether the searches
subsequent to the stop were attenuated. Assuming the stop was illegal or improper law
enforcement action, were there sufficient intervening factors or circumstances to break the causal
chain sufficiently to dissipate the taint of the illegal stop? The attenuation doctrine permits the
use of evidence that would normally be suppressed as fruit of police misconduct. In applying the
attenuation doctrine, the ultimate question is whether the police acquired evidence from
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"exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint." United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (ih Cir. 1997). For purposes of our
analysis this Court will assume that the stop here was illegal.
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that three factors should be considered to
determine if the unlawful conduct of the officer(s) has been adequately attenuated. These factors
are (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the
occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). The Idaho Supreme Court adopted
the Brown three factor test in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004). However, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that the discovery of a warrant satisfies only the second prong,
(showing an intervening circumstance), but that the other factors, particularly the flagrancy and
purpose of the improper law enforcement action, must be weighed in every case to determine
whether the taint of that misconduct is sufficiently attenuated. State v. Bigham, 141 Idaho 732,
734-735 (2005). Arenas has attached a case, Utah v. Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr., 2015 UT 2
(decided on January 16, 2015) to his Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress
Evidence which this Court finds persuasive, however, this Court is compelled to follow Idaho
case law.
1.) The elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence.
As in Green, in a typical attenuation case, a short lapse of time between the unlawful
conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence weighs against a finding of attenuation.

Bigham, at footnote 1. This Court agrees with that proposition. 9 A traffic stop is not a typical
attenuation case, however, at least not in Idaho. At a traffic stop it is typical and routine practice
9

As the Idaho Court of Appeals noted in that footnote, although usually a short lapse of time between the unlawful
conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence weighs against a finding of attenuation, it appears the Idaho
Supreme Court in Page used the minimal lapse of time as evidence ofa lack of flagrant conduct by the officer.
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for an officer to ask for the driver's license and run the name through dispatch without delay.
This Court assumes that at the time of a traffic stop, officers would ordinarily believe they had a
basis for their stop and are not conducting improper law enforcement action. 10 As a result,
information about the driver would routinely be found within close temporal proximity to the
improper law enforcement action, the illegal stop. The Court in Page, citing Green, stated that
an "outstanding warrant was enough of an intervening circumstance to dissipate the prior taint
because: It would be startling to suggest that because the police illegally stopped an automobile,
they cannot arrest an occupant who is found to be wanted on a warrant - in a sense requiring an
official call of "Olly, Olly Oxen Free."" Page at 846,459. This would lead to an absurd result.
People expect traffic stops to be completed rather quickly, and in the usual case, a warrant would
be found close in time to the stop.
Such is the case here. Officer Ornelas received information that Mr. Arenas had a
warrant out for his arrest within 6 minutes of the stop, and found the challenged evidence less
than 9 minutes into the stop.
2.) The occurrence of intervening circumstances.
The Page decision does not stand for the proposition that discovery of a valid arrest
warrant provides comprehensive insulation of police misconduct. Bigham at 735, 148. The
discovery of a warrant, however, does satisfy the second prong of the attenuation analysis and
weighs in favor of a finding of attenuation. Id. (See also Page at 846, 459). This is legal
precedent in Idaho that this Court cannot ignore. Officer Ornelas received information from
dispatch that Mr. Arenas had a valid arrest warrant. The Court finds this weighs in favor of a
finding of attenuation.

10 This Court believes that law enforcement almost always acts in good faith in trying to uphold the law. This
assumption also bears on the third prong of the Brown test.
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3.) The flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61
L.Ed.2d 357 ( 1979) that in the absence of any basis for suspecting an individual of misconduct,
the Fourth Amendment generally does not allow government agents to detain an individual and
demand identification. Based upon that, the Idaho Supreme Court in Page was "concerned about
the implications of a rule allowing law enforcement officers the ability to initiate consensual
encounters with pedestrians in order to seize identification and run a warrants check." 140 Idaho
at 845. In this case Mr. Arenas was detained or seized when he was stopped for touching a lane
dividing line. As discussed above, this Court believes that simply touching a lane dividing line
does not give rise to reasonable and articulable suspicion or probable cause to stop a driver.
However, even assuming that touching a lane dividing line is legal and that the stop here was not
justified by probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion, the flagrancy of the police
action in this case was not so flagrant as to tilt the scales against attenuation.

11

Currently, it is apparent that officers are stopping drivers throughout the state based upon
their touching of a lane dividing line. This Court has at least two pending cases on that same
issue and previously issued an opinion (now on appeal) in State v. Garcia-Rodriguez. However
the statute, and current controlling law, is not so clear as to make an officer's decision to stop
someone for what they consider a violation of l.C. § 49-637 clearly improper police conduct. In
fact, the officer's conduct in effecting the traffic stop here has been recently approved by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Neal and State v. Morris, but those decisions are not yet final.

If the lawfulness of touching or travelling over a lane dividing line is the subject of heated debate
The parties are well aware at this point of this Court's disagreement with the current interpretation of I.C. §49-637
by the Court of Appeals. The Idaho Supreme Court's position is as of yet unknown. It is not clear at this point how
this particular driving conduct will be construed in Idaho.
11
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among the courts of Idaho, it can hardly be considered a "flagrant" violation of legal standards
for purposes of the attenuation doctrine.
No matter how this Court interprets LC. § 49-637 or thinks it should be applied,
unless or until the decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals are overturned, officer conduct in
stopping vehicles pursuant to this statute does not rise to the level of flagrant conduct required to
outweigh the discovery of a warrant during a traffic stop.
Despite viewing the stop in a light favorable to Mr. Arenas, and in fact agreeing with Mr.
Arenas that the stop of his vehicle was unlawful, this Court still finds that at least one of the
searches was attenuated. The valid arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening circumstance
outweighing both the short time period and the flagrancy of the improper law enforcement action
in accordance with Idaho law. As a result, the search ofMr. Arenas 's person, pursuant to the
outstanding arrest warrant, resulting in the finding of the meth pipe, was lawful.

Was there a Violation of Miranda?
Once a person is "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way," it is incumbent upon the police to provide Miranda warnings before seeking to
elicit incriminating statements from the in-custody defendant. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966).
The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subject
either to express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term
'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant
to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.

Rhode Islandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980).
1.) Statement "Meth Pipe."
14
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Mr. Arenas argues that before giving Miranda warnings, Officer Ornelas elicited an
incriminating response during the initial search of his person incident to arrest, and that the
statement and the meth pipe must be suppressed because of it. It is a fact that Mr. Arenas was
not given Miranda warnings prior to the statement by the officer "I thought you had nothing on
you, dude." However, the officer made that statement after he had discovered the arrest warrant,
after he had Arenas step out of the car, after he had placed Arenas in handcuffs, and after he felt
the object in Arenas's pocket. Officer Ornelas also testified that when conducting that pat-down
"I felt a familiar object." At that point, with or without any oral response by Arenas, discovery of
the pipe was a foregone conclusion. Arenas's statement did not lead to the discovery of the meth
pipe. In addition, the Court does not find Officer Ornelas's statement any more likely to elicit an
incriminating response than if the officer had said "I know what that is." The officer did not
need, nor was he intending, necessarily, to obtain, an incriminating response. All he had to do
was reach in Arenas's pocket, and he knew it. The pipe was actually discovered during the
course of the pat-down search with or without any statements by Arenas or questioning by
Officer Ornelas. The pipe would have been taken from Arenas within seconds of Officer
Ornelas's statement ("I thought you had nothing on you, dude") whether Arenas made any
comment or not. Because the search was valid the meth pipe will not be suppressed, nor will
Arenas's statement about what it was.
2.) Admitting to "baggies in his waistband."
The defendant also argues that the baggies found in his waistband should be
suppressed because there is no audio or video of Officer Jones giving Mr. Arenas Miranda
warnings prior to Mr. Arenas admitting there were methamphetamine baggies in his waistband.
It is true that there is no audio of Mr. Arenas receiving Miranda warnings at any time.
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The Court finds that Mr. Arenas was properly Mirandized prior to making any
incriminating statements about the baggies. First, Officer Jones testified that he gave Mr. Arenas
the proper warnings prior to any incriminating statements about the baggies. Second, review of
the audio supports this conclusion. After the arrest Officer Jones can be heard telling Mr. Arenas
something like "you bring something into jail guess what.. .another felony." Exhibit B at 10:36.
There is no incriminating response to this statement by Arenas that can be heard. Following this
statement, or about the time it was made, Officer Ornelas was engaged with the passenger Duran
and then with a search of the vehicle. Later on the audio recording, at 37:20, Officer Ornelas told
Officer Jones that Mr. Arenas hadn't been Mirandized. Following that statement Officer Jones
left the presence (or audio reception) of Officer Ornelas. Officer Jones returned two minutes
later to tell Officer Ornelas, who was still talking with the passenger, that he Mirandized Mr.
Arenas. The police reports and testimony confirm that Officer Ornelas was the officer that
removed the baggies from Arenas's waistband. Testimony and audio confirm that Ornelas did
not remove the baggies from Arenas's waistband prior to Arenas being advised of his Miranda
rights. Additionally, it appears that there was a fairly significant lapse of time between the time
when Officer Jones first made the statement to Arenas ("you bring something into jail, guess
what...another felony.") and the time Jones testified that he Mirandized Arenas and Arenas
conceded the drugs were in his waistband.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Arenas was advised of his Miranda rights prior to
making any incriminating statement concerning the drugs in his waistband. That evidence is not
subject to suppression by Arenas.
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Search of the Vehicle Following Arenas's Arrest
The State has the burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement. Police
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense ofarrest." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,351 (2009).
In State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho 247 (Ct.App. 2010) the Court of Appeals relied heavily on a
Florida case Brown v. State, 24 So.3d 671 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009). In Brown the Court
determined that "the 'nature of the charge' is determinative of whether there exists a reasonable
basis to search for evidence, not whether there is some independent evidence that gives rise to a
belief that the particular vehicle contains evidence."
There is no argument by the state that Mr. Arenas was within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search and therefore that exception to the warrant
requirement does not apply. Secondly, there is no argument from the State that the arrest based
on a valid warrant for a probation violation justified a warrantless search of Mr. Arenas's car. 12
Certainly the officers could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Mr.
Arenas's arrest warrant. Thirdly, there is no evidence or argument that Mr. Arenas consented to
the search of the car. 13 Therefore the justification for the search must be based on whether it was
reasonable for Officer Ornelas to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of
arrest-possession of paraphernalia.

12 There is also no evidence as to what the probation violation consisted of or what the underlying conviction was
for, which may have supported a search of the vehicle under a theory as used in Brown or Chime/ v. California 395
U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
13 During his testimony, Officer Omelas's stated reason for searching the car was because Mr. Arenas had consented
to let his passenger take the car, and the officers searched the car for the passenger's safety. At 7:20 on the audio
Officer Ornelas states to the passenger that "we're going to have you drive." It appears from the testimony and the
audio that the search was conducted for the passenger's "safety" and not as a search incident to arrest or pursuant to
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. In any event, this reason is not sufficient to justify a search of
the vehicle by the officers.
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During the initial search of Mr. Arenas, Officer Ornelas found a meth pipe in his
pocket. As a result, Mr. Arenas was placed under arrest for the additional crime of Possession of
Paraphernalia. The State argues that "upon finding the methamphetamine pipe, it was reasonable
to believe the vehicle contained evidence relevant to the crime Arenas was arrested forpossession of paraphernalia. State's Memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress p. 7. Although the argument is a good one, the Court does not conclude that Gant or

Cantrell go this far. First, there was no testimony given by either officer why the finding of the
meth pipe in Mr. Arenas's pocket gave the officers reason to believe that there were drugs or
additional paraphernalia in the vehicle. Compare, State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115 (Ct. App. 2011)
where the officer testified that in his experience, when he finds a marijuana pipe there are often
drugs as well, in addition to other things, at least giving an arguable basis to conclude probable
cause existed. However, if one follows the opinion of the Florida Court in Brown, whereby "the
'nature of the charge' is determinative of whether there exists a reasonable basis to search for
evidence, not whether there is some independent evidence that gives rise to a belief that the
particular vehicle contains evidence" it is the opinion of the Court that matters, not the opinion of
the officers. That is, it appears the Court's duty here is to examine the nature of the arrest
(possession of paraphernalia) and make its own determination whether that leads the Court to
conclude the vehicle may contain other evidence of the crime for which defendant was arrested;
it is seemingly irrelevant whether the officer thinks so. Moreover, the analysis in the Smith case
is not that the officer testified the vehicle might contain further evidence of the crime for which

the defendant was arrested, that officer testified he should have been able to search the vehicle,
based upon finding paraphernalia,for evidence of other crimes. That particular issue is not before
this court.
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This Court will not infer that the finding of a meth pipe on a driver's person
automatically gives officers probable cause to search a vehicle. Second, there is no direct nexus
between the charge of Possession of Paraphernalia and the vehicle like there is with a DUI and a
vehicle (as in Cantrel[), other than the fact that Mr. Arenas was driving a vehicle. This is not
enough. Instead the nature of the charge, possession of paraphernalia, was complete once
Officer Ornelas found the meth pipe in the defendant's pocket. This Court would generally not
allow an officer to search a person's vehicle without a warrant simply because they found
paraphernalia or drugs on a person in the vicinity of their vehicle. Unlike in Cantrell, where a
DUI investigation does not begin and end with a breathalyzer report (and there is a direct link
between the charge and the vehicle - a DUI charge requires that the defendant have been driving
the car), this charge could stand or fall entirely with the meth pipe, regardless of whether Mr.
· · a car. 14
Arenas was d nvmg
For these reasons evidence found during the search of the vehicle must be suppressed.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The legality of the stop is essentially irrelevant to the overall analysis, at least so far. In
this case the Court assumed it was illegal. That could change in the event of an appeal.
2. The searches were attenuated. The discovery of a valid arrest warrant outweighs the
flagrancy of any improper law enforcement action (assuming there was improper law
enforcement action) and outweighs considerations around the amount of time that passed
prior to the search/discovery of the arrest warrant.
14

If the meth pipe had been suppressed it is highly likely that any evidence found in the vehicle would likewise be
suppressed, because there would be nothing to give rise to a reason to search the vehicle. Unlike a DUI, where a
liquor bottle found in the car can assist in a finding of guilt in the event a breath test or blood draw are suppressed, a
search of the vehicle in this case was not necessary to find other evidence to support the charge.
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3. The meth pipe shall not be suppressed because the search was valid.
4. The statement by Mr. Arenas that the object in his pocket was a "piece" or "meth pipe"
shall not be suppressed. Nor shall the pipe be suppressed due to any statement made by
Arenas after Officer Ornelas felt it during the pat-down search.
5. The baggies found in Mr. Arenas's waistband shall not be suppressed because the Court
finds that Officer Jones gave the defendant Miranda warnings prior to Mr. Arenas
admitting the bags were in his waistband.
6. The search of the vehicle was not justified based on the warrant exception to a search
incident to arrest, or any exception under Arizona v. Gant, and shall be suppressed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

M.J.

DATED this ( fo day of~y, 2014.

t/ifi!r-

Robert
District Judge
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I.C.R. RULE 49{b)
NOTICE OF ORDER

J

I, Deputy Clerk for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that on the
{fJ day of April, 2015, I
have filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document:
Jim Thomas, Esq.
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 lstAve South, Suite201
Hailey, ID 83333

Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 5988
Ketchum, ID 83340
aparnes@mindspring.com

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

1 Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Fax
Email

_1 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Fax
Email

( ' ~~
yClerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001814
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Luis Fernando Duran
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 5/4/2015
Time: 9:27 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Christopher Simms
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter#
9.36

9.37

9.40

Counsel and Defendants present.
Court introduces the cases.
Court takes Mr. Duran's case.
State has a motion to dismiss the Duran case based of the Court's decision.
Court reviews the motion and order- enters order.
Mr. Simms and Mr. Duran are excused from court.
Court takes up Mr. Arenas case.
Court sets 2 day J.T. 8/25/15 and a PTC for 8/3/15 at 9a.m.
Recess
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Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In and For the County of Blaine
2012nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, Idaho 83333
STATE OF IDAHO
)
Plaintiff,
) Case No: CR-2014-0001813
vs.
)
Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
) NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING,
PO Box456
) PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, AND
Hailey, ID 83333
) ORDER GOVERNING FURTHER
Defendant.
) PROCEEDINGS
)
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Pretrial Conference
Judge:

Monday, August 03, 2015
Robert J. El gee

09:00AM

Jury Trial
Judge:

Tuesday, August 25, 2015
Robert J. Elgee

09:00 AM

Total trial days:

2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties must comply with the following requirements:
1. Pre-Trial Motions: ALL pre-trial motions must be filed within 28 days from this date, and heard
within 42 days.
2. Discovery: Must be completed within 42 days of this date.
3. Pre-Trial Conference: The parties shall conduct a settlement conference before the date of the pretrial conference. The day of the pre-trial conference, the parties must be prepared to inform the Court
whether the case is going to trial and the results of the settlement negotiations.
4. Plea Bargain Agreements: All plea bargain agreements shall be reduced to writing before the date
of sentencing or dismissal. The agreement must be signed by the attorneys for both parties and by the
defendant.
5. Change of Plea: The defendant may use the pre-trial conference date to change his/her plea if notice
is given to the Court.
6. Motions to Continue: All motions to continue the trial date must be in writing and shall state the
reason for the motion. Motions to continue made by the Defense shall be signed by the Defendant.
All motions and stipulations for a continuation shall be accompanied by an order to vacate and reset
the trial and pre-trial conference. The dates for rescheduling the trial and pre-trial conference shall be
left blank so that the Court may fill them in.
7. Jury Instructions. Jury instructions and a list of witnesses must be submitted by the parties to the
Court at least 5 days before the trial date.
8. Waiver of Speedy Trial: A written waiver of speedy trial must be signed by the Defendant and filed
with the Court before the Court will schedule a trial date beyond the six-month period. The sixmonth period is calculated from the date of the District Court arraignment.
9. Alternate Judges: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned to this case intends to
utilize the provisions of !.C.R. 25 (a)(6). Notice is also given that if there are multiple defendants,
any disqualification pursuant to l.C.R. 25(a)(l) is subject to a prior determination under I.C.R.
25(a)(3). The panel of alternate judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been
disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan, Brody, Butler, Crabtree, Elgee, Hu lbutt, Schroeder,
Stoker, Wildman and Williamson.
Judge
NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING, PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & ORDER
GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS I
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I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday,
May 05, 2015.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
V
Mailed----6--Mailed

Hand Delivered
Hand Delivered

Andrew Parnes
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum ID 83340
Prosecutor:

Jim Thomas Blaine County Prosecutor
Mailed

Hand Delivered

___x__

Dated: Tuesday, May 05, 2015

By:

NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING, PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & ORDER
GOVERNING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 8/3/2015
Time: 9:00 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: ANDREA
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter#
9.06

Court introduces case, State represented by Mr. Fredback, Defendant present
with counsel Mr. Parnes
Mr. Parnes requests to vacate the jury trial and set for change of plea August
24th, 2015, matter is completely settled
State agrees, no objection to vacating trial
Court vacates trial on August 25th, sets change of plea August 24, 2015 at 10 a.m.

9.08

Recess
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Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In and For the County of Blaine
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, Idaho 83333
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
vs.

Defendant.

JoLynnCJrage, Ct.rkD/strlct
Court Blttlne Cou

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
PO Box 456
Hailey, ID 83333

AUG - 3 2015
, lalaho

Case No: CR-2014-0001813
NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Change of Plea
Monday, August 24, 2015
Judge:
Robert J. Elgee

10:00 AM

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Monday,
August 03, 2015.
ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned to this case intends to utilize
the provisions of I.C.R. 25 (a)(6). Notice is also given that if there are multiple defendants, any disqualification
pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(1) is subject to a prior determination under I.C.R. 25(a)(3). The panel of alternate
judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan,
Brody, Butler, Crabtree, Elgee, Hurlbutt, Schroeder, Stoker, Wildman and Williamson.

Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas V
Mailed- Mailed./

Hand Delivered- Hand Delivered

--

Andrew Parnes
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum ID 83340
Prosecutor:

Jim Thomas Blaine County Prosecutor
Mailed _ _

Hand Delivered

V

Dated: Monday, August 03, 2015
Jolynn Drage
Clerk Of The District Court

~

By:

Deputy Clerk
DOC22 7/96
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FILED ·
AUG 1 2 2015
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Avenue S., Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Telephone: (208) 788-5545
Fax: (208) 788-5554

JoLynn Dra~7e, Clerk District
Court Blaine Count~ Idaho

OR\G\NAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No.: CR-2015-1813
Citation No. 67334

Plaintiff,
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
CITATION

vs.
TEAL BLAKE,

Defendant.

Plaintiff State of Idaho moves the Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-3504 and
Idaho Criminal Rule 48 for its order dismissing the above-captioned criminal action.
The reasons for the dismissal are: (a) the Defendant has shown proof of a valid
Idaho fishing license for the date of the incident; and (b) Dismissal would serve the ends
of justice and the eff(3[IT; administration of the Court's business.
DATED this ~

day of August,

15.

STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS CITATION - Page 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2015-1813
Citation # 67334

Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS

vs.
TEAL C. BLAKE,
Defendant.

The Court, having considered the motion to dismiss filed herein, and good cause
appearing therefor, HEREBY ORDERS that the above-captioned criminal action be
dismissed.
DATED this

_lj__ day of August, 2015.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS- Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

V

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
/
day of August, 2015, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office
219 1st Ave S. Suite 201
Hailey, Idaho 83333
Teal Blake
1700 N FM 52 Road
Weatherford, TX 76088

_
/
_
_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

~ U.S.

_
_
_

Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Deptffy Clerk

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - Page 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Change of Plea
Hearing date: 8/24/2015
Time: 10:00 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter#
10.04

10.06
10.08
10.09

10.17
10.19

Counsel present, Def. present in custody.
Court introduces the case.
State reviews recommendations.
Mr. Parnes comments- presents written conditional plea, reserves Defs right to
appeal.
Court reviews Information, reviews maximum penalty.
Def. pleads guilty.
Mr. Parnes has had adequate time with the case and consents to a plea of guilty.
Def. is sworn under oath and questioned by the Court
Court accepts the Defs plea of guilty. Orders a PSI, sets Sentencing for
11/2/2015 at lOa.m., and enters an Order to Report
Recess
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I Fl[eo
AUG 2 ~. 2~15

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

~·~iJ,tf;,

1

.hiJQ7 ~ Cls,tc,

Co/Jrf R~ r',ntw,flt. ~

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813

WRITTEN ENTRY OF
CONDITIONAL PLEA

Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 1 l(a)(2), Defendant, Osvaldo Arenas, enters a
conditional plea of guilty to Count One of the Information reserving the right to appeal
the following issues:
(1)

whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and

statements as the result of an illegal detention, arrest, and Miranda violations.

WRITTEN ENTRY OF CONDITIONAL PLEA

1
169 of 200

Dated: August 24, 2015.

Dated: August 24, 2015.

a&g-s----=--:,
Attorney for Defendant

WRITTEN ENTRY OF CONDITIONAL PLEA

2
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AUG 2 %2C15
JoL'YfJl'I Drags, Clerk District
__ Court 8/elrii:I r',()Untv. Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
STATE OF IDAHO,
vs.

Osva\Jo 6uadaltwe,
Defendant.

nY2/ltlI

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER TO REPORT

The above-noted defendant having ~ plead guilty [ ] been found guilty [ ] been
sentenced for a felony offense,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The DEFENDANT SHALL REPORT to the Idaho Department of Correction, District 5
Community Corrections, Probation and Parole (731 Shoup Ave. West, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83301,
(208) 736-3080. ext. 10) as directed by the Court, but no later than 4:30 p.m. on the second
business day following the date and time of this Order. Initial reporting may be done by phone
unless otherwise directed by the Court.
Defendant shall keep all other appointments with the Idaho Department of Correction,
District 5, and/or with any evaluators or service providers required by the Court.
Failure to obey this Court Order is punishable as contempt of court and/or by revocation of
bond/release and/or by issuance of a warrant for your arrest.

DATED~___..K.,._[__
iJ--=--iY{l--"1__
5""~--

'
RobertJ.0 7¥
District Judge

Copies:
Prosecutor: Mailed( ) emailed( ) hand delivered or boxv,'faxed( )
Defense Counsel: Mailed( ) emailed ( ) hand delivered or box~faxed( )
Defendant: Mailed( ) emailed( ) hand delivered or box~ faxed ( )

Clerk of the District Co
By Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Sentencing
Hearing date: 11/2/2015
Time: 10:01 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Sabrina Vasquez
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas
Counter#
10.02

10.03

Counsel and Def. present.
Court introduces the case.
Mr. Parnes requests to continue the Sentencing to allow time for the Def. to
apply for drug court.
State has no objection.
Court continues Sentencing to 11/23/15 at 9:30a.m.
Recess
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IFILED~~/
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.

vs.

Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In and For the County of Blaine
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, Idaho 83333
)
)
)
)
Case No: CR-2014-0001813

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
PO Box 456
Hailey, ID 83333

)

NOTICE OF HEARING

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:
Sentencing
Judge:

Monday, November 23, 2015 09:30 AM
Robert J. Elgee

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday,
November 03, 2015.
ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the presiding judge assigned to this case intends to utilize
the provisions of 1.C.R. 25 (a)(6). Notice is also given that if there are multiple defendants, any disqualification
pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(1) is subject to a prior determination under I.C.R. 25(a)(3). The panel of alternate
judges consists of the following judges who have otherwise not been disqualified in this action: Judges Bevan,
Brody, Butler, Carey, Crabtree, Elgee, Schroeder, Shindurling, St. Clair, Stoker, Wildman, Woodland and
Williamson.
Defendant:

Private Counsel:

Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
,/
Mailed-4-

LMailed_t_

Hand Delivered

--

Hand Delivered· - -

Andrew Parnes
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum ID 83340
Prosecutor:

Jim Thomas Blaine County Prosecutor

l]llailed~

Hand Delivered _ _

Dated: Tuesday, November 03, 2015
Jolynn Drage
Clerk Of T
By:

D0C22 7/96
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
COURT MINUTES
CR-2014-0001813
State of Idaho vs. Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
Hearing type: Sentencing
Hearing date: 11/23/2015
Time: 9:36 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Defense Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Prosecutor: Matthew Fredback
Counter#
9.36

9.37
9.43
9.53

10.03

Counsel and Def. present.
Court introduces the case.
Mr. Parnes comments that the Def. has been accepted into drug court and
request the Court follow that recommendation for sentencing.
Court has reviewed the PSI.
Mr. Parnes has no corrections.
State makes comments and recommendations.
Mr. Parnes responds.
Def. has no comment.
Court comments to the Def., imposes 3+ 2 years prison, suspends execution, 3
years of supervised probation, attend and complete Drug Court, and reviews
other conditions of probation, fine of $1,000 suspended, court costs.
Recess
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
State of Idaho,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CR-14-1813

vs.

Osv
SS
D.0.8.

enas,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
UPON A PLEA OF GUilTY TO ONE FELONY COUNT,
SUSPENDING SENTENCE AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION
I.C.§ 19-2601 (2)

I. INTRODUCTION
1.

The date of sentencing was November 23, 2015 (hereinafter called sentencing
date).

2.

The State of Idaho was represented by counsel, Matthew Fredback, of the Blaine
County Prosecutor's office.

3.

The defendant Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas, appeared personally. I.C. § 19-2503.

4.

The defendant was represented by counsel, Andrew Parnes.

5.

Robert J. Elgee, District Judge, presiding.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION - 1
175 of 200

II. ARRAIGNMENT FOR SENTENCING. I.C. § 19-2510

1.

The defendant Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas, was informed by the Court at the time
of the sentencing of the nature of the defendant's plea, which in this case was:

Crime of: Possession of a Controlled Substance, a felony
Idaho Code: I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1)
Guilty by Plea -- date of: August 24, 2015

2.

The defendant was then asked by the Court whether the defendant had any legal
cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against the defendant, to
which the defendant responded "No."

Ill. PLEA OF GUilTY PREVIOUSLY ENTERED AND ACCEPTED
1.

The defendant, Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas, previously pied guilty on the date of
August 24, 2015, (hereinafter called "the entry of plea"), to the crime set forth in
section 11 immediately above.

2.

At the entry of plea, pursuant to I.C.R. Rules 5 and 11, the defendant was advised
by the Court of the following:
(a)

The nature of the charge against the defendant, the minimum and maximum
punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply;

(b)

That the defendant was not required to make any statement and that any
statement made by the defendant may be used against the defendant in a
court of law;

(c)

That the defendant was presumed to be innocent;

(d)

That by entering a plea of guilty to the above identified charge, the
defendant would:
(i)

Waive the right to a trial by jury;

(ii)

Waive the right to require the State to prove each material element of
the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt;

(iii)

Waive the right to free Court appointed counsel to represent the
defendant through a jury trial if the defendant was indigent;

(iv)

Waive the right to a speedy trial;

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION - 2
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(v)

Waive the right to challenge the evidence presented by the State, and
specifically the right to confront and cross examine the witnesses who
testified against the defendant;

(vi)

Waive the right to present evidence on the defendant's own behalf,
specifically including the right to subpoena witnesses at the County's
expense;

(vii)

Waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination;

(viii)

Waive any and all possible defenses to the charge brought against
the defendant, both factual and legal;

(ix)

Lose the right to appeal except as to the sentence imposed.

3.

The Court inquired of whether any promises had been made to the defendant or
whether the plea was a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the
nature of the agreement; and that the defendant was informed that the Court was
not bound by any promises or recommendations from either party as to
punishment; and

4.

The defendant was advised, in accordance with I.C.R. 11 (d)(2), that if the Court did
not accept the sentencing recommendation or request, the defendant nevertheless
had no right to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea on that basis.

5.

The defendant stated and acknowledged that the plea was knowingly and
voluntarily given; and that the plea was given of the defendant's own free will and
volition.

6.

That there was a factual basis to support the said plea;

7.

Whereupon the defendant entered a plea of guilty to said charge.

8.

The Court also found that the plea was entered upon the advice and consent of the
defendant's counsel.

9.

Whereupon the Court accepted the plea of guilty and found and adjudged the
defendant Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas, guilty of the crime identified and set forth in
section II "Arraignment for Sentencing" above.

IV. SENTENCING DATE PROCEEDINGS

On November 23, 2015, the sentencing date, and after the arraignment for
sentencing as set forth in section II "Arraignment for Sentencing" above, the Court
proceeded as follows:
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER OF SUPERVISED PROBATION - 3
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1.

Determined that more than two (2) days had elapsed from the plea to the date of
sentencing. I.C. § 19-2501 and I.C.R. Rule 33(a)(1).

2.

Discussed the presentence report and relevant matters with the parties pursuant to
I.C. § 20-220 and I.C.R. Rule 32.

3.

Determined victim's rights and restitution issues pursuant to I.C. § 19-5301 and
Article 1, § 22 of the Idaho Constitution.

4.

Offered an aggravation and/or mitigation hearing to both parties, including the right
to present evidence pursuant to I.C.R. 33(a)(1).

5.

Heard comments and sentencing recommendations of both counsel and asked the
defendant personally if the defendant wished to make a statement and/or to present
any information in mitigation of punishment. I.C.R. Rule 33(a)(1 ).

6.

The Court made its comments pursuant to I.C. § 19- 2512, and discussed one or
more of the criteria set forth in I.C. § 19-2521.

V. THE SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows:
The Defendant is guilty of the Crime of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
felony and a Judgment of Conviction shall enter.

1.

Court costs: The defendant shall pay court costs in the sum of $285.50.

2.

Fine: The defendant is fined the sum of $1,000 with $1,000 suspended, and the
defendant shall pay all costs, fees and fines ordered by this Court. The fine will
become due and payable if the defendant, Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas, is ejected
from the Blaine County Drug Court program. This judgment that the defendant pay
a fine and costs shall constitute a lien in like manner as a judgment for money in a
civil action. I.C. § 19-2518, I.C. § 19-2702.

3.

Penitentiary: The defendant, Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas, shall be committed to
the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction, Boise, Idaho for a unified
sentence (I.C. § 19-2513) of 5 years; which unified sentence is comprised of a
minimum (fixed) period of confinement of 3 years, followed by an indeterminate
period of custody of 2 years, with the precise time of the indeterminate portion to be
set by said Board according to law, with the total sentence not to exceed 5 years.
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4.

Credit for time served: The defendant is given credit for time previously served
on this crime in the amount of 2 days. I.C. § 18-309.

The credit for time served is calculated as follows:
July 31, 2014-August 1, 2014
5.

2days

Sentence suspended/terms of supervised probation: Provided however, that
the execution of said prison portion of the sentence is hereby suspended (the
costs and fine portion is not suspended) and the defendant is placed on supervised
probation for a period of 3 years beginning on November 23, 2015 to and under the
control of the Idaho State Board of Correction, (I.C. § 19-2601 (5) and I.C. § 20219), subject to the following terms:

General Terms and Conditions of Probation:

a)

Supervision Level: The defendant shall successfully complete any specialized
supervision level deemed appropriate for the Defendant's needs by the Department
of Probation and Parole.

b)

General Conditions: The defendant shall abide by the General Conditions of
Probation promulgated by the Idaho Department of Corrections and by Judge
Elgee's General Conditions of Probation. Where IDOC's probation conditions are
inconsistent with Judge Elgee's probation conditions, Judge Elgee's conditions will
govern. Additionally, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(5), the defendant must enter into
and comply with an agreement of supervision with the board of correction.

Special Terms and Conditions of Probation:

a) Time allowed for payment of court costs, fines and restitution: The defendant
must pay all court costs, fines and restitution within 30 months of the date of this
judgment. To that end, and beginning on the date of February 10, 2016, and
continuing on the 1oth day of each calendar month thereafter, the defendant shall
make monthly payments to the clerk of the court in the sum of at least $75.00, until
all court costs, fines and restitution are paid in full. _ _
b) Discretionary time: Defendant is ordered to serve up to thirty (30) days of
discretionary time at the discretion of defendant's assigned probation officer, as a
sanction for violating a term or condition of probation, subject to the requirements of
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e). In no event may discretionary time be imposed or served
that exceeds three (3) consecutive days.
c)

Blaine County Drug Court: The defendant shall attend and complete the Blaine
County Drug Court program.
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d)

Community Service: The defendant shall perform 100 hours of community service
at the direction of the defendant's probation officer pursuant to I.C. § 37-2738(5).

e) Other Special Terms:

VI. ORDER REGARDING RESTITUTION
1.

Restitution to Victim: The Court hereby ORDERS a Judgment of Restitution to
be entered in this case in the sum of $200.00, (I.C. § 19-5304 (victim)). A separate
written order of restitution shall be entered. I.C. § 19-5304(2). This amount is
payable through the Clerk of the District Court to be disbursed to the victim(s) in this
matter as follows:
Name: Idaho State Forensic Services (lab no. M2014-2359)

$200.00

VII. RIGHT TO APPEAULEAVE TO APPEAL INFORMA PAUPERIS
The Right:
The Court advises the defendant, of the Defendant's right to appeal this judgment
within forty two (42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court. I.AR. Rule
14 (a).

In forma Pauperis:
The Court further advises the defendant of the right of a person who is unable to
pay the costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, meaning the
right as an indigent to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and the right to be
represented by a court appointed attorney at no cost to the defendant. I.C.R. 33(a)(3). I.C.
§ 19-852(a)(1) and (b)(2).

VIII. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT - RECORD BY CLERK
The Court orders the Judgment and record be entered upon the minutes and that
the record be assembled, prepared and filed by the Clerk of the Court in accordance with
I.C. § 19-2519.

IX. BOND/BAIL
The conditions of bail given in this case having been satisfied, the bail is ordered
exonerated. I.C.R. 46(g).
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X. ORDER ON PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORTS
The parties are hereby ordered to return their respective copies of the presentence
investigative reports to the deputy clerk of the court. Use of said report shall thereafter be
governed by I.C.R. 32(h)(1),(2), and(3).

XII. ORDER TO DEFENDANT TO COMPLY WITH "THE IDAHO DNA
AND GENETIC MARKER DATABASE ACT OF 1996", I.C. §§ 19-5501,
et.seq.
Having been convicted of a felony crime, Defendant Osvaldo Guadalupe-Arenas is
subject to I. C. § 19-5506, which requires the defendant to provide an adequate (I.C. § 195508) DNA sample and right thumbprint impression at a department of law enforcement
designated location, which sample and impression shall be collected in accordance with
the procedures established by the bureau of forensic services. If the defendant is not
incarcerated at the time of sentencing, the defendant is hereby further ordered to report
within ten (10) working days to the facility designated by the department of law
enforcement for the collection of such specimens.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

{I

/t~/ ( j

--------------
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I.C.R. RULE 49 (b)
NOTICE OF ORDER
I, Deputy Clerk for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that on the Zf;day of
November, 2015, I have filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document:
Jim Thomas, Esq.
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
219 1st Ave South, Suite 201
Hailey, ID 83333

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Fax
1.. Email

Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 5988
Ketchum, ID 83340
aparnes@mindspring.com

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Fax
Email

Kevin Wayt
Probation Officer
dist5@idoc.idaho.gov

A-

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Fax
_1.Email

t

Blaine County Sheriff's Office
Hailey, Id 83333

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Fax
lEmail

CCD Sentencing Team

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Fax
'i,. Email

ccdsentencingd5@idoc.idaho.gov
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
ST A TE OF IDAHO,

)
)
vs.
)
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
_____________)

CR / ' / -

/t)/'3

ORDER TO REPORT

The above-noted defendant having [ ] plead guilty [ ] been found guilty
sentenced for a felony offense,

[}4 been

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The DEFENDANT SHALL REPORT to the Idaho Department of Correction, District 5
Community Corrections, Probation and Parole (731 Shoup Ave. West, Twin Falls, Idaho, 83301,
(208) 736-3080. ext. 10) as directed by the Court, but no later than 4:30 p.m. on the second
business day following the date and time of this Order. Initial reporting may be done by phone
unless otherwise directed by the Court.
Defendant shall keep all other appointments with the Idaho Department of Correction,
District 5, and/or with any evaluators or service providers required by the Court.

Failure to obey this Court Order is punishable as contempt of court and/or by revocation of
bond/release and/or by issuance of a warrant for your arrest.
DATED

RobertJ. El~{fi
District Judge

~

Copies:
Prosecutor: Mailed( ) emailed(~ hand delivered or box( ) faxed( )
Defense Counsel: Mailed( ) en;i.ailed
hand delivered or box( ) faxed( )
Defendant: Mailed( ) emailed( ) hand~elivered or box( faxed ( )

Cli
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ORIGINAL
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-2014-1813

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

Defendant.

~ Drags, Cl9rlc District

Court Blaine ~ount,;, idaho

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

The Defendant, OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS, is to pay to the victim, Idaho
State Police Forensic Services for laboratory number M2014-2359, restitution in the
amount of two hundred dollars ($200.00) as a result of the defendant's criminal
conduct. The defendant shall make payments to the Blaine County Clerk of the Court,
201 Second Avenue South, Suite 110, Hailey, Idaho 83333.

DATED this

l3

day of November, 2015

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s ~ day of November, 2015, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Jim J. Thomas
Blaine County Prosecuting
Attorney
219 1st Avenue South, Suite 201
Hailey, ID 83333

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
I.. l"elooopy- e,--na i J

Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, ID 83340

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
___i.__ T-eleoopy ~t:. i I

Kevin Wayt
Blaine County Felony Probation
Hailey, ID 83333
Forensic Services
700 South Stratford
Meridian, ID 83642-6202
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_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

__A_ Hand Delivered
_ _ Telecopy

_X_ U.S.

Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Telecopy
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Fifth Judicial District Court, State _of Idah1·
In and For the County of Blame
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106
Hailey, Idaho 83333

I
·

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs.
Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas
PO Box 456
Hailey, ID 83333
Defendant.

F11.£D ~-t:m'.zj
t.'('1J '1
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.kJl.ym Drags, Cl9rlc District
Co11rt RIA/na ~')rmtv /d::1ho

)
) Case No: CR-2014-0001813
)
) ORDER OF ACCEPTANCE INTO
)DRUGCOURTPROGRAM
)
)
)

The above-named defendant has been accepted by the Drug Court Team and has completed
the requirements for acceptance to Drug Court and good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas shall report to Drug Court'lti=

~./

~

~_j

Blaine County Judicial Building, District Courtroom, 201 2nd Ave South, Hailey, Idah/on the

5

day o f ~

,20_,at

L(

PtA 91@

J-/vii-

2-~J__day of _ _~_JJwJw-______, 20/~

DATED this _ _

- ·1~ <i

@"-':f
- ~ Q--s.1, vl:Th Ml·

-h~.

- ~ ~ ~·...rd- ~ ~ j @ 4 f'fVJ
- S 4v' ~
r~J: t>J.\0yt~
1

-

~r

~ kt,../JJft

~s ~ ~

cc: prosecutor, defense coun.sel1' defendant, felony probation and parole, county misdemeanor
probation, Sonya Wilander-drug court coordinator
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Jolynn D,age, Cleric District
Ct'Jurl B/r,/n,:, :nuntv. id8ho

ADDENDUM TO FELONY PROBATION RE: DRUG COURT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant is to participate in Drug Court and is
ordered as a further condition of probation to do the following:

Contact the Drug Court Coordinator within 48 hours of the file stamp on this
Judgment to have the program explained to you and begin the entrance process. The
Blaine County Drug Court Coordinator's name is Sonya Wilander. Her contact
number is 208-481-0182. She will help guide you through this process and complete
any steps you have not completed yet, which could include:

*Getting an LSI from the State Probation and Parole Office.
*Attending two recovery support meetings per week.
*Beginning urinalysis testing.
*Working with the Drug Court Coordinator to secure funding.
*Getting a drug court screening from the Department of Health & Welfare.
*Getting an assessment from the treatment provider.
*Complying with any further requests or programs ordered by Drug Court.
*Completing all paperwork for eligibility.
*Understanding Drug Court could last 18 months.

Contact the Blaine County Probation Department at 219 South 1st Ave, Ste.
108, Hailey, Idaho, to sign up for and begin urinalysis testing immediately!
You must abstain from alcohol and illegal drugs. Failed or missed tests will
have immediate consequences!

Begin attending Drug Court sessions commencing immediately after receiving
this Judgment. Sessions are every Thursday at 4 p.m. at the Blaine County
Courthouse, 201 2°d Ave South, Hailey, Idaho.
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Andrew Parnes

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law ·

70b.•L.
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P. D02i005

FIL

671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchwn, Idaho 83 340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

NOV 2 5 2015

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

Defendant.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, BLAINE COUNTY, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF IDAHO AND THE CLERK OF THE
DIS1RICT COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendant/Appellant, Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas,

appeals against the Plaintiff/Respondent, State of Idaho, to the Idaho Supreme Court from
the final judgment sentencing Mr. Arenas to probation after conviction by guilty plea,

entered on November 24, 2015, by the Honorable Robert J. Elgee, District Judge,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
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Andrew Parnes
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in the above-entitled case.
2.

The party has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgment above-described is an appealable order tmder and pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 1 l(a)(2) as a conditional plea and Idaho Appellate Rule l l(c)(l) as a fmal judgment

of conviction.
3.

A preliminary statement of issues on appeal includes:
A.

Whether the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress

evidence by Order dated April 16, 2015.

4.

A Reporter's Transcript. is requested of the follO\vings hearings before the

district court:
a.

The December 25, 2014 hearing on Mr. Arenas's motion to suppress.

The court reporter is Susan Israel. The transcript is estimated to be less than 100 pages
and has not been prepared.
5.

Petitioner requests the standard designation of the Clerk's Record pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 28 and in addition the Defendant's Memorandum regarding the
motions filed on June 7, 2015; the State's Memorandum filed on June 20, 2015; and
Defendant's Reply Memorandum filed on June 27, 2015.

6.

I certify:
a.

That I have served a copy of this Notice on the court reporter;

b.

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated reporter's

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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l l 1_,

P,ndrew Parnes

,I

transcript and clerk's record fees because the appellant is indigent. Mr. Arenas was
represented by appointed counsel in Magistrate and District Court;
c.

That the appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee

because the appellant is indigent as set forth above;
d.

That service has been made upon all parties, including the

Prosecuting Attorney and the Attorney General, required to be served pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 20.
7.

Furthermore, Mr. Arenas requests appointment of the State Appellate

Public Defender's Office to represent him on appeal as he is indigent.
DATED this 25th day of November, 2

ew Parnes
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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FAX No. 2Cl8 726 1187

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Emily Dion, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Blaine, Idaho; I
am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; my business address is
671 First Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340; on November 25, 2015, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing:
TO:
Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine Cowity Prosecuting Attorney
20 I znd A venue South, Suite 100
Hailev,
~. ID 83333

_L By sending a facsimile copy of the same to said attorney at his
facsimile number: 788-5554.
AND:

Lawrence Wasden
Attome.y General
State of Idaho
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-00 I 0

_1_ By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, at the post office at Ketchum, Idaho.
AND TO:
Susan Israel, CSR
P.O. Box 1379
Ketchum, ID 83340

~

By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, at the post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

E.,trr:B'==

Emily Di~

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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FAX No. 202, 7~t, l l :37

Andrew Parnes

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchwn, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2014-1813

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

COMES NOW, Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas, by and through his attorney, Andrew
Parnes, and hereby moves this Court for its order pursuant to Idaho Code §19-867,
appointing the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to represent the appellant in all
further appellate proceedings and allowing current counsel for the defendant to withdraw

as counsel of record. This motion is brought on the grounds and for the reasons that the
appellant is currently represented by appointed attomey Andrew Parnes; the State
Appellate Public Defender is authorized by Idaho Code §19-870 to represent the

MOTION FOR APPOINTI'vfENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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P,ndrew Parnes

defendant in felony appellate proceedings; the defendant has been found indigent; and it
is in the interest of justice for them to do so in this case.
The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for the purposes of the
appeal only.
DATED this 30th day of November, 2015.

~~h~~r.. __-------.. ,

~-.An:orew Pa.mes

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STA TE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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Andrew Parnes
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on ~ \
I served a true and correct
copy of foregoing by the method indicated bel6w, and addressed to each of the
following:

TuC:

Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney
20 I znct A venue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333

U.S. lVIail Postage Prepaid
-1C'" Telecopy

20"8-788-5554
Sara Thomas
State Appellate Public Defender
364 7 Lake Hm·bor Lane
Boise, ID 83703

_/u.s. Mail Postage Prepaid

Osvaldo Guadelupe Arenas
P.O. Box 456
Hailey, ID 83333

~U.S. MaiI Postage Prepaid

Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-00 I 0

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid

Clerk of the Court
Idaho State Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid

~1c&~

Emily Dion '

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

-
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,ll,ndrew Parnes

II,

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)
)
)
_)

OSVALDO GUADALlJPE ARENAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR- 2014-1813
ORDER FOR APP0INTJ\1ENT OF
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

THIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to Appellant's Motion for
Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender, the Court having reviewed the
pleadings on file and the motion; the Court being fully apprised in the matter and good

cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Andrew Parnes is withdrawn as cotmsel of record
for the Defendant and the State Appellate Public Defender us hereby appointed to
represent the Appellant, Osvaldo Guadalupe Arenas, in the above-entitled matters for

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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Andrew Parnes

FAX No. 208 7:t, 112:7

appellate purposes.
The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for the purposes of
appeal only.
DATEDthis~{_dayof

~ ,2015.
Honorable Ro e
District Judge

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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P.ndrew Pa.mes

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

o\

I hereby certify that on
\ 2....\
21) I~
, I served a true and correct
copy of foregoing Order by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Andrew Parnes
P .0. Box 5988
Ketchwn, Idaho 83340
208 726-1187

/

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Telecopy

w/~~:fi)i~4~~paid

Jim Thomas
Office of the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney

Telecopy

201 2nd A venue South, Suite 100
Hailey, ID 83333

208-788-5554

Sara Thomas

/

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid

State Appellate Public Defender

364 7 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
Osvaldo Guadelupe Arenas
P.O. Box 456
Hailey, ID 83333
Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Clerk of the Court
Idaho State Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid

/

~

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid

__.c::' U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid

CQ~Aq~

Deputy Clerk

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Plaintiff/ Respondent,

Supreme Court No. 43751

)

)
)
)
)

vs.
OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,
Defendant/ Appellant,

)

________________

)
)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho
in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the following documents will be submitted as
exhibits to the Record:

Confidential Exhibits
-(PG 2 SEALED) Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered and Notice of Sentencing
-Application for Public Defender
-PSI Report
Preliminary Hearing- 10/8/2014
EXH. 1- Results from Idaho State Lab-ADMITTED
EXH. A- Sgt. Ornelas' Diagram- ADMITTED
Motion to Suppress Hearing- 12/15/2014
Exh. A- Video (HPD)- ADMITTED
Exh. B- Audio (HPD)-ADMITTED
Court's Exhibits
-Transcript- Preliminary Hearing 10/8/2014

"1

n. IN WITN~HEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this
day of
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, 2016.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff/ Respondent,

vs.

Supreme Court No. 43751

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

_______________
Defendant/ Appellant,

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Blaine

)
)
)
)

)
) ss.
)

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of
the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant.
I do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause and
exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along
with the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal.
IN WITNESS
Court at Hailey, Idaho, this

YJf EREOF
' 2 jve hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
a'1 ·
, 2016.
day of
Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court

By

~Y2:3~

CrystalRigby,Oeputlerk

1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.

OSVALDO GUADALUPE ARENAS,

________________
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 43751
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)

I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed , by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and
Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Idaho State Appellate Public
Defender's Office
PO Box 2816
Boise , Idaho 83701

Attorney General's Office
CRIMINAL APPEALS
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1
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